Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.

Decision Date06 March 1923
Citation235 N.Y. 152,139 N.E. 223
PartiesGREGONIS v. PHILADELPHIA & READING COAL & IRON CO.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Action by Benny Gregonis against the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company. Judgment for plaintiff entered on a verdict of a jury was unanimously reversed, and the complaint was dismissed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Second Department (188 App. Div. 975,176 N. Y. Supp. 901), and plaintiff appeals.

Judgment of Appellate Division reversed, and that of Trial Term affirmed.

See, also, 201 App. Div. 861,93 N. Y. Supp. 935.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second department.

John C. Robinson and Morris A. Wainger, both of New York City, for appellant.

Pierce M. Brown, of New York City, for respondent.

CRANE, J.

This action was brought to recover for personal injuries received while working for the defendant in its coal mines in Pennsylvania. At the time of the accident, December 28, 1915, the plaintiff was a resident of the state of Pennsylvania. Before bringing this action he had, however, moved into the state of New York, and there was sufficient evidence introduced on the trial to warrant the jury in answering the questions submitted by the court in the plaintiff's favor. These questions were as follows: Was the plaintiff a bona fide resident of the state of New York at the time he commencedthis action? The answer was, ‘Yes.’ Was the plaintiff's sole object in coming to New York to maintain this action? The answer was, ‘No.’

The judgment entered upon a verdict for the plaintiff was reversed by the Appellate Division, which by a resettled order, entered the 17th day of April, 1922, made the following direction:

‘Ordered that the judgment and the order denying the motion for a new trial herein be unanimously reversed and the complaint dismissed, upon the ground that, at the time of the commencement of this action, plaintiff was not a bona fide resident of the state of New York. Further ordered that the judgment herein be unanimously reversed and the complaint dismissed, upon the ground that this court, in the exercise of its discretion, declines to entertain jurisdiction of this action even if the plaintiff was a resident of the state of New York at the time of the commencement of the action, for the following reasons: That the accident which is the subject of the action occurred in the state of Pennsylvania; that plaintiff was at the time a resident of that state, and the defendant a corporation organized under the laws of that state, and transacting business there; that the claim presented by plaintiff depends largely upon the construction and applicability of the statutes of the state of Pennsylvania enforcing rules which do not prevail in the state of New York; that it is evident from the testimony that the plaintiff came here or was brought here for the purpose of instituting this action in the courts of this state.’

[1][2][3][4] The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint. As there was evidence sufficient to create a question of fact as to residence, the Appellate Division might have reversed upon the weight of evidence and granted a new trial, but could not dismiss the complaint. Woicianowicz v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 232 N. Y. 256, 133 N. E. 579. It went further, however, and assumed that, if the plaintiff were a resident of the state of New York, the Supreme Court had the discretion and the power to dismiss the complaint because the tort happened in Pennsylvania, and was governed somewhat by the statutes of that state. The question is, therefore, squarely presented to us, whether or not the Supreme Court has any such power over an action brought by a resident of the state of New York. Torts are transitory actions and can be brought, as a general rule, in any state where the courts have jurisdiction over the parties. Crashley v. Press Publishing Co., 179 N. Y. 27, 71 N. E. 258, 1 Ann. Cas. 196. The courts of this state may entertain jurisdiction of a negligence case arising in another state, where the plaintiff is a resident or nonresident of this state. As to nonresidents, the courts have many times refused to entertain jurisdiction in the exercise of their discretion. As to a resident, however, a different question arises and a different law is applicable. Can the Supreme Court refuse to hear a case against a foreign corporation brought by one resident of this state, where the tort occurred outside the state, and entertain jurisdiction for another resident upon the same state of facts? If it has discretion to refuse jurisdiction in the one instance, it must have a like discretion to entertain it in the other. Discretion implies a power to make a choice. We do not think that, as to a resident of this state, the court has any such discretion. The statutes from a very early date have controlled or regulated somewhat the right of a resident to bring an action against a nonresident corporation. In Robinson v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. (112 N. Y. 315, 322,19 N. E. 625, 626 (2 L. R. A. 636) it was said:

‘The Supreme Court, being a court of general jurisdiction, could, independently of any statute, entertain actions against foreign corporations. Such corporations could, by the common law, always be sued in this state by any plaintiff for any cause of action, provided jurisdiction could be obtained of their persons.’

