Higgins-Williams v. Sutter Med. Found.

• Decision Date: 26 May 2015
• Docket Number: C073677
• Citation: 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 745,31 A.D. Cases 1167,237 Cal.App.4th 78
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Michaelin HIGGINS-WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SUTTER MEDICAL FOUNDATION, Defendant and Respondent.

237 Cal.App.4th 78

187 Cal.Rptr.3d 745

31 A.D. Cases 1167

Michaelin HIGGINS-WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.SUTTER MEDICAL FOUNDATION, Defendant and Respondent.

C073677

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Filed May 26, 2015

Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen, Lincoln, Stephen G. Pongratz, Etan E. Rosen, and Ralph C. Lee, Sacramento, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Hanson Bridgett, Larkspur, Jahmal T. Davis and Adam W. Hofmann, San Francisco, for Defendant and Respondent.

Opinion

BUTZ, J.

In this action for disability discrimination and wrongful termination, we affirm a summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer. We do so largely because the plaintiff employee's alleged disability--an inability to work under a particular supervisor because of anxiety and stress related to the supervisor's standard oversight of job performance--is not a disability recognized in the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq. ).¹

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Summary Judgment Standard of Review

“The aim of the summary judgment procedure is to determine, through the use of declarations and evidence disclosed in discovery, whether the parties possess conflicting evidence on a material issue that requires a trial to sort out--in short, whether a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Yanez v. Plummer (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 180, 185-186, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 309 (Yanez ).)

In reviewing a summary judgment, we first identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must be directed. (Rio Linda Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 732, 734-735, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 710.) Summary judgment is properly granted to a defendant who shows that an element of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established, unless the plaintiff sets forth specific facts showing a triable issue of material fact as to that element. (Yanez, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 186, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 309.)

“We review independently from the trial court the summary judgment papers. We do not resolve factual issues but ascertain whether there are any to resolve.” (Yanez, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 186, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 309.)

The Complaint's Causes of Action

The complaint alleges four causes of action under FEHA (§ 12900 et seq. ): disability discrimination; failure to engage in the interactive process and make reasonable accommodation for the disability; retaliation for assertion of disability rights; and disability-related wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

Additionally, the complaint alleges two causes of action under California's Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA; §§ 12945.1, 12945.2): discrimination for using CFRA leave; and CFRA-related wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

Undisputed Facts

The summary judgment papers show the following undisputed facts.

In September 2007, defendant Sutter Medical Foundation (Sutter) hired plaintiff Michaelin Higgins-Williams (plaintiff) as a clinical assistant in Sutter's shared services department (the Department or the Shared Services Department). The Department's clinical assistants work as “floaters” doing patient intake.

Since 2007, Norma Perry has been Sutter's regional manager overseeing the Shared Services Department. From 2007 through 2011, Debbie Prince was plaintiff's immediate supervisor in the Department, and reported to Perry.

In June 2010, plaintiff reported to her treating physician, Alexander Chen, M.D., that she was stressed because of interactions at work with human resources and her manager. Dr. Chen diagnosed plaintiff as having adjustment disorder with anxiety

.

Based on Dr. Chen's diagnosis, Sutter granted plaintiff a stress-related (disability) leave of absence from work under the CFRA and the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ), from June 28, 2010, through August 2, 2010. Dr. Chen reported plaintiff's disabling condition as “ ‘stress[ ] when dealing with her Human Resources and her manager.’ ”

Plaintiff exhausted her available CFRA and FMLA leave entitlements when she took this leave of absence from June 28 through August 2, 2010.

When plaintiff returned to work on August 3, 2010, she received a negative performance evaluation from supervisor Prince, which was also signed by regional manager Perry; this was plaintiff's only negative evaluation while employed at Sutter.

According to plaintiff, regional manager Perry, on September 8, 2010, began singling plaintiff out for negative treatment; Perry was curt and abrupt with plaintiff, while being open and friendly with plaintiff's coworkers, and gave plaintiff a disproportionate share of work.

The next day, September 9, 2010, according to plaintiff, supervisor Prince inaccurately accused plaintiff of being irresponsible in the care of her identification badge. And on that same day, regional manager Perry grabbed plaintiff's arm and yelled at her, after which plaintiff suffered a panic attack, left work, and never returned.

