Marshall v. Town of Newington

Decision Date30 January 1968
Citation156 Conn. 107,239 A.2d 478
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesHarry MARSHALL et al. v. TOWN OF NEWINGTON. (two cases).

Abraham S. Silver, New Britain, for appellants (plaintiffs).

William W. Sprague, Hartford, with whom was David C. Rappe, Meriden, for appellee (defendant).

Before ALCORN, HOUSE, COTTER, THIM and RYAN, JJ.

HOUSE, Associate Justice.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Common Pleas from a decision of the board of tax review of the defendant town which denied relief to the plaintiffs on their appeals from the refusal of the assessor to classify and assess three tracts of their land as farmland on the tax lists of 1964 and 1965. By way of relief, the appeals prayed only that the valuation of the property be reduced. During the trial, the plaintiffs were permitted to amend their prayers for relief to include a prayer that the property be classified as farmland. The court found the issues for the defendant in each case and rendered judgments dismissing the appeals. From those judgments the plaintiffs have taken a combined appeal to us pursuant to Practice Book § 606.

In 1963, the General Assembly enacted §§ 12-107a-12-107c of the General Statutes, which provided for preferential tax treatment of farmlands. In its '(d)eclaration of policy,' § 12-107a declares that it is in the public interest to encourage the preservation of farmland in order to maintain a readily available source of food and farm products close to the metropolitan areas of the state and to prevent the forced conversion of farmland to more intensive uses as a result of economic pressures caused by the assessment of the land for purposes of property taxation at values incompatible with their preservation as farmland. '(F)arm land' is defined to mean 'any tract or tracts of land, including woodland and wasteland, constituting a farm unit.' General Statutes § 12-107b.

Section 12-107c(a) directs that when any owner of land has applied for its classification as farmland, the local assessor shall determine whether it qualifies for such a classification, and, '(i)n determining whether such land is farm land, such assessor shall take into account, among other things, the acreage of such land, the portion thereof in actual use for farming or agricultural operations, the productivity of such land, the gross income derived therefrom, the nature and value of the equipment used in connection therewith, and the extent to which the tracts comprising such land are contiguous.' The same statute in subsection (d) provides that any person aggrieved by the denial of any application for the classification of land as farmland shall have the same rights and remedies for appeal and relief as are provided by the General Statutes for taxpayers claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of assessors or boards of tax review.

The provisions of one other statute are relevant. Section 12-63 provides that, although the present true and actual value of all other property shall be deemed by all assessors and boards of tax review to be the fair market value, the true and actual value of land classified as farmland pursuant to § 12-107c (as well as open space land and forest land) 'shall be based upon its current use without regard to neighborhood land use of a more intensive nature.' It is admitted that the plaintiffs, in accordance with the statutory requirements, petitioned the assessor for the classification of the three parcels as farmland, that he refused to make the requested classification, that he assessed them on the basis of fair market value, that the plaintiffs appealed to the board of tax review, and that the board refused to classify the parcels as farmland.

The court's finding lacks the clarity and specificity which is not only desirable but necessary to test the validity of its conclusions. Practice Book § 619. It appears that the three tracts of land involved a total of slightly over seventy-three acres, that the plaintiffs' principal crop was sweet corn, that one of the plaintiffs estimated that he picked 500 dozen ears of corn per acre planted and sold them for seventy cents a dozen, and that in the years 1964 and 1965 the plaintiffs expended $1977.20 per year for fertilizer and farm supplies. Their farm equipment consisted of three tractors, one corn planter, one hay baler, one mowing machine, two harrows, one plow and two sprayers for which the assessor allowed a $3000 farm equipment tax exemption pursuant to § 12-91 of the General Statutes, which provides for a maximum exemption of $3000 for farm machinery 'actually and exclusively used in farming.' On one tract, consisting of 35.3 acres, fifteen acres of corn were cultivated. Some fifteen acres of the remaining acres of that tract were swampy and unfit for cultivation, and about 3.6 acres were wooded. The fifteen acres of swamp land, however, were not included as part of the 'farm unit' on the plaintiffs' application for farm classification. The court also specifically found that in Connecticut farm units traditionally include some land which is not tillable and that it is a recognized principle of good farming to allow portions of tillable land to remain unused for one or more years. Another parcel consisting of 9.7 acres was treated with atrozine, a recognized herbicide, and seven acres of it was cultivated with rye. The third parcel consisted of 28.2 acres. In 1963 and 1964, a knoll on this parcel was removed, the topsoil was accumulated on adjacent land, and the underlying material was sole as fill. In their farm classification application, the plaintiffs claimed that twenty acres of the tract were usable for farming. They did not include the 8.2 acres from which fill was removed as a part of the acreage for the farm unit, and their application claimed that, of the remaining twenty acres,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Griswold Airport v. Town of Madison
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 23 Diciembre 2008
    ...by the same stated policy considerations. See General Statutes § 12-107a.14 Consequently, this court's decision in Marshall v. Newington, 156 Conn. 107, 239 A.2d 478 (1968), concerning the use of property for purposes of farmland classification under § 12-107c, is instructive for purposes o......
  • Consiglio v. Warden, Connecticut State Prison
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 15 Diciembre 1970
    ...to be added are not shown to be admitted or undisputed. Thus, these assignments of error cannot be considered. Marshall v. Town of Newington, 156 Conn. 107, 111, 239 A.2d 478. The plaintiff has further assigned as error, in that they were found without evidence, the court's findings that th......
  • New Haven Water Co. v. Board of Tax Review of Town of Prospect
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 26 Junio 1979
    ...supra, 174 Conn. 13, 381 A.2d 534; see Johnson v. Board of Tax Review, 160 Conn. 71, 73, 273 A.2d 706 (1970); Marshall v. Newington, 156 Conn. 107, 239 A.2d 478 (1968). With this much, the parties agree, but as the arguments concerning the proper components of a valuation formula based upon......
  • State ex rel. Ogan v. Teater
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • 17 Mayo 1978
    ...164 Ohio St. 275, 281, 131 N.E.2d 390; State v. Gilkerson (1965), 1 Ohio St.2d 103, 104, 205 N.E.2d 13; see, also, Marshall v. Newington (1968), 156 Conn. 107, 239 A.2d 478; State ex rel. Moore v. Munchmeyer (W.Va.1973), 197 S.E.2d 648. The above rule especially applies in the situation whe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT