Dowd v. United Mine Workers of America

• Decision Date: 21 July 1916
• Docket Number: 4623.
• Citation: 235 F. 1
• Parties: DOWD v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. [1]
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

235 F. 1

DOWD v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. ^[1]

No. 4623.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

July 21, 1916

Henry S. Drinker, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa., and James B McDonough, of Ft. Smith, Ark. (Walter Gordon Merritt, of New York City, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

G. L Grant and Webb Covington, both of Ft. Smith, Ark. (Henry Warrum, of Indianapolis, Ind., on the brief), for defendants in error.

Before SANBORN, ADAMS, and CARLAND, Circuit Judges.

CARLAND Circuit Judge.

Dowd hereafter called plaintiff, as receiver of nine coal mining companies, commenced this action against the defendants in error, hereafter called defendants, to recover damages resulting from an alleged unlawful conspiracy and combination formed by them in restraint of trade and commerce among the several states of the United States, in violation of the act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. 209). The defendants named in the complaint are the United Mine Workers of America, about 27 local unions of the same, and numerous individual defendants comprising, among others, the president and other officers of the United Mine Workers of America and the presidents and other officers of the district branches and local unions of the same.

The complaint alleges that the United Mine Workers of America is an unincorporated association of mine workers, engaged in or about the work of mining and shipping coal in and from the different mines throughout the United States, its headquarters being located at the city of Indianapolis, in the state of Indiana; that the members of said association are subdivided into about 30 districts, and numerous local unions are located therein, each district having jurisdiction of the local unions within its territory; that every member of said local unions is a member of the United Mine Workers of America, and subject to the rules laid down in its constitution and by-laws, as well as the constitution and by-laws of the various district and local unions having jurisdiction over them, respectively; that the membership of the United Mine Workers of America exceeds 400,000 miners; that each of the district branches and local unions, which are a part of the United Mine Workers of America, are created by said United Mine Workers of America to carry out the purposes and business of said national organization, and more particularly to act with and for said national organization in carrying out the combination and conspiracy in respect of interstate trade and commerce set forth in the complaint; that the defendant United Mine Workers of America, District 21, is one of the said district branches of said United Mine Workers of America, and has jurisdiction over all union mines and miners in the states of Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, and that all of the defendant local unions above named are affiliated with and subject to the laws of District 21; that the local unions named as defendants are unincorporated associations of mine workers in the state of Arkansas.

The United Mine Workers of America and the several unions demurred to the complaint upon the following grounds: (1) The court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action, as it appeared from the complaint that neither of the coal companies were engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the alleged acts causing the damages sued for, within the meaning of the act of July 2, 1890. (2) The complaint failed to disclose that the court had any jurisdiction of the cause of action, for the reason that the acts complained of were not an interference with interstate commerce or a violation of the above act. (3) The court had no jurisdiction of the defendant or the subject of the action, for the reason that defendants United Mine Workers of America and the several local unions are voluntary unincorporated associations, and as such have no power to sue and cannot be sued. (4) The complaint does not allege any contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce within the meaning of the above act. (5) The complaint does not allege any acts of defendants monopolizing or attempting to monopolize, combining or conspiring to monopolize, any part of such trade or commerce within the meaning of the above act. Two other grounds of demurrer were mentioned, namely, a misjoinder of parties plaintiffs, and a misjoinder of causes of action. These grounds are not argued in the briefs, and will be deemed abandoned. The individual defendants demurred to the complaint upon the same grounds, except that no point was made that these defendants could not be sued. The court below sustained the demurrers upon the specific ground, as recited in the judgment:

'That the complaint fails to disclose that this court has any jurisdiction of the cause of action therein set forth, for the reason that the acts of defendants complained of were not an interference with interstate commerce, or a violation of the federal statute upon which the complaint is predicated.'

The other grounds of demurrer were in terms overruled.

As the plaintiff alone sued out a writ of error, it is contended that our power to review is limited to the point ruled against the plaintiff; but it was the demurrers that were sustained, and the scope of our power to review cannot be limited by the specific reason given by the court below for its judgment. Such judgment may be right or wrong, notwithstanding the reason given for it. The plaintiff elected to stand upon the complaint, which was thereupon dismissed. Claiming the point to be jurisdictional, the United Mine Workers of America and the several unions made a motion in this court to dismiss the writ of error, upon the ground that defendants are voluntary unincorporated associations or labor unions, having no legal entity, not registered under any trade union law of the United States or of any state or territory, and cannot sue or be sued, and are not engaged in any kind of business.

All of the defendants made a similar motion, for the reason that the writ of error in this case should have issued from the Supreme Court of the United States. This motion is denied, for the reason that the judgment is properly reviewable by this court, the writ of error sued out by the plaintiff from the Supreme Court of the United States has been dismissed, and the point in reference to the plaintiff's right to sue the United Mine Workers of America and the different local unions by name, having been one of the grounds of demurrer in the court below, will be considered here on this writ of error, for the reasons hereinbefore stated, as the defendants still insist upon the point. The questions then for consideration are: (1) May the United Mine Workers of America and the different local unions be sued in the name of the association? (2) Does the complaint state a cause of action?

The complaint was filed September 1, 1914, and the acts of which complaint is made are alleged to have occurred early the same year. Taking up the first question suggested, we find that section 7 of the act of July 2, 1890, reads as follows:

'Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act may sue therefor in any Circuit Court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.'

Section 8 of the same act provides:

'The word 'person,' or 'persons,' wherever used in this act, shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the territories, the laws of any state, or the laws of any foreign country.'

Section 4 of the act of Congress of October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 731, c. 323), provides:

'Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws may sue therefor in any District Court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.'

It will be noticed that section 4 of the act of October 15, 1914, eliminates any description of the persons or corporation by whom the injury shall be committed, leaving the party injured free to pursue any one who causes the injury. It is claimed by the defendants the United Mine Workers of America and the several local unions that the word 'associations' found in section 8, above quoted, means associations which have a legal entity by reason of having been organized under the laws of the United States, their territories, the states, or the laws of a foreign country; that the words 'existing under' or 'authorized by' mean that the word 'association' refers only to an association having a legal entity by force of law; and that the United Mine Workers of America and the local unions, not having been shown in this case to be organized under any particular law, may not be held liable under section 7, above quoted, in the name of the association. Such a construction of the law would relieve labor organizations generally from all liability.

The United States Supreme Court in Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U.S. 274, 301, 28 Sup.Ct. 301, 310 (52 L.Ed. 488, 13 Ann.Cas. 815), said:

'The records of Congress show that several efforts were made to exempt, by legislation, organizations of farmers and laborers from the operation of the act, and that all these efforts failed so that the act

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