Company v. United States No 151 Same v. Same No 152 Same v. Same No 154 Same v. Same No 155 Same v. Same No 156 156

• Citation: 35 S.Ct. 339,236 U.S. 397,59 L.Ed. 637
• Decision Date: 23 February 1915
• Docket Number: WRIGHT-BLODGETT,152,Nos. 151,154,155,s. 151
• Parties: COMPANY, Limited, Appt., v. UNITED STATES. NO 151. SAME v. SAME NO 152. SAME v. SAME. NO 154. SAME v. SAME. NO 155. SAME v. SAME. NO 156. , and 156
• Court: United States Supreme Court

236 U.S. 397

35 S.Ct. 339

59 L.Ed. 637

WRIGHT-BLODGETT COMPANY, Limited, Appt.,

v UNITED STATES.

NO 151.

SAME

v. SAME

NO 152.

SAME

v. SAME.

NO 154.

SAME

v. SAME.

NO 155.

SAME

v. SAME.

NO 156.

Nos. 151, 152, 154, 155, and 156.

Argued January 26 and 27, 1915.

Decided February 23, 1915.

Messrs. J. Blanc Monroe, Monte M. Lemann, and A. R. Mitchell for appellants.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 398-400 intentionally omitted] Assistant Attorney General Knaebel and Mr. S. W. Williams for appellee.

Mr. Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court:

These five cases, although involving separate transactions, may conveniently be considered in a single opinion. The suits were brought by the United States to annul certain land patents¹ issued under the homestead laws upon the ground that the respective entrymen had defrauded the government in securing the patents in that they had not actually resided upon the land and cultivated it as required by the statute, the statements in their proofs upon commutation being false. Rev. Stat. § 2301, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 4589. It was further averred that the Wright-Blodgett Company, the appellant, at the time of its purchase of the respective tracts, had notice through its agents of the fraud which had been perpetrated by the entrymen. The appellant answered in each case, disclaiming all knowledge of the alleged fraud, and setting up that it was a bona fide purchaser for value after the issuance to the entrymen of the final receipts. The cases were separately heard and in each, upon pleadings and proofs, a decree was entered canceling the patent. Upon appeal, the circuit court of appeals affirmed the decrees. The opinion of that court stated that it found 'that fraud in the homestead entry' was proved, and that the appellant was 'charged through their active agents on the ground with knowledge of the fraud.'

The appellant urges that it does not appear that the two courts concurred in their findings, as the cases were decided in the district court without opinion, and, in three of the cases, there was testimony which, according to the government, tended to show that the transactions were fraudulent not only because there had not been the residence and cultivation required by the statute and stated in the proofs, but also because of agreements prior to the commutation proofs to sell the lands to the appellant. But the district court rendered its decree in the five cases on the same day; in two of these it is not suggested that there was evidence of such anticipatory agreements, but the same decree was entered and must have proceeded on the evidence as to the lack of residence and cultivation. While the facts in the several cases vary in details, they are so far alike in their main features with respect to residence and cultivation as to make it absolutely impossible to assume that any different conclusion of fact was reached by the district court in the three cases than that at which it arrived in the two others. The two courts must be deemed to have concurred in their findings, and, in accordance with the well-settled rule, their determination upon mere questions of fact will not be disturbed, unless clear error is shown. Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U. S. 1, 14, 42 L. ed. 639, 643, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 274; Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17, 24, 43 L. ed. 597, 600, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 332; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 232 U. S. 338, 339, 58 L. ed. 630, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 438; Washington Securities Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 76, 78, 58 L. ed. 1220, 1222, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 725; Gilson v. United States, 234 U. S. 380, 384, 58 L. ed. 1361, 1363, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 778. An examination of the record fails to disclose any such error in the finding as to the fraud of the entrymen, and it is not necessary to recite the evidence.

It is insisted, however, that in the finding as to the standing of the appellant there was involved an erroneous application of the law. In substance, the argument comes to this, that in a suit by the United States to cancel a patent upon the ground of fraud, where the land is held by a grantee of the entrymen, the government must establish that the grantee is not a bona fide purchaser for value; that this must be shown by proof of a clear and cogent character; and that, measured by this standard, the government's case was not made out. This contention proceeds upon an erroneous view of the governing principles as repeatedly set forth in the decisions of this court. These principles may be briefly restated: Where a patent is obtained by false and fraudulent proofs submitted for the purpose of deceiving the officers of the government, and of thus obtaining public lands without compliance with the requirements of the law, while the patent is not void or subject to collateral attack, it may be directly assailed in a suit by the government against the parties claiming under it. In such case, the respect due to a patent, the presumption that all the preceding steps required by the law had been observed before its issue, and the immense importance of stability of titles dependent upon these instruments, demand that suit to cancel them should be sustained only by proof which produces conviction. United States v. Minor, 114 U. S. 233, 239, 29 L. ed. 110, 112, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 836; Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, 381, 30 L. ed. 949, 959, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1015; United States v. Stinson, 197 U. S. 200, 204, 205, 49 L. ed. 724, 725, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426; Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U. S. 236, 239, 58 L. ed. 936, 939, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507. And, despite satisfactory proof of fraud in obtaining the patent, as the legal title has passed, bona fide purchase for value is a perfect defense. Colorado Coal & I. Co. v. United States, 123 U. S. 307, 313, 31 L. ed. 182, 185, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131; United States v. Stinson, and Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, supra; United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. 200 U. S. 321, 50 L. ed. 499, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; United States v. Clark, 200 U. S. 601, 50 L. ed. 613, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340. But this is an affirmative defense which the grantee must establish in order to defeat the government's right to the cancelation of the conveyance which fraud alone is shown to have induced. The rule as to this defense is thus stated in Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 177, 211, 212, 9 L. ed. 388, 400, 401: 'In setting it up by plea or answer, it must state the deed of purchase, the date, parties, and contents briefly; that the vendor was...