234 F.3d 1272 (7th Cir. 2000), 00-1316, Boyd v. Davis

Docket Nº:00-1316.
Citation:234 F.3d 1272
Party Name:Arthur BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carole DAVIS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Case Date:August 01, 2000
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Page 1272

234 F.3d 1272 (7th Cir. 2000)

Arthur BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellant,


Carole DAVIS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 00-1316.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

August 1, 2000

Submitted July 31, 2000 [*]

Editorial Note:

This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA7 Rule 53 regarding use of unpublished opinions)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. IP 98-1795-C-M/S. Larry J. McKinney, Judge.



Indiana state prisoner Arthur Boyd brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison superintendent Richard Clark, sergeants Snider and Wheeler, and correctional officers Davis and Jackson, alleging that excessive force was used in moving him to a segregation cell, that he was held in the cell for seven days under unconstitutional conditions, and that he was subjected to unspecified forms of racial prejudice. The district court dismissed the superintendent during initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and later granted the remaining defendants' motion for summary judgment. Boyd appeals, and we affirm.

At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Boyd was incarcerated at the Putnamville Correctional Facility. On June 29, 1998, Officer Davis told Boyd to leave the game room because he was being disruptive. According to Davis, Boyd refused to leave and used obscene language. Davis and Officer Jackson then escorted Boyd to the sergeants' office, where Boyd allegedly directed obscenities towards Sergeant Snider and refused her orders to remove his hands from his pockets and to stop leaning against the wall. Because of this behavior, Snider told Boyd that he was going to be placed in the Maximum Security Unit ("MSU"). 1 Snider ordered Boyd to step outside the office and instructed Jackson and two unidentified officers to take Boyd's cane and handcuff him, which they did. Boyd protested that he could not walk without his cane, so Snider called the Health Care Unit for verification and learned from Nurse Allen that Boyd could in fact walk without it. The unidentified officers then left with Boyd for MSU, where Boyd was held for seven days.

Boyd filed suit in December 1998, claiming violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He alleged that he was unable to walk without his cane, and, that because he could not walk, the unidentified officers knocked him to the ground. When other unidentified officers arrived to take him to MSU in a van, according to Boyd, they "roughly" picked him up and threw him into the van, and later "roughly" put him into his cell at MSU. Boyd further alleged that his MSU cell had no water and only a small hole in the floor for a toilet, which was flushed by staff outside of the cell. He was confined there, he said, for seven days without water or hygiene products.

After summary judgment papers had been filed by both sides, Boyd tried to amend his complaint to reinstate superintendent Clark as a defendant, claiming that Clark failed to review his status in segregation as required by prison policy. Boyd also claimed that Clark knew that the conditions in the MSU cells were unconstitutional, but failed to remedy them. Clark had previously been dismissed because Boyd's suit rested solely on his position as prison superintendent, and once again the district court concluded that "the proposed claim against Clark [was] based solely on his supervisory position." The court further explained that allowing "an additional claim would disrupt and cause unwarranted delay to the resolution of the claims already asserted."

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Chavez v. Cady, 207 F.3d 901, 902 (7th Cir.2000). "Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ." Id. We construe the facts in the light most favorable to Boyd and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Id. However, "neither the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties, nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 471 (7th Cir.1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

On appeal, Boyd argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his excessive force claim. He asserts that the district court simply chose not to believe his account of the incident. Boyd, however, misunderstands the court's ruling. The district court held, and we agree, that Boyd failed to produce evidence that the...

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