U.S. v. Jones, 99-11235

• Citation: 239 F.3d 716
• Decision Date: 22 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-11235,99-11235
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMOND LEE JONES, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 716

239 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2001)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMOND LEE JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 99-11235

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT

January 22, 2001

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas.

Before DUHE and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and FOLSOM^*, District Judge.

ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

This case involves the constitutionality of a police officer's intrusion into an individual's home to seize a handgun in plain view to officers standing outside. The defendant, Raymond Lee Jones, filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that the officer's intrusion into his apartment to secure the firearm violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Jones for illegally possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).¹ Jones properly preserved error for this Court's review and timely appealed. Jones argues that the exclusionary rule mandates suppression of the handgun and any statements he made prior to receiving Miranda warnings.

I.

When reviewing a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress evidence, this Court may consider the evidence admitted at both the suppression hearing and the trial. See United States v. Rico, 51 F.3d 495, 504 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.1 (5th Cir. 1987)). On February 23, 1999, five Dallas police officers arrived at 1818 Park Row, an apartment house in Southeast Dallas, to investigate complaints of illegal drug sales. The officers obtained information from the Inner Community Policing unit that citizens were complaining about drug activity inside the apartment house, specifically in Apartment No. 3. In addition, Officer Ruff, the lead officer in the investigation, encountered a woman leaving the apartment house who claimed she went to Apartment No. 3 to buy drugs. Because Officer Ruff believed that he did not have probable cause to obtain a search warrant, he decided to knock on the apartment's door in order to identify the occupants and further investigate the complaints.

Officer Ruff and two other officers entered the small common area of the apartment house and approached the entrance to Apartment No. 3. The remaining two officers waited outside. The door leading to Apartment No. 3 stood ajar, but the screen door was shut, giving the officers a clear view into the small apartment.

Officer Ruff approached the screen door, knocked, and announced his presence. At this time, Jones was standing with his back to the door near a kitchen table. A handgun rested on the kitchen table in plain view to the officers in the doorway. Another man sat on a nearby couch. During the seconds that followed, Jones unlocked the screen door and began talking to the police in the common area. Officer Ruff entered the apartment and secured the gun on the kitchen table. After securing the weapon, Officer Ruff asked if Jones had been convicted of a felony. Jones answered that he had. Officer Ruff placed Jones under arrest and recited the Miranda warnings. Jones then told the officers that the gun belonged to him.

Following the hearing on Jones' motion to suppress, the district judge ruled that the officers had probable cause to search the apartment and that the presence of the handgun in plain view created exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless intrusion into Jones' apartment. Jones argues on appeal that the officer's entry was unreasonable. He also claims that his statement concerning his prior felony conviction was the product of a custodial interrogation without the required Miranda warnings.

II.

A warrantless intrusion into an individual's home is presumptively unreasonable unless the person consents or probable cause and exigent circumstances justify the encroachment. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 798 (5th Cir. 2000). The exigencies supporting a warrantless search may not, however, "consist of the likely consequences of the government's own actions or inaction." Vega, 221 F.3d at 799. Jones argues that the government failed to prove that Officer Ruff's observation of the handgun was an exigent circumstance, or, in the alternative, that the officers' appearance in his doorway manufactured the exigency.²

"We review a district court's denial of a motion to suppress by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (here, the government), accepting the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, and considering all questions of law de novo." Rico, 51 F.3d at 501. The presence of exigent circumstances is a finding of fact, which is reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Richard, 994 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1993).

The possibility that evidence will be removed or destroyed, the pursuit of a suspect, and immediate safety risks to officers and others are exigent circumstances that may excuse an otherwise unconstitutional intrusion into a residence. See Richard, 994 F.2d at 248. "Because it is essentially a factual determination, there is no set formula for determining when exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry." United States v. Blount, 123 F.3d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1138 (1998). This Court has looked to the following non-exhaustive list of factors to assess whether an exigency justifies a warrantless search:

(1) the degree of urgency involved an the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant;

(2) the reasonable belief that contraband is about to be removed;

(3) the possibility of danger to the police officers guarding the site of contraband while a search warrant is sought;

(4) information indicating that the possessors of the contraband are aware that the police are on their trail; and

(5) the ready destructibility of the contraband and the knowledge that efforts to dispose of narcotics and to escape are characteristic behavior of persons engaged in the narcotics traffic.

Blount, 123 F.3d at 837; Rico, 51 F.3d at 501; Richard, 994 F.2d at 248.

This Court has consistently held that the presence of a firearm alone does not create an exigency without reason to believe that a suspect is aware of police surveillance. See United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1986). Once Officer Ruff stood before the screen door and knocked, the residents were cognizant of the officers' presence. Jones approached the door in a passive manner, but the handgun remained a short distance from the other occupant. A firearm that is located a short distance from an occupant in a residence likely containing illegal narcotics presents an obvious safety risk to law enforcement officers. See United States v. Howard, 106 F.3d 70, 75 (1997) (finding that narcotics trafficking alone may present safety risks to law enforcement officials because firearms are considered tools of the drug trade). Given the highly deferential standard for reviewing a district court's factual conclusions, we do not think that the district court clearly erred in finding that exigent circumstances arose prior to Officer Ruff's entry. See Blount, 123 F.3d at 839.

The government's own action or inaction, however, cannot be the likely cause of an exigent circumstance. See Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 798 (5th Cir. 2000). In assessing whether the officers created the exigency, we focus on the "reasonableness of the officers' investigative tactics leading up to the warrantless entry." Blount, 123 F.3d at 838.

Federal courts have recognized the "knock and talk" strategy as a reasonable investigative tool when officers seek to gain an occupant's consent to search or when officers reasonably suspect criminal activity. See United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.) ("Reasonable suspicion cannot justify the warrantless search of a house, but it can justify the agents' approaching the house to question the occupants."), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 (1991); United States v. Hardeman, 36 F. Supp. 2d 770, 777 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (discussing the "knock and talk" procedure to obtain a suspects consent to search). Officer Ruff testified that his purpose in approaching Apartment No. 3 was to identify the occupants and discuss the complaints of drug activity. This investigative tactic is not inherently unreasonable.

Jones, relying primarily on this Court's decision in Munoz-Guerra, argues that the danger presented by the handgun would not have arisen but for the officers' approaching his apartment. In Munoz-Guerra, law enforcement officials received an anonymous tip that individuals were stashing illegal drugs in an empty condominium. The informant described the occupants and alerted the police to the presence of firearms. After corroborating this information, the local police requested the help of the Drug Enforcement Agency. During surveillance of the condominium, one of the DEA agents observed illegal drugs through a window on the ground floor. Two agents then climbed over the backyard fence and knocked on the patio door. When the suspect answered, the agents ordered him to place his hands on the glass panes and slowly open the door. The defendant told the officers that he needed to find the appropriate key. Fearing that the suspect might retrieve a gun or destroy evidence, the agents kicked open the door and entered the condominium. In reversing the trial court's decision to admit evidence discovered during the search, we held that the officers created the exigency by approaching the defendant's condominium "under circumstances that were likely to necessitate a protective search of the home." Vega, 221 F.3d at 799 (analyzing the facts in Munoz-Guerra).

Our decision in Munoz-Guerra placed particular emphasis on the DEA agent's observation of illegal...