In mid-September 2010, plaintiff submitted to Sutter a disability accommodation request form, requesting a transfer to a different department (for “ ‘forever’ ”), a schedule of 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and, pursuant to Dr. Chen's recommendation, a leave of absence from September 9 through October 31, 2010. Sutter granted the requested leave of absence.

Plaintiff's only alleged disability was her adjustment disorder with anxiety

.

In late October 2010, pursuant to a status report to Sutter, Dr. Chen stated he could not comment on plaintiff's return to work because Sutter had yet to decide whether to transfer plaintiff out of the Shared Services Department. Sutter extended plaintiff's leave through November 9, 2010.

In another status report to Sutter on November 4, 2010, Dr. Chen stated that plaintiff needed to be transferred out of the Shared Services Department under a different regional manager, and that if such a transfer occurred, plaintiff would be able to function without limitations. Sutter extended plaintiff's leave of absence through December 16, 2010.

In late December 2010, Dr. Chen, after consulting with a physician (Alan Rosenthal, M.D.) working for Sutter's third party disability administrator, (1) stated to Dr. Rosenthal that, while plaintiff was able to return to work as a clinical assistant, Dr. Chen was concerned about plaintiff's ability to do so in the same department as regional manager Perry and (2) told plaintiff he believed she was ready to return to work on or about December 27, 2010 (although plaintiff later informed Dr. Chen she was not mentally ready to do so).

On January 6, 2011, Dr. Chen informed Sutter that plaintiff could not return to work on January 6, and requested that Sutter permit plaintiff to return to the Shared Services Department beginning March 1, 2011, on light duty in conjunction with Sutter's transitional connecting to work program.

On January 24, 2011, Sutter informed plaintiff (1) that Dr. Chen had stated on January 6, 2011, that plaintiff could not return to work then, but that plaintiff wanted to return on March 1, 2011, on light duty in the connecting to work program; (2) that Dr. Chen did not provide any information as to if or when plaintiff would be able to return to her clinical assistant position; (3) that there was no information to support a conclusion that additional leave as an accommodation would effectuate plaintiff's return as a clinical assistant; and (4) that if plaintiff did not provide such information by January 31, 2011, her employment would be terminated February 1, 2011.

On January 28, 2011, Dr. Chen informed Sutter that plaintiff was not medically cleared to return to work at that point, and that plaintiff would continue her regimen of psychotherapy and medications. In her deposition, plaintiff testified she did not feel she could have returned to work in the Shared Services Department with regional manager Perry or supervisor Prince on February 1, 2011. Plaintiff also testified at her deposition that at the time of her termination, she “ ‘was willing to try’ ” to return to work on March 1, 2011, in the Shared Services Department under manager Perry.

Sutter terminated plaintiff February 1, 2011.

DISCUSSION

I. Cause of Action for Disability Discrimination--Undisputed Facts Show Plaintiff Is Not Disabled

Plaintiff alleges as a cause of action that Sutter discriminated against her based on a disability and failed to prevent such discrimination, in violation of FEHA.

FEHA states, as relevant, “It is an unlawful employment practice ...[¶] ... [f]or an employer, because of ... mental disability

... to discriminate against [an employee] ... in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (§ 12940, subd. (a).) A qualifying “ ‘[m]ental disability’ ” under FEHA includes “any mental or psychological disorder ..., such as ... emotional or mental illness” that “limits a major life activity.” (§ 12926, subd. (j)(1).) The term “major life activity” is broadly construed and includes physical, mental and social activities, and working (§ 12926, subd. (j)(1)(C)); “limits” means the achievement of a major life activity is made difficult (id., subd. (j)(1)(A) & (B)).

To establish a prima facie case of mental disability

discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must show the following elements: (1) She suffers from a mental disability ; (2) she is otherwise qualified to do the job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability. (Faust v. California Portland Cement Co. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 864, 886, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 729 ; Chin et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Employment Litigation (The Rutter Group 2014) ¶ 9:2297, pp. 9-202 to 9-203.)

As we shall explain, the undisputed facts show plaintiff does not suffer from a FEHA-recognized mental disability

; consequently, the trial court properly granted summary adjudication of this cause of action because plaintiff cannot establish...