239 F.Supp. 1 (W.D.Ark. 1965), Civ. A. 944, Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Hardin
| Citation | 239 F.Supp. 1 |
| Party Name | Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Hardin |
| Case Date | March 05, 1965 |
| Court | United States District Courts, 8th Circuit, U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
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Probable Jurisdiction Noted June 7, 1965, See 85 S.Ct. 1802.
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Clyde W. Fiddes, Roy P. Cosper, Tyler, Tex., Barrett, Wheatley, Smith & Deacon, Jonesboro, Ark., for St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co.
Ernest D. Grinnell, St. Louis, Mo., Warner, Warner, Ragon & Smith, Fort Smith, Ark., for St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.
Martin L. Cassell, E. D. Curlee, Chicago, Ill., Wright, Lindsey, Jennings, Lester & Shults, Little Rock, Ark., for Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co.
William E. Davis, Kansas City, Mo., Hardin, Barton, Hardin & Jesson, Fort Smith, Ark., for the Kansas City Southern Railway Co.
Mark M. Hennelly, R. W. Yost, St. Louis, Mo., Smith, Williams, Friday & Bowen, Little Rock, Ark., for The Texas and Pacific Railway Co. and the Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.
Bruce Bennett, Atty. Gen., Jack L. Lessenberry, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John P. Gill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for defendants.
McMath, Leatherman, Woods & Youngdahl, Little Rock, Ark., for intervenors.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judge, and MILLER and HENLEY, District judges.
JOHN E. MILLER, District Judge.
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment under the provisions of Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., is before the court for disposition. The parties have served and submitted elaborate and thorough briefs in support of their respective contentions, and none of the parties has requested oral argument, but in view of the extensive briefs, the court does not believe any useful purpose would be served by oral argument and the motion has been considered upon the exhibits thereto, the affidavits, the pleadings and briefs.
Before discussing the questions presented by the motion, we believe it would be helpful to briefly outline the pleadings, other motions filed by intervenors
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prior to the filing of the motion for summary judgment, and the action of the court on such motions.
The complaint was filed April 10, 1964. 1 Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the complaint are jurisdictional allegations. Paragraph 4 contains allegations of identity of the plaintiffs, and alleged that they are engaged in the transportation of property in interstate commerce over railroads which they own and operate in the State of Arkansas and numerous other states; that each plaintiff owns and operates lines more than 100 miles in length, regularly operates freight trains in Arkansas consisting of more than 25 cars, and regularly conducts switching operations in cities of the first and second class across public crossings, that by reason of such operations they are subject to the provisions of Act 116 of the Acts of Arkansas of 1907, Exhibit A 2 to complaint, and Act 67 of the Acts of Arkansas of 1913, Exhibit B 3 to complaint.
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Paragraph 5 identifies the defendants as Prosecuting Attorneys in their respective circuits of Arkansas, and it is alleged therein that by virtue of the duties imposed upon them by law and by virtue of their oaths of office, they are threatening to enforce the penalties of these Acts and will enforce the penalties unless restrained by this court.
In paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 it is alleged:
'(6) As applied to these plaintiffs, these Acts are in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in that they are arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory and unreasonable in their operation and bear no reasonable relationship to the purported purpose of safety to employees and the public.
'(7) As applied to these plaintiffs, these Acts are in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in that they single out the railroad industry in the State of Arkansas, of which plaintiffs are a part, and impose by statute upon it alone, arbitrary, inflexible requirements as to the minimum number of employees which must be assigned in its business as therein provided.
'(8) As applied to these plaintiffs, these Acts are in violation of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States, known as the Commerce Clause, in that they impose upon plaintiffs' conduct of interstate commerce unreasonable and arbitrary requirements constituting a direct interference with, burden upon, and impediment of such commerce, and in that they greatly and unreasonably increase plaintiffs' operating costs within the State of Arkansas. * * * In addition to the financial burden imposed on plaintiffs by these Acts, they further operate to unduly and unreasonably burden interstate commerce in that some plaintiffs are required to stop or slow interstate trains at various points entering and leaving the State of Arkansas for the sole purpose of loading or unloading employees who are unnecessary to the safe and efficient operation of these trains, and such interstate commerce is therefore unreasonably delayed.'
In paragraph 9 it is alleged that the Acts are also in violation of the Commerce Clause in that they discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of local or intrastate commerce. Act 116 of 1907 applies only to plaintiffs and seven other interstate railroads operating in Arkansas, because each of the twelve interstate railroads operating in Arkansas owns and operates in excess of 50 miles of line; the Act exempts all sixteen of the intrastate railroads operating in Arkansas because each has less than 50 miles of line; Act 67 of 1913 exempts all intrastate railroads and penalizes only plaintiffs and two other interstate railroads with at least 100 miles of line; and this classification 'constitutes a direct, substantial and discriminatory burden upon interstate commerce.'
Paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 deal only with prior litigation 4 concerning these
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Acts, and paragraph 13 concludes: 'The Acts are therefore unconstitutional as applied to all plaintiffs for the reasons set out in Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9.'
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Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 are factual allegations relative to the enactment of Public Law 88-108, August 28, 1963 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3).
Paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 are allegations of the proceedings that followed the enactment of Public Law 88-108 and the award and opinion issued November 26, 1963, by the Arbitration Board.
In paragraph 26 the plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the award 'the federal government has entered the field pertaining to regulation of manning of trains and locomotives and, by reason of the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, has pre-empted the State of Arkansas' power and authority to enforce state legislation inconsistent with, and contrary to, that Award.'
In paragraph 27 plaintiffs alleged:
'The enforcement of Exhibits 'A' and 'B' will frustrate, hinder and prevent the execution and operation in Arkansas of Public Law 88-108, and the Award made pursuant thereto, and would further frustrate and prevent the nationally uniform operation of federal legislation intended by the Congress to provide a uniform solution to a national problem.'
In paragraph 28 the plaintiffs alleged that they have no adequate remedy at law, and that unless the court enters a judgment declaring the Acts of Arkansas void and invalid and restrains and enjoins the defendants from the enforcement of the Acts, plaintiffs will either be compelled to bear the heavy burden and cost of complying with these Acts or will be exposed to prosecution for violation of the laws. The prayer of the complaint was in accordance with the allegations of the complaint.
On April 13, the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit, Hon. Harvey M. Johnsen, designated the acting Judges 'as members of a Three-Judge District Court to hear and determine said action and proceeding.'
On April 29 the intervenors named in the caption hereof filed a motion for permission to intervene. On May 7 an order was entered granting such leave and allowing intervenors 60 days in which to plead. On July 6 intervenors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 'for failure to state a claim upon which relief should be granted.' On July 31 intervenors filed a motion to dismiss for failure
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to 'establish statutory jurisdiction for a Three-Judge Federal Court.'
On May 11 the defendants upon their motion were allowed 60 days in which to answer or otherwise plead. The answer of defendants was filed July 10, substantially denying allegations of the complaint and specifically denying paragraphs 26 and 27. In paragraph 13 of the answer the defendants admitted that in the event plaintiffs do not comply with the Acts, they will be exposed to prosecution for violation.
Simultaneously with the filing of the motion of intervenors to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, they also moved for an order setting consolidated oral argument on the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the motion to dismiss for lack of statutory jurisdiction. On August 19 the motion for order setting consolidated argument on the motions was denied and overruled. On August 25 by separate orders the court overruled both the motions.
On September 4 the...
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