Hicks v. General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Assembly Plant

• Decision Date: 03 December 1975
• Docket Number: Docket No. 22268
• Citation: 238 N.W.2d 194,66 Mich.App. 38
• Parties: Julius B. HICKS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET ASSEMBLY PLANT, Defendant-Appellant. 66 Mich.App. 38, 238 N.W.2d 194
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 194

238 N.W.2d 194

Julius B. HICKS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET ASSEMBLY PLANT,

Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 22268.

66 Mich.App. 38, 238 N.W.2d 194

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Dec. 3, 1975.

Released for Publication Feb. 17, 1976.

Leave to Appeal Denied March 17, 1976.

[66 MICHAPP 40] Munroe & Nobach, P.C. by Richard P. Shumaker, East Lansing, for defendant-appellant.

Theodore M. Rosenberg, Flint, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before McGREGOR, P.J., and D. E. HOLBROOK, Jr., and KELLY, JJ.

McGREGOR, Presiding Judge.

On leave granted, defendant appeals from an order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, affirming the hearing referee's award of workmen's compensation benefits to the plaintiff.

The opinion of the appeal board, though brief, sets forth the essential facts found, the issue presented, the standard of law applied, and their conclusion, as follows:

'Defendant appeals the referee's award of benefits for an accident occurring just outside plant gates, arguing that it has successfully rebutted the presumption in Chapter 3, Section 301(2): (MCLA 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2))

"Every employee going to or from his work, while on the premises where his work is to be performed, and within a reasonable time before and after his working hours, shall be presumed to be in the course of his employment.'

'This case involves a plaintiff who finished his work shift, got into his personal truck on the company parking lot, and drove to the exit gate. That exit was controlled by a traffic signal as it fed onto a city street. As plaintiff waited in line for his turn to exit, his truck muffler fell off. He drove out through the light and crossed the four-lane city street, parking the truck on the far side of the intersection. He waited for the traffic signal to change, and walked back across the street with the intention of picking up his muffler, which was back inside the plant parking lot. He had crossed three of the four lanes and was struck by a car in the fourth. His injuries and continuing disability since the incident are not in dispute. The referee's decision gives defendant[66 MICHAPP 41] credit for a third-party settlement made with the auto owner.

'Defendant argues essentially that the falling of a muffler from plaintiff's truck was not a risk occasioned by employment, and that plaintiff had left its premises and had not regained those premises when the accident occurred.

'However, applying the yardstick of Fischer v. Lincoln Tool & Die, 37 Mich.App. 198, 194 N.W.2d 476 (1971) (and citations therein), we find plaintiff not to have left the 'zone, environments and hazards' of his workplace * * * and point specifically to the hazards of exiting or returning to the plant entrance precisely where hundreds of workers' cars flow out onto the city street.'

Defendant argues that plaintiff had left the 'zone, environments, and hazards' of the employment. Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N.W. 243 (1914). In Hills, the employee was struck by a train on his way home for lunch, although still on the employer's premises. Therefore, defendant asserts that Hills is distinguishable from the instant matter because this plaintiff was not on the employer's premises and was pursuing a completely personal mission. ¹ As Hills and numerous succeeding cases have made clear, however, the zone, environment and hazards of employment are not determined solely by the boundaries of the premises.

It has been held:

'* * * that the employment is not limited by the exact time when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it nor when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time, space, and opportunity before and [66 MICHAPP 42] after, while he is at or near his place of employment. One of the tests sometimes applied is whether the workman is still on the premises of his employer. This, while often a helpful consideration, is by no means conclusive. A workman might be on the premises of another than his employer, or in a public place, and yet be so close to the scene of his labors, within its zone, environments, and hazards, as to be in effect at the place and under the protection of the act'. Hills v. Blair, supra, 27, 148 N.W. 246.

Having become riddled with exceptions, the general rule of noncompensability while going to and from work has evolved into a new rule which compensates injury where there is a sufficient nexus between the employment and the injury to conclude that it was a circumstance of the employment. Thomas v. Certified Refrigeration, Inc., 392 Mich. 623, 221 N.W.2d 378 (1974), Nemeth v. Michigan Building Components, 390 Mich. 734, 213 N.W.2d 144 (1973); also see Stark v. L. E. Meyers Co., 58 Mich.App. 439, 228 N.W.2d 411 (1975).

One of the factors considered as supportive of a finding that the employee is entitled to workmen's compensation benefits, either as an exception to the general rule or as establishing a sufficient nexus, is whether the employment subjects the employee to excessive exposure to traffic risks. See Chrysler v. Blue Arrow Transport Lines, 295 Mich. 606, 295 N.W. 331 (1940), Dent v. Ford Motor Co., 275 Mich. 39, 265 N.W. 518 (1936).

Applying that appropriate standard of law, we cannot say that the appeal board erred in concluding that the zone, environments and hazards of the employment included the risk of being struck by another car at a heavily travelled and very busy traffic light and plant exit. Compare Stark v. L. E. Meyers, Co., supra, in which this Court affirmed [66 MICHAPP 43] a finding that plaintiff was exposed merely to the normal risks of traffic in his 140-mile daily travels.

We agree with the appeal board's finding, that there was no significant difference in the risks involved to one who is on foot rather than driving a vehicle at such an intersection.

Defendant argues that the doctrine applies...