West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Springfield
Decision Date | 21 April 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 31741,31741 |
Citation | 238 Ga. 655,235 S.E.2d 24 |
Parties | WEST POINT PEPPERELL, INC. v. Shirley A. SPRINGFIELD. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
McCamy, Minor, Phillips & Tuggle, J. T. Fordham, Dalton, for appellant.
Mitchell, Mitchell, Coppedge, Boyett & Wester, Warren N. Coppedge, Jr., Dalton, for appellee.
The primary issue raised in this appeal is whether Code Ann. Sec. 114-711 is unconstitutional in that it denies procedural due process to a party against whom a judgment is entered. The appellant's contention is that this statute does not provide for notice and a hearing before the entry of a judgment or within a reasonable time after the entry of a judgment.
This statute provides in essence that after an order or decision of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation requiring periodic payments has become final, the proper trial court may, upon application, enter a judgment and issue an execution based upon the Board's final award. This, in effect, is the equivalent of a judicial determination of the amount due under the Board's final award, rendering judgment in that amount, and issuing an execution for that amount.
The complaint of the employer-insurer, against whom the judgment is entered and against whom the execution is issued, is that the entry and the issuance take place without prior notice to the employer-insurer and without affording the employer-insurer an opportunity for a meaningful hearing. There is then the further contention that this amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of both the Federal and Georgia Constitutions. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 95 S.Ct. 719, 42 L.Ed.2d 751 (1974).
In this case the trial judge, upon application, entered a judgment apparently based on the Board's final award. The judgment was in the amount of $1092. Because the employer-insurer did not have prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the entry of the judgment, it moved in the trial court to set the judgment aside. The trial court then entered a judgment denying the motion to set aside, and the employer-insurer has appealed.
We hold that Code Ann. Sec. 114-711 is not unconstitutional for failure to provide for notice and a hearing. The entry of a judgment and the issuance of an execution under this statute are administrative only. It is the equivalent of a determination of an amount due under a former final periodic-payment judgment. And the entry of the judgment and issuance of an execution under this statute do not amount to a "taking" or deprivation of property.
In another case involving this principle, we said: Wood v. Atkinson, 231 Ga. 271, 201 S.E.2d 394 (1973).
Though rendering a judgment and recording an execution under Georgia law hamper the sale or alienation of real property, these two acts do not amount to a taking or deprivation in the constitutional sense. The...
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Childers v. Childers
...given notice and an opportunity to raise his defenses. Daniel v. Daniel, 239 Ga. 466, 238 S.E.2d 108 (1977); West Point Pepperell v. Springfield, 238 Ga. 655, 235 S.E.2d 24 (1977); Wood v. Atkinson, 231 Ga. 271, 201 S.E.2d 394 However, despite the propriety of this procedure in Georgia, a L......
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Ayers v. Rembert, A99A2023.
...may be issued ex parte, but does not amount to a taking or deprivation of property without due process. West Point Pepperell v. Springfield, 238 Ga. 655, 656, 235 S.E.2d 24 (1977). When issuing a judgment under OCGA § 34-9-106, a superior court may not change the award of the Board. Wade v.......
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Daniel v. Daniel
...of Code Ann. § 30-204. We have recently reviewed and upheld the principles of that decision in West Point Pepperell v. Springfield, 238 Ga. 655, 656-657, 235 S.E.2d 24 (1977). We do not agree with the appellant that decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of this court since the 19......