233 U.S. 223 (1914), 727, United States v. Birdsall
|Docket Nº:||No. 727, 728, 729|
|Citation:||233 U.S. 223, 34 S.Ct. 512, 58 L.Ed. 930|
|Party Name:||United States v. Birdsall|
|Case Date:||April 06, 1914|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Submitted and argued January 8, 9, 1914
Restored to docket for reargument January 19, 1914
Reargued February 25, 1914
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
Where the district court holds that the acts charged do not fall within the condemnation of the statute on which the indictment is based, it necessarily construes that statute, and this Court has jurisdiction under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907.
Sections 39 and 117, Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1109, defining and punishing the giving and accepting of bribes, cover every action within the range of official duty.
It is not necessary in order to constitute an act of an officer of the United States official action that it be prescribed by statute; it is sufficient if it is governed by a lawful requirement, whether written or established by custom, of the department under whose authority the officer is acting.
The office of Commissioner of Indian Affairs was established to create an administrative agency with adequate powers to execute the policy of the government towards the Indians, and one of the important duties of the Indian Office is the enforcement of liquor prohibition.
The action of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in advising the
President of the United States whether or not clemency should be granted to one convicted of violating liquor laws in the Indian country is official action, and it is within the competency of the office to establish regulations requiring from all persons connected with the office true and disinterested reports to the Commissioner on which to base such advice.
The powers of the Indian Office to aid in suppressing the liquor traffic in Indian country extend to every matter to which such aid is appropriate, and the giving of recommendations to a federal judge or attorney as to sentences of those convicted of violating the liquor laws is an official duty within the meaning of §§ 39 and 117, Criminal Code, and the giving of gifts to, and acceptance thereof by, officers in that department to influence their reports and recommendations constitute bribery under, and are punishable by, such sections.
206 F. 818 reversed.
The facts, which involve the validity of indictments under §§ 39 and 117, Criminal Code for giving and accepting bribes, are stated in the opinion.
HUGHES, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Separate indictments were found against the several defendants. There were two indictments against the defendant Birdsall (which were consolidated), charging him with having given to Brents and Van Wert, respectively, a bribe in violation of § 39 of the Criminal Code. The indictments against Brents and Van Wert were for accepting the bribes in violation of § 117. Demurrer to each indictment, upon the ground that it charged no offense, was sustained by the district court. 206 F. 818. The cases are brought here under the Criminal Appeals Act. 34 Stat. 1246, c. 2564.
In view of the nature of the question presented, it is not necessary to consider the indictments separately. According to the allegations, Birdsall was attorney for certain persons who, on indictment for unlawfully selling
liquor to Indians, had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced at the April term, 1910. Application had then been made to the judge of the court for a reduction or suspension of the sentences, and it was also stated that an effort would be made to obtain a commutation by executive action. Brents and Van Wert were special officers, duly appointed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, under the authority of the Secretary of the Interior, for the suppression of the liquor traffic among the Indians. It was averred that, by the regulations and established requirements of the Department of the Interior, they were charged with the duty of informing and advising the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, either directly or through other subordinates, concerning all matters connected with the conviction and punishment of persons violating the laws of the United States in reference to the liquor traffic affecting the Indians, and particularly
to inform the said Commissioner whether or not the effective suppression of the liquor traffic with and among Indians would be furthered or prejudiced by executive or judicial clemency in any particular case.
After referring to the conviction and sentence of the persons named, and to the application then made to the judge for a reduction or suspension of sentence, each indictment continued as follows:
That then and there the judge of the said court announced that he would not change or reduce or suspend the said sentences or any part thereof, unless a recommendation to that effect was made to him by the said Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the United States attorney in the aforesaid district announced that he would not [34 S.Ct. 514] recommend a commutation or other executive clemency unless a recommendation to that effect was made to him by the said Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
That then and there, and during all the dates and times herein mentioned, it was and long had been the
settled usage and practice for the United States judges, in determining upon sentences and upon the applications for changes, reductions, or suspensions thereof, to consult the United States attorney, and either directly or through him the administrative officer charged with the enforcement of the laws in question, including laws for the suppression of the liquor traffic with and among the Indians, the said Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and likewise it had been and was the settled usage and practice of the President, in the exercise of his power of extending executive clemency, to consult the Attorney General, and likewise it had been and was the settled usage and practice of the Attorney General, for the purpose of advising the President on the said subject, to consult with the United States attorney or other officer by whom the prosecution had been conducted. . . .
That then and there and that at all the times herein mentioned, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in the performance of his official duty, as provided by the rules and regulations and established usages and practices and requirements of the said Department of the Interior, and as provided by law, was charged with the duties of assisting in the enforcement of the laws of the United States in reference to the liquor traffic affecting Indians, and particularly with the duty, when requested so to do, of advising and making recommendations to any judge before whom any prosecutions on the said subject may have been tried, and the United States attorney or other officer by whom the said prosecution had been conducted, concerning the effect upon the enforcement of the said law of any proposed leniency or clemency in connection with the punishment of persons found guilty of offenses thereunder.
The indictments against Birdsall charged him with having given money to Brents and Van Wert with intent to influence their official action so that they would advise the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, contrary to the truth,
that, upon facts officially known to them, leniency should be granted to the persons who had been convicted and sentenced, as stated, and that, in the interest of the enforcement of the laws, the Commissioner should so recommend to the judge, the United States attorney, the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney General, or the President. The indictments...
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