Southern Railway Company v. Railroad Commission of Indiana
Decision Date | 23 February 1915 |
Docket Number | No. 107,107 |
Citation | 59 L.Ed. 661,236 U.S. 439,35 S.Ct. 304 |
Parties | SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF INDIANA |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. John D. Welman, Alexander P. Humphrey, and Edward P. Humphrey for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Frank H. Hatifield, John R. Brill, John W. Brady, and T. P. Littlepage for defendant in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 440-444 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Lamar delivered the opinion of the court:
The Indiana statute requires railway companies to place secure grab irons and hand holds on the sides or ends of every railroad car, under a penalty of $100 fine, to be recovered in a civil action.
In March, 1910, the railroad commission of the state brought such a suit against the Southern Railway Company, alleging that the company on February 24, 1910, had transported from Boonsville, Indiana, to Milltown Indiana, a car which did not have the required equipment. The defendant filed an answer in which it denied liability under the state law inasmuch as on February 24, 1910, the Federal safety appliance act imposed penalties for failing to equip cars with hand holds, and also designated the court in which they might be recovered. The commission's demurrer to the answer was sustained. The defendant refusing to plead further, judgment was entered against the company. That judgment was affirmed by the state court, and the case was brought here by writ of error.
The car alleged to have been without the required equipment, though transporting freight between points wholly within the state of Indiana, was moving on a railroad engaged in interstate commerce, and the company was, therefore, subject to the provisions and penalties of the safety appliance act. 27 Stat. at L. 531, § 4, chap. 196, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8608. Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 56 L. ed. 72, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2.
The defendant in error insists, however, that the railroad company was also liable for the penalty imposed by the Indiana statute. In support of this position numerous cases are cited which, like Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131, 33 L. ed. 287, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47, hold that the same act may constitute a criminal offense against two sovereignties, and that punishment by one does not prevent punishment by the other. That doctrine is thoroughly established. But, upon an analysis of the principle on which it is founded, it will be found to relate only to cases where the act sought to be punished is one over which both sovereignties have jurisdiction. This concurrent jurisdiction may be either because the nature of the act is such that at the same time it produces effects respectively within the sphere of state and Federal regulation, and thus violates the laws of both; or where there is this double effect in a matter of which one can exercise control, but an authoritative declaration that the paramount jurisdiction of one shall not
Act March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943 (Comp. St. 1913, §§ 8613-8615) exclude that of the other. Compare, Rev. Stat. § 711, 37 Stat. at L. 670, chap. 50, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8603.
But the principle that the offender may, for one act, be prosecuted in two jurisdictions, has no application where one of the governments has exclusive jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and therefore the exclusive power to punish. Such is the case here where Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce, has legislated as to the appliances with which certain instrumentalities of that commerce must be furnished in order to secure the safety of employees. Until Congress entered that field, the states could legislate as to equipment in such manner as to incidentally affect, without burdening, interstate commerce. But Congress could pass the safety appliance act only because of the fact that the equipment of cars moving on interstate roads was a regulation of interstate commerce. Under the Constitution the nature of that power is such that, when exercised, it is exclusive, and ipso facto supersedes existing state legislation on the same subject. Congress, of course, could have 'circumscribed its...
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