We find as early as 2 Revised Statutes, pt. 3, c. 8, tit. 4, art. 1, § 15, the following provision:

‘Suits brought in the Supreme Court by a resident of this state, against any corporation created by or under the laws of any other state, government or country, for the recovery of any debt or damages, may be commenced by attachment.’

The notes of the revisers had this to say:

‘The fair protection of our own citizens requires that some provision should be made to render such corporations amenable to our laws and in our own courts.’

An amendment by chapter 107 of the Laws of 1849 reads as follows:

Section 1. Section 15, art. I, title 4, chap. 8, part 3d of the Revised Statutes, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

Sec. 15. Suits may be brought (in the Supreme Court in the Superior Court of the city of New York and in the Court of Common Pleas in and for the city and county of New York) against any corporation, created by or under the laws of any other state, government, or country, for the recovery of any debt or damages whether liquidated or not arising upon contract made, executed or delivered, within this state, or upon any cause of action arising therein such suits may be commenced by complaint and summons together with an attachment as now provided by law, and such complaint and summons may be served as providedby sections 113 and 114 of the Code of Procedure.’

The Code of Procedure (Laws of 1849, c. 438) contained the following provision:

Sec. 427. An action against a corporation, created by, or under the laws of any other state, government, or country may be brought in the Supreme Court, the Superior Court of the city of New York, or in the Court of Common Pleas for the city and county of New York in the following cases:

‘1. By a resident of this state for any cause of action;

‘2. By a plaintiff not a resident of this state, when the cause of action shall have arisen, or the subject of the action shall be situated within this state.’

These provisions passed over into the Code of Civil Procedure (§ 1780), wherein they were changed to read as follows:

‘An action against a foreign corporation may be maintained by a resident of the state, or by a domestic corporation, for any cause of action. An action against a foreign corporation may be maintained by another foreign corporation, or by a nonresident, in one of the following cases only:

‘1. Where the action is brought to recover damages for the breach of a contract made within the state, or relating to property situated within the state, at the time of the making thereof.

‘2. Where it is brought to recover real property situated within the state, or a chattel, which is replevied within the state.

‘3. Where the cause of action arose within the state, except where the object of the action is to affect the title to real property situated without the state.’

By an amendment (chapter 60, Laws of 1913) a fourth provision was added:

‘4. Where a foreign corporation is doing business within this state.’

Prior to the provisions of the Revised Statutes, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction against a foreign corporation unless it could obtain jurisdiction of the person of such corporation. Thereafter jurisdiction might be obtained by attachment in favor of a resident of the state. Ladenburg v. Commercial Bank, 87 Hun, 269, 33 N. Y. Supp. 821, affirmed 146 N. Y. 406, 42 N. E. 543. Then came the provisions of the Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, which extended the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to a resident of this state for any cause of action against a foreign corporation.

A distinction has always been maintained, however, by the statutes between a resident and a nonresident plaintiff. A thorough search of the authorities from the enactment of the Revised Statutes down to the present day has failed to disclose a single instance wherein the courts of this state have refused to entertain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in behalf of a resident, for a cause of action arising out of the state. I do not refer to cases where the courts had not jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the litigation; I am speaking here of those transitory causes of action such as contract and tort cases, where the courts had jurisdiction of both parties. Never has the Supreme Court refused jurisdiction in such instances to a resident of the state. On the contrary, it has always assumed jurisdiction of such actions. Tullock v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 147 App. Div. 524,132 N. Y. Supp. 88; affirmed 205 N. Y. 576, 98 N. E. 1117;...

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    ...out of a tort committed in a sister state where both the plaintiff and defendant are nonresidents. Gregonis v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & I. Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 160, 139 N.E. 223, 32 A.L.R. 1, and cases cited. While no controlling reason compelled, the Special Term refused to assume jurisdicti......
  • Alcoa Steamship Company, Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent
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    ...practice of giving favored jurisdictional treatment to resident plaintiffs. The Court's citation of Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223 (1923), which held that New York courts could not refuse to exercise jurisdiction in a tort action by a resident......
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