People v. Hill

• Citation: 233 N.E.2d 367,39 Ill.2d 125
• Decision Date: 19 January 1968
• Docket Number: No. 40605,40605
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Clarence HILL, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Page 367

233 N.E.2d 367

39 Ill.2d 125

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Clarence HILL, Appellant.

No. 40605.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 19, 1968.

Edmund W. Kitch, Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and John J. Stamos, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane, Daniel W. Weil and Oliver D. Ferguson, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellee.

UNDERWOOD, Justice.

Clarence Hill was found guilty of murder by a jury in the Cook County circuit court and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 15 to 30 years. On this direct appeal he alleges that the admission into evidence of an incriminating statement which he made while in police custody, violated his constitutional rights to assistance of counsel and against self-incrimination under the doctrine of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. He asserts as a second ground for reversal that one of the instructions given to the jury on criminal accountability was an erroneous statement of the law.

At approximately 11:15 P.M. on July 3, 1966, Officer Love Davis, a 'gang officer' of the Chicago Police Department, found Charles Linear, the victim of a shooting, dead in Garfield Park. At 3:00 on the morning of July 4, Officer Davis arrested the defendant because he believed Hill to be a member of a gang in the area known as the 'Casanova Cobras.' From his home where the arrest was effected, the defendant was taken to the Maxwell Street Station for questioning.

The chronology of events on the night of July 3 leading up to the murder was supplied at the trial by the testimony of the State's witnesses. Curtis Dotson, a 16-year-old boy, testified that he was a member of a gang called the 'Roman Saints', and that on the night in question he and 15 or 20 other youths gathered on the street corner of Albany and Jackson at about 10:00 P.M. According to Dotson's testimony all of the members of the group besides himself and one other were members of the Casanova Cobras and they were armed with one pistol and one rifle which he knew about. From the time that the youths joined forces at Albany and Jackson until the fatal shooting on the edge of Garfield Park none of the boys left the group. When the gang arrived at Garfield Park they saw some young men sitting on a bench drinking beer, and as they approached the men seated on the bench Dotson heard the cry of 'Spanish Cobras' followed by gun shots which were fired from the group.

Dotson's testimony was corroborated by two other witnesses for the prosecution: James Johnson, an employee of the YMCA who worked with gangs in the vicinity, and Clifford Faulkner who was with Charles Linear at the time he was murdered. Faulkner, who was wounded in the incident, stated that he saw a gang of fellows approaching and heard them call out 'Mighty Cobras' and said he was shot as he dove to the ground in an attempt to flee. James Johnson testified that he was standing on the street two blocks from Garfield Park when he heard shots at approximately 10:30 P.M. As he proceeded in the direction of the shooting Johnson was attacked by a band of approximately 10 or 15 youths all screaming 'Cobras and Roman Saints'. In the melee Johnson sustained a stab would that required 10 stitches to treat. None of the State's witnesses was able to identify Clarence Hill as a gang member who was present when Charles Linear was murdered.

When the defendant arrived at the Maxwell Street Station between 3:00 and 3:30 A.M. he was questioned by Detective John Serafini who was conducting an investigation into the slaying. Prior to their conversation the police officer testified that he warned Hill of his constitutional rights as required by the rule of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Serafini stated that Hill responded to his questions regarding the murder by saying, 'I don't know anything about the shooting. I don't know anything.' The detective testified that between the time the youth was brought to the station and 6:00 o'clock that morning, he questioned Hill on three or four separate occasions for periods of 10 to 15 minutes each. During these periods of interrogation the detective was alone with the defendant in an interview room and inquired as to Hill's involvement as well as that of others whose names had come up in the investigation. While the defendant does not dispute the adequacy of the Miranda warnings initially given by Detective Serafini, it is clear that the police officer did not renew the warnings each time he returned to the interview room to resume questioning Hill. Detective Serafini testified that during his second conversation with the defendant, Hill stated that he was with a girl at the time of the shooting. At the trial the defendant admitted that he had given such an account of his whereabouts to the police officer because he was scared, but that he was really at a hamburger grill when the murder occurred. Although Hill named two persons in the restaurant with whom he testified he was carrying on a conversation at the time the murder was taking place, neither of the named persons was called to testify.

The major question raised in this appeal relates to an incriminating admission which Detective Serafini testified was made by the defendant at about 6:00 A.M. after the officer had finished questioning Hill and other police had been called to transport defendant from the Maxwell Street Station to the police lockup at 11th and State streets. The detective's testimony follows: 'I had called for a squadrol to transport Mr. Hill back to the 11th District, and as Mr. Hill saw the patrolmen come up the stairs he called to me, and when I went back into the room he told me, he says 'Serafini, look, I was there, but I didn't do the shooting.' He said, 'The stud that was standing next to me did the shooting.' * * * He said, 'I told him to only wop him on the head a few times.' * * * He identified the man with the gun as Willie Clemons.'

Both the State and the defense cite the Miranda decision as authority for holding that the trial court's action in admitting this incriminating statement was either correct or improper. Counsel for the defendant relies heavily on the warning of Miranda that 'If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. * * * But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.' 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724.

By asserting that the defendant's adminission was a 'volunteered statement', the prosecution attempts to avoid the burden of showing that his incriminating words were spoken voluntarily after a knowing waiver of constitutional rights. The State contends that the defendant's statement to Detective Serafini comes within an exception for volunteered statements which the Miranda majority would allow into evidence even when not preceded by the four warnings now required as a prerequisite for the admission of statements elicited during in-custody interrogation. In the following passage Miranda apparently sets forth a distinction between 'volunteered statements' that are not the product of police questioning, and those confessions which are voluntarily given in response to interrogation by law enforcement officials:

'In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.' (384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.) In support of its contention that the defendant's damaging admission was the type of volunteered statement which is left unaffected by Miranda, the State notes that the conditions under which it was given include (1) that the statement was made after all the questioning had ceased; (2) that the defendant knew all questioning had terminated; (3) that the defendant was in the process of being taken out of the police station; (4) that the defendant had to call the officer back into the room in order to give him the statement; (5) that the defendant was not subjected to interrogation after he made the statement; (6) that the trial judge found that the statement was made 'after' a series of interrogations.

While the State's argument that the defendant's statement falls within the confines of the niche carved out in Miranda for volunteered statements is not without merit, and although future clarifications of the 'volunteered statement' exception may show that Hill's in-custody admission comes appropriately within that category, we prefer to predicate our affirmance on a different basis. Under the circumstances here it is possible to equate Hill's inculpatory admission with the incriminating statement of a person who enters or calls a police station to confess a crime, or analogize it to a suspect's spontaneous statement to police before any...