Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry Machine Company

• Decision Date: 19 April 1915
• Docket Number: No. 669,669
• Parties: F. T. ROUNDS and S. A. Jesse, Plffs. in Err., v. CLOVERPORT FOUNDRY & MACHINE COMPANY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

237 U.S. 303

35 S.Ct. 596

59 L.Ed. 966

F. T. ROUNDS and S. A. Jesse, Plffs. in Err.,

v CLOVERPORT FOUNDRY & MACHINE COMPANY.

No. 669.

Submitted February 23, 1915.

Decided April 19, 1915.

Mr. William T. Ellis for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. Claude Mercer for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 304 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court:

The Cloverport Foundry & Machine Company, the defendant in error, brought this suit against F. T. Rounds and S. A. Jesse, of Owensboro, Kentucky, in the Breckinridge circuit court of that state, to recover the sum of $5,668.65 for work and materials furnished under a contract to repair and rebuild a steamboat formerly known as the 'R. D. Kendall,' and renamed the 'Golden Girl.' The defendants were the owners of the vessel. A specific attachment was issued under §§ 2480 to 2486 of the Kentucky Statutes, which provided for a lien upon watercraft for work and supplies, etc., and the defendants procured a release of the boat by executing a forthcoming bond. By special demurrer, the defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the action upon the ground that the subject-matter was exclusively cognizable in the admiralty. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendants, reasserting the absence of authority in the court, answered, denying the allegations of the petition, and setting up a counterclaim for damages alleged to have been caused by defective work and by delay in completion. Upon the trial, the counterclaim was dismissed and the company had judgment against the defendants for the amount demanded in its petition; it was further adjudged that, by virtue of the attachment and the applicable law, the plaintiff had a lien upon the vessel for the payment of the judgment, and the vessel was ordered to be sold and the proceeds applied to the debt. The court of appeals of the state affirmed the judgment. 159 Ky. 414, 167 S. W. 384.

The question presented on this writ of error relates solely to the jurisdiction of the state court. It is contended by the plaintiffs in error that the contract in suit was for repairs on the vessel, and therefore was maritime in character; that the proceeding was in rem and beyond the* competency of the local tribunal. See The Moses Yaylor, 4 Wall. 411, 18 L. ed. 397; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 18 L. ed. 451; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 19 L. ed. 266; The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1, 37 L. ed. 345, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498; The Glide, 167 U. S. 606, 42 L. ed. 296, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930; The Robert W. Parsons (Perry v. Haines) 191 U. S. 17, 48 L. ed. 73, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8; act of June 23, 1910, chap. 373, 36 Stat. at L. 604, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 7783. On the other hand, the defendant in error denies that the contract was maritime, contending that the old boat was dismantled, its identity destroyed, and a new boat built, and that the case in this aspect falls within the decisions relating to contracts for the original construction of a vessel. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393, 15 L. ed. 961; Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129, 16 L. ed. 294; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, 22 L. ed. 487; The Winnebago (Iroquois Transp. Co. v. Delaney Forge & Iron Co.) 205 U. S. 354, 51 L. ed. 836, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 509. Further, it is urged in support of the judgment that the proceeding was in personam, and not in rem; that the attachment and direction for sale were incidental to the suit against the owners and for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the personal judgment. Accordingly, it is said, the proceeding was within the scope of the 'common-law remedy' saved to suitors by the judiciary act. 1 Stat. at L. 77, chap. 20; Rev. Stat. § 563, Judicial Code, § 24 [36 Stat. at L. 1091, chap. 231, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 991].

As the last point is plainly well taken, it is unnecessary to go further. It is well settled that in an action in personam the state court has jurisdiction to issue an auxiliary attachment against the vessel; and, whether or not the contract in suit be deemed to be of a maritime nature, it cannot be said that the state court transcended its authority. The proceeding in rem which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty is one essentially against the vessel itself as the debtor or offending thing,—in which the vessel is itself 'seized and impleaded as the defendant, and is judged and sentenced accordingly.' By virtue of dominion over the thing all persons interested in it are deemed to be parties to the suit; the decree binds all the world, and under it the property itself passes, and not merely the title or interest of a personal defendant. The Mary, 9 Cranch, 126, 144, 3 L. ed. 678, 684; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 18 L. ed. 397; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 18 L. ed. 451; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 19 L. ed. 266; The Glide, 167 U. S. 606, 42 L. ed. 296, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930; The Robert W. Parsons (Perry v. Haines) 191 U. S. 17, 48 L. ed. 73, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8; Bird v. The Josephine, 39 N. Y. 19, 27. Actions in personam with a concurrent attachment to afford security for the payment of a personal judgment are in a different category. The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 19 L. ed. 266; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, 598, 599, 15 L. ed. 1028, 1033, 1034; The Robert W. Parsons (Perry v. Haines) 191 U. S. 17, 48 L. ed. 73, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8. And this is so not only in the case of an attachment against the property of the defendant generally, but also where it runs specifically against the vessel under a state statute providing for a lien, if it be found that the attachment was auxiliary to the remedy in personam. Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185, 20 L. ed. 74; see also Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co. 119 U. S. 388, 398, 399, 30 L. ed. 447, 450, 451, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254; ...