Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Beauregard Magdalene Koennecke Koennecke

• Decision Date: 13 December 1915
• Docket Number: No. 491,491
• Citation: 36 S.Ct. 126,60 L.Ed. 324,239 U.S. 352
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY, Plff. in Err., v. BEAUREGARD MAGDALENE KOENNECKE, as Administratrix of the Estate of J. T. KOENNECKE, Deceased
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

239 U.S. 352

36 S.Ct. 126

60 L.Ed. 324

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY, Plff. in Err.,

v BEAUREGARD MAGDALENE KOENNECKE, as Administratrix of the Estate of J. T. KOENNECKE, Deceased.

No. 491.

Argued November 30, 1915.

Decided December 13, 1915.

Mr. Jo Berry S. Lyles for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Frank G. Tompkins, C. S. Monteith, and W. H. Cobb for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action brought by the defendant in error for causing the death of her intestate, J. T. Koennecke. That latter was run over by a train of the plaintiff in error (the defendant) while acting as switchman in the defendant's yard at Cayce, South Carolina. The declaration alleged reckless negligence, and set out that the wife and four children named were the only heirs and distributees of the deceased, that they were dependent upon him for support, and that they had suffered damage to the amount of $75,000. There was a statute in South Carolina similar to Lord Campbell's act and allowing exemplary damages in the case alleged. In view of testimony brought out on cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses the plaintiff asked leave to amend so as specifically to bring the case under the employers' liability act of Congress, of April 22, 1908, chap. 149, 35 Stat. at L. 65, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8657, the declaration as it stood not disclosing in terms under which statute the action was brought. If it were read as manifestly demanding exemplary damages, that would point to the state law, but the allegation of dependence was relevant only under the act of Congress. The amendment was allowed over a denial of the power of the court to allow it, which, however, is not argued here. Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 59 L. ed. 1433, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, 576, 57 L. ed. 355, 363, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 135, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 134. The defendant then objected to the trial going on. The court left it to the counsel to say whether he was taken by surprise, and, the counsel not being willing to say so, although saying that he was not prepared on the question of dependency, ordered the trial to proceed. It was alleged as an error that the requirement was contrary to the 14th Amendment. The other errors alleged concerned the sufficiency of the evidence said to bring the case within the act of Congress and also the evidence touching the questions of negligence and assumption of risk. The plaintiff got a verdict for $22,500, and the supreme court of the state sustained the judgment. 101 S. C. 86, 85 S. E. 374.

There is nothing to show that the trial court exceeded its discretionary power in allowing the trial to go on,—still less that there was such an arbitrary requirement as to amount to a denial of due process of law within the 14th Amendment. The court well may have considered that the defendant was endeavoring to get a technical advantage, as it had a right to, but that it would suffer no...