233 N.E.2d 422 (Ill. 1968), 39983, City of Chicago v. Gregory

Docket Nº:39983, 39984.
Citation:233 N.E.2d 422, 39 Ill.2d 47
Party Name:The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee, v. Dick GREGORY et al., Appellants.
Case Date:January 19, 1968
Court:Supreme Court of Illinois

Page 422

233 N.E.2d 422 (Ill. 1968)

39 Ill.2d 47

The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee,

v.

Dick GREGORY et al., Appellants.

Nos. 39983, 39984.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January 19, 1968.

Page 423

Marshall Patner and Paul E. Goldstein, Chicago, for appellants.

Raymond F. Simon, Corp. Counsel of the City of Chicago (Sydney R. Drebin and Howard C. Goldman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of counsel), for appellee.

HOUSE, Justice.

[39 Ill.2d 48] These consolidated appeals involve the conviction of 40 civil rights marchers under two provisions of the disorderly conduct ordinance of the city of Chicago. (Municipal Code of Chicago, sec. 193--1.) In cause number 39983 defendant Dick Gregory and four other defendants were found guilty in a jury trial before a magistrate in the circuit court of Cook County and each defendant was fined $200. In cause number 39984 the other 35 defendants were found guilty in a trial before a magistrate on a stipulation of facts adduced at the Gregory trial and each defendant was fined $25. The defendant Gregory was charged with disorderly conduct in that he 'did make or aid in making an improper noise, disturbance, breach of peace, or diversion tendidng to a breach of peace, or diversion tending to a city.' A constitutional question gives us jurisdiction.

The gist of the occurrence giving rise to the arrest and conviction of defendants was a march by 65 to 85 persons around the home of the mayor of Chicago. The marchers carried signs, sang songs and chanted slogans protesting the retention of Dr. Benjamin C. Willis as Superintendent of Schools of Chicago and his handling of school segregation problems in the city. In order to avert what the police believed would become a riot, the marchers were ordered to stop their demonstration and upon their refusal they were arrested.

The city in its brief has taken the position that residential picketing is Per se a violation of the city ordinance. Extremely strong arguments have been advanced for the proposition that the constitutional rights of free speech, free assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances do not protect marches, demonstrations and picketing of a residence or residences--even of the privately owned homes of public officials. (See Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 N.W.L.Rev. 177 (1966); Cf. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 406--407; Pritchett, The Brief, p. 4 (published [39 Ill.2d 49] by the Illinois Division of American Civil Liberties Union, September 1965); but see Haiman, The Rhetoric of the Streets: Some Legal and Ethical Considerations, LIII The Law Quarterly Journal of Speech 99 (April 1966); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 Supreme Court Review 1.) Furthermore, our legislature has now enacted a statute prohibiting residential picketing (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, chap. 38, par.

Page 424

21.1--1) based on the following declaration of policy: 'The Legislature finds and declares that men in a free society have the right to quiet enjoyment of their homes; that the stability of community and family life cannot be maintained unless the right to privacy and a sense of security and peace in the home are respected and encouraged; that residential picketing, however just the cause inspiring it, disrupts home, family and communal life; that residential picketing is inappropriate in our society where the jealously guarded rights of free speech and assembly have always been associated with respect for the right of others. For these reasons the Legislature finds this Article to be necessary.' Professor Kamin in his article, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, states that nine other States (Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Utah and Wisconsin) have enacted statutory prohibitions of residential picketing, 61 N.W.L.Rev. 177, 206.

A review of the record shows, however, that the arrests were not made on the basis of residential picketing nor did the trial proceed on that theory. Under these circumstances, we will assume, for the purposes of this opinion, as did the police and the magistrates below, that the residential picketing was not in and of itself a violation of the city ordinance.

