Easterling Lumber Company v. Pierce
Citation | 59 L.Ed. 279,235 U.S. 380,35 S.Ct. 133 |
Decision Date | 14 December 1914 |
Docket Number | No. 589,589 |
Parties | EASTERLING LUMBER COMPANY, O. L. Benway, and T. R. Thames, Plffs. in Err., v. S. W. PIERCE |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Messrs. Edward Mayes and T. brady, Jr., for plaintiffs in error.
Messrs. Joseph Hirsh and E. L. Dent for defendant in error.
Memorandum opinion by direction of the court, by Mr. Chief Justice White:
The injuries for which damages were awarded by the judgment sought to be reviewed (——Miss. ——, 64 So. 461) happened on a steam logging railroad engaged in purely domestic business. The power to here review is based on two constitutional grounds seasonably asserted below, assailing two state statutes, the one (chap. 194, Miss. Laws of 1908, p. 204) enacted before the accident, doing away in the cases for which it provided with the principle of fellow servant; and the other (chap. 215, Miss. Laws of 1912), enacted after the happening of the accident, but before the trial below, providing that from the proof of the happening of an accident there should arise a prima facie presumption of negligence.
The constitutional objection to the first statute is that the classification for which it provided was so unequal as to cause the statute to be in conflict with the 14th Amendment. The classification was this: 'Every employee of a railroad corporation, and all other corporations and individuals, using engines, locomotives, or cars of any kind or description whatsoever, propelled by the dangerous agencies of steam, electricity, gas, gasolene, or lever power, and running on tracks, . . .' That the objection is without merit is so clearly established as to require only references to the decided cases to that effect.1
The objection to the second statute is that it was wanting in due process because retroactively applied to the case, since the statute was enacted after the accident ocourred. statute was enacted after the accident occurred. statute cut off no substantive defense, but simply provided a rule of evidence controlling the burden of proof. That as thus construed it does not violate the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is also so conclusively settled as to again require nothing but a reference to the decided cases.2
As it results that at the time the writ of error was sued out it had been conclusively settled by the decisions of this court that both grounds relied upon were devoid of merit, we think the alleged constitutional questions...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Clark v. State
...so as to uphold their constitutionality if it can be done. Easterling Lbr. Co. v. Pierce, 106 Miss. 672, 64 So. 461; Easterling Lbr. Co. v. Pierce, 235 U.S. 380; Hart v. State, 87 Miss. 171, 39 So. 523; v. Sumner, 50 Miss. 517; Railroad Co. v. Crawford, 99 Miss. 679, 55 So. 596; State v. Wh......
-
Alton v. Alton, 11087.
...502, 53 S.Ct. 249, 77 L.Ed. 457; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 1917, 243 U.S. 210, 37 S.Ct. 255, 61 L.Ed. 678; Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 1914, 235 U.S. 380, 35 S.Ct. 133, 59 L.Ed. 279. Cf. Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Henderson, 1929, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445, 73 L.Ed. For presumptions of ......
-
Sampson v. Channell, 3454.
......722; Wallace v. Western N. C. R., 104 N.C. 442, 10 S.E. 552; Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 235 U.S. 380, 35 S.Ct. 133, 59 L.Ed. 279. See Meeker ......
-
Ford v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co
...contended that the effect of the statute, section 4925, was simply to change a rule of evidence. In Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 235 U. S. 380, 381, 35 S. Ct. 133, 59 L Ed. 279, it was held that a state statute which cuts off no substantive defence, but simply provides a rule of evidenc......