D.M. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Human Res.
Decision Date | 03 March 2017 |
Docket Number | 2150931 |
Parties | D.M. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Wendy Allison Reese, Birmingham, for appellant.
Sharon E. Ficquette, chief legal counsel, and Karen P. Phillips, asst. atty. gen., Department of Human Resources, for appellee.
D.M. appeals from judgments entered by the Jefferson Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") in four separate juvenile-court cases—case numbers JU–09–92919.03, JU–09–92920.03, JU–09–92921.03, and JU–14–607.03. We affirm the judgments entered in case numbers JU–09–92919.03, JU–09–92920.03, and JU–09–92921.03; however, because we determine that D.M. lacked standing to appeal from the judgment entered in case number JU–14–607.03, we dismiss the appeal insofar as it arises from the judgment entered in that case.
In case number JU–14–607.03 ("the B.M. case"), the Jefferson County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") filed a petition regarding B.M. seeking to terminate the parental rights of A.M. ("the mother"); D.M., who DHR identified as B.M.'s "alleged father"; and any unknown father. At the termination hearing in that case, which was consolidated with the other three cases addressed in this appeal, the testimony revealed that the mother and D.M. had divorced in August 2010 and that B.M. was born on July 23, 2011. The mother and D.M.'s judgment of divorce lists them as having only three children, and D.M. was not listed as B.M.'s father on B.M.'s birth certificate. DHR filed a motion for service by publication asserting that B.M.'s father was unknown and that service by publication on the unknown father was necessary; the juvenile court granted that motion. Tiarra Thomas, a social-service caseworker for DHR, also testified at the termination hearing that B.M.'s father was unknown. On July 16, 2016, the juvenile court entered a judgment in the B.M. case terminating the parental rights of the mother and any unknown father to B.M.; D.M. was not mentioned in that judgment. Nevertheless, D.M. filed a postjudgment motion in the B.M. case, and has appealed from the judgment entered in that case.
S.B.U. v. D.G.B., 913 So.2d 452, 455 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
"Standing ... turns on ‘whether the party has been injured in fact and whether the injury is to a legally protected right.’ " State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Dr., 740 So.2d 1025, 1027 (Ala. 1999) (quoting Romer v. Board of Cty. Comm'rs of the Cty. of Pueblo, 956 P.2d 566, 581 (Colo. 1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting)).
"
Boschert Merrifield Consultants, Inc. v. Masonite Corp., 897 So.2d 1048, 1051–52 (Ala. 2004). D.M. was not a party to the judgment in the B.M. case. Moreover, there is no indication that D.M. is the presumed father of B.M., see § 26–17–204, Ala. Code 1975, or that he established or sought to establish his paternity of B.M. at any time. Accordingly, the notice of appeal filed by D.M., insofar as it pertained to the B.M. case, failed to invoke this court's appellate jurisdiction, and the appeal, insofar as it pertains to the judgment entered in the B.M. case, is due to be dismissed. See Boschert, 897 So.2d at 1052. Compare W.T.M. v. S.P., 802 So.2d 1091, 1093–94 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) ( ).
Case Numbers JU–09–92919.03, JU–09–92920.03, and JU–09–92921.03
On December 10, 2015, DHR filed separate petitions seeking to terminate the parental rights of D.M. and the mother to N.M., M.M., and S.M. ("the children"); those petitions were assigned case numbers JU–09–92919.03, JU–09–92920.03, and JU–09–92921.03, respectively. Following a hearing on June 14, 2016, the juvenile court entered separate judgments on July 16, 2016, terminating the parental rights of the mother and D.M. to the children. D.M. filed a postjudgment motion that referenced all three case numbers; that motion was denied. D.M. timely filed a notice of appeal from the judgments.
D.M. argues on appeal that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights to the children because, he says, there were viable alternatives to termination.
B.M. v. State, 895 So.2d 319, 331 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004). A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, which is " ‘ "[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion." ’ " C.O. v. Jefferson Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 206 So.3d 621, 627 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So.2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6–11–20(b)(4) ).
Ex parte McInish, 47 So.3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court does not reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile court could have found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971 So.2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus evidence, this court presumes their correctness. Id. We review the legal conclusions to be drawn from the evidence without a presumption of correctness. J.W. v. C.B., 68 So.3d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).
The juvenile court determined in its judgments, among other things, that D.M. had abandoned the children, that there were no suitable relative resources willing and able to receive custody of the children, and that there were no viable alternatives to termination of D.M.'s parental rights. D.M. first argues on appeal that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights despite the willingness of his sister, J.W. ("the paternal aunt"), to accept custody of the children. D.M. also argues that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights because it failed to consider maintaining the status quo as a viable alternative to termination. Both issues raised by D.M. speak to the existence of viable alternatives to termination of parental rights. We note, however, that when, as here, a juvenile court has determined that a parent abandoned his or her children, this court has concluded that consideration of viable alternatives to termination is not required. Thus, "by abandoning [his children], [D.M.] ‘lost any due-process rights that would have required the juvenile court to explore other alternatives before terminating [his] parental rights.’ " L.L. v. J.W., 195 So.3d 269, 274 (Ala....
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