Mahon v. Guaranty Trust & Safe Deposit Co.

• Citation: 239 F. 266
• Decision Date: 02 January 1917
• Docket Number: 2252.
• Parties: MAHON et al. v. GUARANTY TRUST & SAFE DEPOSIT CO.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

239 F. 266

MAHON et al. v. GUARANTY TRUST & SAFE DEPOSIT CO.

No. 2252.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

January 2, 1917

Appellants appeal from an order of the District Court granting a preliminary injunction restraining them from violating or causing others to violate a certain contract governing the conditions of employment of a large number of men operating the street railway lines of the defendant the Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Company, and also restraining the employes of the traction company from going on a strike or quitting in a body in violation of the express provisions of that agreement.

Appellee a citizen of Pennsylvania, is the trustee named in a certain mortgage given by the defendant the Indianapolis Traction &amp Terminal Company, a citizen of Indiana, hereinafter referred to as the traction company, to secure the payment of a loan of $5,000,000. The traction company owns certain franchises real estate, and street car lines, and leases another line from the Indianapolis Street Railway Company, all of which it operates in the city of Indianapolis. A large number of the other defendants are its employes, while other defendants are officers and representatives of labor unions. None of these defendants are citizens of Pennsylvania, nearly all of them being citizens of Indiana.

In October, 1913, the employes of the traction company went out on a strike which continued until November, 1913, when an agreement was reached; some of the more important features being: That the employes should return to their work without prejudice and with full seniority rights recognized; that all grievances as to wages and conditions should be presented by the employes to the company and unless satisfactorily adjusted should be referred to the Public Service Commission for the State of Indiana for final determination, the award of said commission to be binding upon all parties for a period of three years; that the agreement thus to arbitrate was not only to be signed by the traction company and by a committee of the employes, but also by the Governor of the State of Indiana and an official representative of the United States government.

Pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate, the men returned to their work and the Public Service Commission of Indiana filed its award in February, 1914. It consisted of 19 findings and covered questions of wages as well as hours and conditions of work. It also provided for a permanent court of arbitration to hear complaints during the life of the award, to wit, during the three years covered by the agreement.

While most of the findings of the commissioners were acceptable to and accepted by the parties to the agreement without question, there were certain provisions which the traction company contended were both impracticable and unreasonable, and individual employes were induced to sign agreements differing somewhat from those provided in the award as to hours of employment. The traction company claimed these agreements to be in harmony with the award and in no way imposing hardships upon the employes. This claim was disputed by certain of defendants.

Appellee alleges that the officers of the union known as the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electrical Employes of America desired to force the so-called 'closed shop' on the traction company and were threatening to call a strike and to cause the traction company's employes to break their contract with the company and to violate the provisions of the award, and that the officers and certain employes conspired together to force upon the traction company the adoption of the so-called 'closed shop' and to violate the contract hereinbefore referred to, and the bill particularly alleged that as a part of the conspiracy the defendants secured shares of the stock of the Indianapolis Street Railway Company and brought the suit in the state court of Indiana for the avowed purpose of securing the cancellation of the lease between the Indianapolis Street Railway Company and the Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Company but for the real purpose of securing the appointment of a receiver during the pendency of a strike upon the ostensible ground that such traction company failed to operate its cars and therefore forfeited its lease. Appropriate allegations of resulting damage to plaintiff's security also appeared.

Various defendants answered separately, while a larger group answered jointly and severally. While many of the allegations in the bill were disputed, defendants' chief defense was that the traction company constantly violated the award made pursuant to the agreement referred to in the complaint and charged that it was the common practice of the traction company to take individual employes into its office and coerce such employe to sign an agreement, in terms differing from the conditions fixed by the award; that thereby the traction company operated its working schedule contrary to the provisions of the award. It is unnecessary to give a more detailed statement of the various issues raised in the District Court in view of our conclusion on the question of jurisdiction. These issues, without further details, are stated only because they bear upon this question of jurisdiction.

The prayer for relief in the bill was as follows:

'Wherefore plaintiff prays * * * that upon the final hearing of this cause, the defendants and each of them and all persons associated or connected with them in the combination and conspiracy aforesaid, or who are parties to said award, or who are parties to said agreement, and all officers, agents, employes or other persons acting in the interest of any of said defendants or associations be perpetually enjoined and restrained from calling or enforcing a strike of the employes or any of them of the defendant the Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Company, engaged in the operation of its system of street railroads in the city of Indianapolis, or by threats or other intimidation or violence or by the advice, solicitation, influence or pressure of the various organizations to which they belong, the same being the labor unions or associations located in the city of Indianapolis or any other organizations or associations outside of the employes of the defendant Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Company, to strike or desist by other concert action from their service as employes of the defendant the Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Company, in violation of said award, or in violation of said agreement, or from preventing by threats or violence other persons from entering the service of the defendant the Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Company, in the operation of its said system, or by such means inducing or compelling any of the employes now or hereafter in the service of said company to become members of said Amalgamated Association against their wills or without their free consent, or by such means compelling the defendant Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Company, to operate its system of street railroads by union labor exclusively, or from injuring or destroying any of the property of the said defendant Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Company, or from interrupting said defendant in the operation of its said system of street railroads in the city of Indianapolis, or by persuasion, threats or any other means whatever procuring or influencing any of the employes of said defendant Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Company, who are parties to said agreement mentioned in the eighth section of this bill of complaint, to go upon a strike or to suspend the operation of said defendant's property, or from interfering with or in any other way interrupting any other employe of said defendant traction company in the performance of the duties of his employment to said company, or otherwise interrupting the said defendant's service upon its road, or in any other way or manner violating the terms of said award or the terms of said agreement. And that the said defe

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