Padilla v. School Dist. #1 et al., No. 1
| Decision Date | 05 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 99-1061,No. 1 |
| Citation | 233 F.3d 1268 |
| Parties | Page 1268 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) SHAYNE PADILLA, by and through her legal guardians and next friends MICHELLE PADILLA and MARIANO PADILLA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 IN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO; DENVER SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF DUCATION; JEAN BOGGS, individually and in her official capacity as employee of School Districtin the City and County of Denver, Defendants, and PATRICE HALL; CYNTHIA ROSE; MARIA DIAZ; JEANNIE HAYES, individually and in their official capacities as employeees of School Districtin the City and County of Denver, Defendants - Appellants, LEGAL CENTER FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND OLDER PEOPLE; COLORADO DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES PLANNING COUNCIL; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS; CENTER FOR LAW AND EDUCATION; TASH; THE ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY LIVING IN BOULDER COUNTY, INC.; ARC OF DENVER; ARC OF ADAMS COUNTY; ARC OF ARAPAHOE & DOUGLAS COUNTIES; ARC OF COLORADO; ARC OF THE UNITED STATES; NAMI COLORADO; NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL; ROCKY MOUNTAIN CHILDREN'S LAW CENTER; NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION; COLORADO ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL BOARDS, Amici Curiae. & 99-1345 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO. (D.C. No. 98-WY-1262-CB)
Patrick B. Mooney (Julie C. Tolleson and Elizabeth J. Hyatt with him on the briefs) of Semple, Miller & Mooney, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants.
Kathleen Mullen of Law Office of Kathleen Mullen, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Richard F. Hennessey and Kathryn A. Wingard of Pendleton, Friedberg, Wilson & Hennessey, P.C., filed an amicus curiae brief for Rocky Mountain Children's Law Center.
Kathleen B. Boundy, Co-Director, Center for Law and Education, Boston, Massachusetts, and Michael W. Breeskin, General Counsel, Association for Community Living in Boulder County, Inc., filed an amicus curiae brief for Center for Law and Education, Tash, and the Association for Community Living in Boulder County, Inc.
Kristin A. Kutz and William P. Bethke of Kutz & Bethke, Lakewood, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for Arc of Denver, Arc of Adams County, Arc of Arapahoe & Douglas Counties, Arc of Colorado, Arc of the United States, NAMI Colorado, and National Alliance for the Mentally Ill.
Julie K. Underwood, General Counsel, National School Boards Association, Alexandria, Virginia; Lauren B. Kingsbery and Julie Murphy Seavy, Legal Counsel, Colorado Association of School Boards, Denver, Colorado; and Julie J. Weatherly, School Board Attorney, Weatherly Law Firm, Atlanta, Georgia, filed an amicus curiae brief for National School Boards Association and Colorado Association of School Boards.
Chester R. Chapman, Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for The Legal Center for People with Disabilites and Older People, the Colorado Developmental Disabilities Planning Council, and National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems.
Before BALDOCK, McKAY, and ALARCON* , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff, a minor with physical and developmental disabilities, formerly attended school in Denver School District No. 1. She brought an action against the school district and the board of education, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213. She also brought an action against the district, the board, and several individual district employees, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on Defendants' failure to provide rights guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1487. Defendants moved to dismiss on various grounds, including qualified immunity, but the district court denied their motion except as to one of the individual defendants. This court has jurisdiction over the remaining individual defendants' qualified immunity appeal pursuant to Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), and over the appeal of the district court's other determinations pursuant to its certification for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b).1
In 1975, Congress enacted the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), the IDEA's predecessor.2 Its primary purpose is "to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them . . . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs [and] to assure that the rights of children with disabilities and their parents or guardians are protected." 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B).3 To implement these goals, Congress mandated that state and local educational agencies receiving assistance under the IDEA establish procedures to ensure the provision of such services and the protection of these rights. See id. 1415(a). To identify necessary services, the IDEA requires representatives of the responsible educational agencies, in meetings with parents and teachers, to develop an individualized education program (IEP) for each child with a disability. The IEP includes a written statement of the present educational level of such child, of annual goals and short-term instructional objectives, and of "specific educational services to be provided to such child." 1401(a)(20). Before developing or changing a child's IEP, the agency must provide written notice to the parents. See id. 1415(b)(1)(C). The agency must also provide parents who present complaints regarding these matters an impartial due process hearing. See id. 1415(b)(1)-(2). Any party aggrieved by the decision of a local educational agency may appeal to the state educational agency. See id. 1415(c). Further, an aggrieved party has the right to bring a civil action with respect to its complaints if the state has not provided an administrative appeals process or if the aggrieved party is dissatisfied with the findings or decision of the administrative appeal agency. See id. 1415(e).
"Because this appeal arises on a motion to dismiss, we construe the facts, and reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them, in favor of the plaintiff." Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997). According to Plaintiff, during the five-year period between 1992 and 1997, Defendants failed to provide her with the behavioral programming, augmentative communication, and tube feeding services identified in her IEP.
She also asserts Defendants repeatedly "placed her in a windowless closet, restrained in a stroller without supervision," contrary to her IEP. During one of these incidents she tipped over and hit her head on the floor, suffering serious physical injuries, including a skull fracture and exacerbation of a seizure disorder, which kept her from attending school for the remainder of the term. The school district thereafter failed to provide homebound schooling adequate to insure the free appropriate public education to which she was entitled.
In August 1997, Plaintiff moved to a new school district and began attending a different school, neither of which is a party to this action. In February 1998, she requested an administrative hearing from the defendant school district to "contest certain actions of . . . [district] personnel." In her request, Plaintiff sought "any relief" available through the administrative process, "including money damages and attorney fees." Plaintiff's hearing request was denied by the hearing officer, who ruled that he lacked jurisdiction "as the petitioner does not reside within the school district," and that he lacked authority to grant the requested relief.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the instant suit, raising two claims. First, she alleged that the school district and the board of education violated her rights under the ADA by excluding her from participation in publicly funded general and special education programs based on her disability. Second, she brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the school district, the board of education, and several individual district employees violated her rights under the IDEA by denying her a free and appropriate public education. Plaintiff specifically seeks monetary damages for both the ADA and 1983 claims.
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; (2) damages are unavailable under the IDEA and therefore unavailable in a 1983 claim based on an IDEA violation; (3) the IDEA does not allow individual liability actions, and, therefore, individuals cannot be liable under a 1983 claim based on an IDEA violation; and (4) the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's 1983 claim as it applied to one of the individual defendants but denied the motion in all other respects, and the remaining defendants brought this appeal.
"We review the denial or grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, applying the same standard used by the district court." Breidenbach, 126 F.3d at 1291. We first address the viability of Plaintiff's IDEA-based 1983 claims. The district court determined that the IDEA allows for damage awards and that it may be enforced against individuals. Therefore, the court reasoned, Plaintiff can likewise sue individuals and seek damages in a 1983 suit based on the IDEA. The district court's analysis presupposes that 1983 may be used to enforce the IDEA in the first place. This court has not previously ruled on this issue.4 Circuits that have addressed the question have not come to the same conclusion.5
It is well settled that 1983 is "a generally and presumptively available remedy for claimed violations of federal law." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994). Nonetheless, Congress can foreclose recourse to 1983 "either by express words or by providing a comprehensive alternative enforcement scheme." Id.; see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (...
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