Skaggs v. Parker, 98-6249.

Citation235 F.3d 261
Decision Date18 December 2000
Docket NumberNo. 98-6249.,98-6249.
PartiesDavid Leroy SKAGGS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Phil PARKER, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

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Rodney McDaniel (argued and briefed), Thomas M. Ransdell (briefed), Department of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, KY, for Petitioner-Appellant.

David A. Smith (argued and briefed), Ian G. Sonego (briefed), Assistant Attorney Generals, Frankfort, KY, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before MERRITT, NELSON, and COLE, Circuit Judges.

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

AMENDED OPINION

R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge.

Petitioner-Appellant David Leroy Skaggs was convicted by a Kentucky jury of two counts of capital murder, one count of first degree robbery, and one count of first degree burglary. Skaggs was sentenced to death on the murder convictions, twenty years each on the robbery convictions, and twenty years on the burglary conviction. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Skaggs's conviction and sentence. See Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 672 (Ky.1985). The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky denied Skaggs's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, see Skaggs v. Parker, 27 F.Supp.2d 952 (W.D.Ky.1998), and then issued a certificate of probable cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. On appeal to this Court, Skaggs raises numerous assignments of error, only one of which has merit and warrants our discussion: whether Skaggs received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Skaggs's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of the trial; accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's denial of Skaggs's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 6, 1981, Herman and Mae Matthews were shot and killed in their home near Glasgow, Kentucky. The ensuing investigation led police to Skaggs in Columbus, Indiana. Several days later, law enforcement officials transported Skaggs to Kentucky where he was arraigned. During this time, Skaggs made two confessions and other inculpatory statements. Skaggs also led police to the murder weapon and Mae Matthews's purse.

Prior to trial, Skaggs informed the Barren County Circuit Court that he intended to introduce evidence of his mental illness. The court appointed two psychiatrists to evaluate Skaggs's mental condition. One psychiatrist, Dr. Lawrence P. Green, was to evaluate Skaggs and provide both the Commonwealth and the defense with a copy of his report. The other psychiatrist, Dr. William J. Kernohan, was appointed as a "defense psychiatrist" and was to provide his report to only Skaggs's counsel. Dr. Kernohan refused to evaluate Skaggs, resulting in a court order for Skaggs to be evaluated by Dr. Pran Ravani of the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center ("KCPC"). Skaggs objected to the court order and requested that the court appoint an independent psychiatrist for his defense. Skaggs's attorneys selected Elya Bresler, who claimed to be a licensed clinical and forensic psychologist, and the court approved payment of $1,000 for Bresler's services. Bresler evaluated Skaggs in preparation for Skaggs's insanity defense at trial.

The guilt phase of the trial commenced on February 23, 1982. At trial, Bresler testified that Skaggs suffered from a "depressive disorder" and "paranoid personality disorder," both of which would have affected Skaggs's ability to understand the criminality of his actions and to distinguish right from wrong. However, Bresler's testimony was rambling, confusing, and, at times, incoherent to the point of being comical. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Dr. Ravani, who testified that Skaggs had a history of alcohol abuse and displayed a "schizophrenic trend" but could appreciate the difference between right and wrong. The jury rejected Skaggs's insanity defense and returned verdicts of guilty on all charges. The court proceeded to the penalty phase of the trial, but defense counsel chose not to call Bresler because his performance was so poor during the guilt phase. The jury could not agree on an appropriate penalty for the two murder convictions, resulting in a mistrial.

On June 23, 1982, four months later, the court convened a second penalty phase hearing before a new jury. The Commonwealth reintroduced much of the same evidence it had introduced at the guilt phase of the trial, and the testimony of those witnesses was essentially the same. The Commonwealth also introduced, over defense objections, Skaggs's prior criminal record, including convictions of non-assaultive offenses. Defense counsel called Skaggs's father, Roland Skaggs, who testified that his son was born in an "insane asylum," was raised by his grandmother, and started getting into criminal trouble only after leaving home. Defense counsel also decided to recall Bresler, despite his previous poor performance. Bresler testified that Skaggs suffered from a depressive disorder and a paranoid personality disorder which would have impaired his capacity to appreciate the nature of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. On rebuttal, the Commonwealth called Dr. Ravani, who again testified that despite Skaggs's "schizophrenic trend," he had the substantial capacity to resist an impulse to violate the law.

At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the court instructed the jury on two aggravating circumstances with regard to the death of Herman Matthews: (1) Skaggs was engaged in committing a first-degree robbery at the time Herman Matthews was killed; and (2) Skaggs's act of killing Herman Matthews was intentional and also resulted in the death of Mae Matthews. The court also instructed the jury on the aggravating circumstances with regard to the death of Mae Matthews: Skaggs was engaged in committing a first-degree robbery and first-degree burglary at the time Mae Matthews was killed. Finally, the court instructed the jury to consider the mitigating factors of Skaggs's emotional disturbance and whether Skaggs could appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law in light of his mental disease or defect.1 The jury recommended that Skaggs be sentenced to death, and the court entered a final sentence of death on July 13, 1982.

Skaggs filed several motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, all of which were denied. His first motion was based upon the discovery by appellate counsel that Bresler had completely falsified his credentials, was not a licensed clinical or forensic psychologist, and had no academic degrees or training as a psychologist whatsoever — in fact, his post-secondary education consisted of two years of college as an English major. Skaggs's third motion for a new trial, on grounds of newly discovered evidence, offered the evaluations of two psychiatric experts who examined Skaggs in preparation for his federal habeas petition. Dr. Charles Yont, a certified psychologist, stated that Skaggs was mildly retarded and functioned at the level of a twelve- or thirteen-year-old. Dr. Eric Engum, a clinical neuropsychologist, determined that Skaggs's intelligence quotient ("I.Q.") of 64 indicated that Skaggs was borderline mentally retarded and that Bresler's testimony was "so far below the standard of care as to totally misrepresent Mr. Skaggs to the jury...."

The trial court acknowledged Bresler's lack of credentials but overruled Skaggs's motions. Skaggs appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which unanimously affirmed Skaggs's conviction and sentence. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.

On January 19, 1996, Skaggs filed a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising numerous assignments of error. The district court held an evidentiary hearing limited to Skaggs's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. On July 22, 1998, the district court denied Skaggs's petition for habeas relief, granted him in forma pauperis status for appeal, and issued a certificate of probable cause.

On appeal, Skaggs raises twenty-seven assignments of error, including ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial. Although we agree with the district court that Skaggs's challenges to the guilt phase of his trial do not satisfy the standard for grant of a habeas petition, we conclude that Skaggs received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial, and, therefore, grant his habeas petition based on that issue.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

Skaggs filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in January 1996, prior to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which became effective on April 24, 1996. Accordingly, pre-AEDPA law governs Skaggs's entitlement to habeas relief. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Nonetheless, the certificate of appealability ("COA") requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) after the enactment of AEDPA apply to Skaggs's appeal of the district court's denial of his habeas petition, which was initiated after AEDPA's effective date. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1602, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (holding that when a habeas petitioner seeks to initiate an appeal of the dismissal of his petition after AEDPA's effective date, the right to appeal is governed by the COA requirements found in § 2253(c), regardless of whether the habeas petition was filed in the district court before AEDPA's effective date).

We review the district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus de novo. See McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1310 (6th Cir.1996). Although this standard applies to questions of federal constitutional law,...

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