Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Underwood
Decision Date | 04 October 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 15913.,15913. |
Parties | ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. Nathan R. UNDERWOOD and Richard M. Murray, Jr., Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
R. L. Dent, M. E. Ward, Vicksburg, Miss. (Burch, Porter & Johnson, Memphis, Tenn., Joseph H. Wright, Vice-President and Gen. Counsel, Illinois Central R. R. Co., Chicago, Ill., John W. Freels, Gen. Solicitor, Illinois Central R. R. Co., Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellant.
Landman Teller, Vicksburg, Miss., Fred C. Berger, Natchez, Miss., E. H. Cunningham, Jr., Jackson, Miss., for appellees.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and CAMERON and BROWN, Circuit Judges.
This appeal calls on us to decide whether evidence offered in the present trial was sufficiently different from that before us when we reversed the case on the prior trial, to bring about a different result. An automobile driven by appellee Murray, in which appellee Underwood was a passenger ran into the side of a freight train, and both appellees sustained serious injuries. The two actions brought against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, appellant, were consolidated and resulted in a directed verdict in favor of the Railroad on the first trial. We reversed,1 holding that, "Under the evidence in this case," the jury might find in favor of the two injured men on the doctrine of Last Clear Chance.
In stating the facts before the Court in the former appeal we used in part the following language:
The former opinion then proceeded with an extended quotation from the engineer's testimony, but we end the quotation at this point for the reason that the testimony quoted in the former opinion was taken from an exploratory deposition taken by appellees some months before the first trial, while this time the engineer testified in person,2 being examined by the railroad's attorneys for the first time. Based exclusively upon the deposition testimony of the engineer including his estimate as to how far his train ran after application of the brakes in emergency, we concluded before that "the automobile would have been somewhere between 300 feet and 800 feet north of the crossing when the engineer applied the brakes." We further concluded that, "The engineer north of the crossing may have had a clear view of highway traffic moving south, while the train and the lights on the engine may not have been obvious to the operator of the motor vehicle." Emphasis supplied in each instance.
Based upon the testimony at the former trial and the quoted assumptions we found then to be sustained by it, we concluded that the Court below had committed error in directing a verdict in favor of the railroad company at the end of appellee's testimony, citing the rule of law recognized by the Supreme Court of Mississippi:
"When the engineer saw and appreciated the peril, it was his duty to use every reasonable means to prevent the collision."
In the former opinion we recognized that the Supreme Court of Mississippi had, in a long line of decisions, recognized the rule that the presence of a train of cars making legitimate use of a crossing is, of itself, sufficient warning to approaching motorists.3 We pointed out, however, that, in the case of Boyd v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 211 Miss. 409, 52 So.2d 21, the Mississippi Court had recognized that exceptional circumstances might exist at the crossing which would warrant the non-application of the rule. The exceptional circumstances there existing were that the railroad had not, as required by law,4 provided the Mississippi Stop Sign, that there was a dip in the road a short distance away from the intersection and a down-grade just before reaching the main track, deflecting downward the lights of approaching automobiles; that the railroad had stopped a flatcar straddle the crossing, which presented to the oncoming motorist a view only of the side of a sill about fifteen or eighteen inches across; and that Boyd, realizing that he was approaching the vicinity of the railroad track, was looking for the stop sign to indicate when he was actually approaching the point of intersection and was lured into the danger by its absence. Our conclusion based upon that case and certain cases dealing with the doctrine of Last Clear Chance, was "Under the evidence in this case, it was open to the jury to find that the engineer saw and appreciated the peril of the appellants and the fact that they were unaware of the train in time to give warning by a blast or blasts of the whistle * * *"
Upon a second trial of the consolidated cases the jury was unable to reach a verdict, and upon a third trial the jury found in favor of appellee Murray in the sum of $5,000 and of appellee Underwood in the sum of $45,000. The Court below tracked our former opinion meticulously and no errors are assigned in connection with its charge. But we think that the Court below erred in denying the railroad's motion for a directed verdict at the end of all of the evidence for the reason that the evidence in this case met and repelled the assumptions quoted above upon which the case was decided on the former appeal.
In this case the testimony of appellees was somewhat different from what it had been in the first trial, all of the members of the train crew testified, both on direct and cross-examination, showing full performance of the duties laid upon them by law; the engineer amplified the testimony he had given on ex parte examination by appellees' attorney; and, in addition, evidence was admitted without objection of experiments conducted by engineer Mobley and others which demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to see appellees' car at a sufficient distance from the point of collision to warrant the finding that it was reasonably probable that the engineer could have done anything to prevent the accident. This experimentation and the measurements developed by it furnished by far the most important additional evidence and will be discussed fully below.
The evidence here shows without dispute that the concrete highway upon which appellees approached the point of collision was substantially level (1.13 percent grade); that the curve to the left was very slight (1° 30') and reached a straightaway 222 feet from the railroad track; that appellees faced a reflective type crossing sign, two and one-half feet in diameter with the top five feet from the ground, 675 feet from the crossing and the regular Mississippi Stop Sign 56 feet from the crossing, both of which signs were, by the slight curve, thrown directly into the rays of the car headlights. It was further undisputed that a series of moving railroad cars were passing along in front of appellees which...
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