Lieutenant Hougeson testified that on August 2, 1965, he was in charge of the 'task force' of the Chicago police department and that his assignment for that day was to protect a group of people who were going to march. He explained[39 Ill.2d 50] that the task force is a unit which provides extra police protection to a district to help handle crowds at a sporting or public event or to combat a high crime rate in a certain district. On this day he had 40 police officers and 4 sergeants. About 4:00 P.M. he went to Buckingham Fountain in Grant Park on Chicago's lake front just east of the Loop, where approximately 65 marchers had assembled. He observed Dick Gregory addressing the marchers and heard him say, 'First we will go over to the snake pit (city hall). When we leave there, we will go out to the snake's house (the mayor's home). Then, we will continue to go out to Mayor Daley's home until he fires Ben Willis (Superintendent of Schools).'

About 4:30 P.M. the marchers, two abreast, walked out of the park and went to the city hall in the loop. The marchers then walked south on State Street to 35th Street and then proceeded west to Lowe Avenue, a distance of about 5 miles from the city hall. The mayor's home is at 3536 South Lowe Avenue. The demonstrators had increased in number to about 85 and they arrived at the mayor's home about 8:00 o'clock P.M. In addition to the police, the marchers were accompanied by their attorney and an assistant city counsel. At the suggestion of an assistant city counsel, Gregory had agreed that the group would quit singing at 8:30 P.M. Commander Pierson, district commander of the 9th police district which encompasses this area, met Lieutenant Hougeson at the corner of 35th and Lowe and assumed command of the police operations.

There were about 35 people on the corner and a group of about 6 or 8 youngsters carrying a sign 'We Love Mayor Daley' tried to join the marchers but the police stopped them. As the demonstrators started south into the 3500 block of Lowe Avenue, Gregory testified he went back through the line to tell everyone just to keep signing and to keep marching. 'Don't stop and don't answer any one back. Don't worry about anything that is going to be said [39 Ill.2d 51] to you. Just keep marching. If anyone hits you or anything, try to remember what they look like, but above all means, do not hit them back. Keep the line straight and keep it tight.' The demonstrators chanted 'Ben Willis must go, Snake Daley also;' 'Ben Willis must go--When?--Now;' 'We are going to the home of the snake, the snake pit is down the street;' 'Hey, Hey, what do you know, Ben Willis must go' and 'Hey, Hey, what do you know, Mayor Daley must go also.' They carried signs which read:

Page 425

'Daley fire Willis;' 'Defacto, Desmacto, it is still segregation;' 'Ben Willis must go--now;' and 'Mayor Daley, fire Ben Willis.' They also sang the civil rights songs, 'We Shall Overcome' and 'We Shall Not Be Moved.'

The police ordered the taverns closed during the march. Police from the task force, the 9th district and other districts surrounded the block in which the mayor's home is located. There were about 10 officers at each of the four intersections and about 10 officers spread along each of the four blocks. The rest of the 100 police officers assigned to the march accompanied the demonstrators as they marched around the block. The police tried to keep all spectators across the street from the marchers. They were equipped with walkie-talkie radios to relay reports of conditions to each other and they had a bullhorn with which they addressed the spectators and the demonstrators.

As the marchers started around the block the first time, the neighbors began coming out of their homes. On the second time around the block some of the residents had moved their lawn sprinklers onto the sidewalk and the demonstrators went into the street just long enough to get around the water. On the third trip around the block the water sprinklers had been removed, presumably by order of the police. Gregory himself testified to several instances when the police kept the crowd that was accumulating from interfering with the march. 'One of the neighborhood people stood in front of the line, and we just stopped. This [39 Ill.2d 52] individual didn't move and we didn't move. After a few minutes, the officer standing on the corner asked him to move and he moved.' He said that on their fourth trip around the block (about 8:30 P.M.) people were yelling out the windows and the police made spectators in door ways close the doors. About 8:30 P.M. the demonstrators quit their singing and chanting and marched quietly. Shortly before 9:00 P.M. 100 to 150 spectators formed a line of march ahead of the demonstrators. Gregory said 'the lieutenant (Hougheson) asked me if I would hold up the line until they got those people out of the way. I said, I will hold up the line, but they have just as much right to march peacefully as we have.' The spectators were ordered to move. In order to avoid the appearance that the marchers were following the 100 to 150 spectators who had been ordered to move, Gregory said his group marched straight south crossing 36th Street thus taking them one block south of the block which they had been marching. They had to stop when they crossed 36th Street while the police opened a pathway through about 300 spectators they had confined on the corner across the street.

Sergeant Golden testified that between 8:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock the crowd increased steadily to a few hundred, but that from 9:00 o'clock until about 9:00 o'clock the people just seemed to come from everywhere until it reached...

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  • 375 N.E.2d 1342 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1978), 76-726, People v. Mcclinton
    • United States
    • Illinois Court of Appeals of Illinois
    • 11 Abril 1978
    ...crucial hours. As in People v. Ware, the attorney "of necessity had to assume a position of ambivalence." (39 Ill.2d at 67, 233 N.E.2d at 422.) He was obligated to assist defendants in their defense, and concurrently he had an obligation to assist codefendant Banks. The State argu......
  • 408 U.S. 104 (1972), 70-5106, Grayned v. City of Rockford
    • United States
    • Federal Cases United States Supreme Court
    • 26 Junio 1972
    ...phrase "tends to disturb."18 However, in Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill.2d 1, 4, 23 N.E.2d 400, 402 (1969), and Chicago v. Gregory, 39 Ill.2d 47, 233 N.E.2d 422 (1968), reversed on other grounds, 394 U.S. 111 (1969), the Supreme Court of Illinois construed a Chicago ordinance prohibitin......
  • 394 U.S. 111 (1969), 60, Gregory v. City of Chicago
    • United States
    • Federal Cases United States Supreme Court
    • 10 Marzo 1969
    ...trial judge's charge allowed the jury to convict for acts protected by the First Amendment. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359. P. 113. 39 Ill.2d 47, 233 N.E.2d 422, WARREN, J., lead opinion MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a simple case. Petitioners, ......
  • 253 N.E.2d 400 (Ill. 1969), 41117, City of Chicago v. Meyer
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 26 Noviembre 1969
    ...protected by the first amendment. This same challenge was leveled at this disorderly conduct ordinance in City of Chicago v. Gregory, 39 Ill.2d 47, 233 N.E.2d 422, and at this 'resisting or interfering' ordinance in City of Chicago v. Lawrence, 42 Ill.2d 461, 248 N.E.2d 71, and we rejected ......
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8 cases
  • 375 N.E.2d 1342 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1978), 76-726, People v. Mcclinton
    • United States
    • Illinois Court of Appeals of Illinois
    • 11 Abril 1978
    ...crucial hours. As in People v. Ware, the attorney "of necessity had to assume a position of ambivalence." (39 Ill.2d at 67, 233 N.E.2d at 422.) He was obligated to assist defendants in their defense, and concurrently he had an obligation to assist codefendant Banks. The State argu......
  • 408 U.S. 104 (1972), 70-5106, Grayned v. City of Rockford
    • United States
    • Federal Cases United States Supreme Court
    • 26 Junio 1972
    ...phrase "tends to disturb."18 However, in Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill.2d 1, 4, 23 N.E.2d 400, 402 (1969), and Chicago v. Gregory, 39 Ill.2d 47, 233 N.E.2d 422 (1968), reversed on other grounds, 394 U.S. 111 (1969), the Supreme Court of Illinois construed a Chicago ordinance prohibitin......
  • 394 U.S. 111 (1969), 60, Gregory v. City of Chicago
    • United States
    • Federal Cases United States Supreme Court
    • 10 Marzo 1969
    ...trial judge's charge allowed the jury to convict for acts protected by the First Amendment. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359. P. 113. 39 Ill.2d 47, 233 N.E.2d 422, WARREN, J., lead opinion MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a simple case. Petitioners, ......
  • 253 N.E.2d 400 (Ill. 1969), 41117, City of Chicago v. Meyer
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 26 Noviembre 1969
    ...protected by the first amendment. This same challenge was leveled at this disorderly conduct ordinance in City of Chicago v. Gregory, 39 Ill.2d 47, 233 N.E.2d 422, and at this 'resisting or interfering' ordinance in City of Chicago v. Lawrence, 42 Ill.2d 461, 248 N.E.2d 71, and we rejected ......
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