24 Cal.3d 266, 23866, Agins v. City of Tiburon
|Citation:||24 Cal.3d 266, 157 Cal.Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25|
|Opinion Judge:|| Richardson|
|Party Name:||Agins v. City of Tiburon|
|Attorney:|| Reginald G. Hearn for Plaintiffs and Appellants.  Ronald A. Zumbrun, Thomas E. Hookano and Elleene A. Kirkland as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.  Robert I. Conn, City Attorney, Gary T. Ragghianti and Richard H. Breiner, Deputy City Attorneys, for Defendants and Res...|
|Case Date:||March 14, 1979|
|Court:||Supreme Court of California|
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Reginald G. Hearn for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Ronald A. Zumbrun, Thomas E. Hookano and Elleene A. Kirkland as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Robert I. Conn, City Attorney, Gary T. Ragghianti and Richard H. Breiner, Deputy City Attorneys, for Defendants and Respondents.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, E. Clement Shute, Jr., Robert H. Connett, Assistant Attorneys General, and Richard C. Jacobs, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
We review the availability of inverse condemnation as a landowners remedy when a public agency has adopted a zoning ordinance which Substantially limits Use of his property. We will conclude that although a landowner so aggrieved may challenge both the constitutionality of the ordinance and the manner in which it is applied to his
property by seeking to establish the invalidity of the ordinance either through the remedy of declaratory relief or mandamus, he may not recover damages on the theory of inverse condemnation.
Plaintiffs own five acres of unimproved land in the City of Tiburon, Marin County. Tiburon has an area of 1,676 acres, a population of approximately 6,000, and because of its proximity to San Francisco, its aquatic facilities, temperate climate, and other geographic advantages, is a very desirable suburban residential area. Plaintiffs' real property is ridgeland, possesses views of San Francisco Bay, and was acquired by plaintiffs for residential development.
Tiburon, like every other city in California, is required by state law to prepare a general plan containing, among other things, "A land use element which designates the proposed general distribution and general location and extent of the uses of the land for housing, business, industry, open space ... and other categories of public and private uses of land. The land use element shall include a statement of the standards of population density and building intensity recommended for the various districts and other territory covered by the plan." (Gov. Code, section 65302, subd. (a).)
Routinely, the development of a general plan entails a careful examination of numerous social and economic factors. Many cities, especially those which are too small to maintain a staff of sufficient size and technical expertise to undertake such a project, seek the advice of expert consultants. The recommendations of these consultants are considered when the local governmental entity prepares its general plan.
In January 1972 Tiburon retained two private consultants, Williams & Mocine and Dean Witter & Co., Incorporated, to prepare advisory reports. The Williams report, issued in October 1972, focused on possible land use designations and recommended that Tiburon attempt to acquire "a substantial portion of Tiburon ridge" for "open space." Plaintiffs' property was identified in the report as one of those parcels of property which were suitable for acquisition for open space. The Witter report, dated July 1972, recommended that the purchase of open space lands be financed through the issuance of $1.25 million of general obligation bonds. The subsequent resolution of the Tiburon City Council approving sale of these bonds did not specifically authorize acquisition of plaintiffs' property or directly refer to it.
By Ordinance No. 124 N.S., effective June 28, 1973, Tiburon adopted widespread zoning modifications which drew upon but did not mirror the consultants' reports. Under the ordinance, plaintiffs' land was designated "RPD-1," defined by Ordinance No. 123 N.S. as a "Residential Planned Development and Open Space Zone." The authorized uses of land so designated are (1) one-family dwellings, (2) open space uses, and (3) accessory buildings and accessory uses. The permissible density of buildings is "not less than .2 nor more than 1 dwelling unit per gross acre" depending on other specified provisions. As applied to plaintiffs' five acres "RPD-1" zoning means a maximum of five dwelling units or a minimum of one. Whether plaintiffs are permitted to build five dwelling units, or fewer, will depend upon the particular architectural design contemplated and the results of the required environmental impact report.
Plaintiffs have never made application to use or improve their property following Tiburon's adoption of Ordinance No. 124 N.S., nor have they either sought or received any definitive statement as to how many dwelling units they could build on their land. On October 15, 1973, plaintiffs filed a claim against the City of Tiburon in the amount of $2 million alleging that the adoption of Ordinance No. 124 N.S. had completely destroyed the value of their property. The city rejected the claim on November 12, 1973.
On December 4, 1973, Tiburon filed a complaint in eminent domain against plaintiffs to acquire their property, but on November 1, 1974, filed a notice of abandonment of the proceedings as then authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 1255a, subdivision (a). (This section was repealed by Stats. 1975, ch. 1275, section 1.) The trial court entered its judgment of dismissal of the action on May 20, 1975. The city paid plaintiffs $4,500 for their necessary expenses incurred during the pendency of the action pursuant to section 1255a, subdivision (c), which then fixed the rights of a condemnee upon abandonment of a condemnation proceeding. The remedy was exclusive and the section did not include, as an element of damages, financial impairment during pendency of the eminent domain action of the owner's right to sell. Accordingly, there was no further cause of action available to plaintiffs by reason of the city's eminent domain proceeding.
On June 16, 1975, plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Marin County Superior Court against the City of Tiburon and Does One through Fifty alleging, as a first cause of action, a claim in inverse condemnation for $2
million damages and requesting, in a second cause of action, declaratory relief, asserting, among other things, that Ordinance No. 124 N.S. is unconstitutional in that it "constitutes a taking of [plaintiffs'] property without payment of just compensation."
Defendants' general demurrer to the first cause of action (inverse condemnation) was sustained without leave to amend. Similarly, their demurrer to the second cause of action (declaratory relief) was sustained with 10 days leave to amend. Plaintiffs declined to amend their second cause of action and plaintiffs appeal from the ensuing judgment of dismissal with prejudice.
Plaintiffs contend that the limitations on the use of their land imposed by the ordinance constitute an unconstitutional "taking of [plaintiffs'] property without payment of just compensation" for which an action in inverse condemnation will lie. Inherent in the contention is the argument that a local entity's exercise of its police power which, in a given, case, may exceed constitutional limits is equivalent to the lawful taking of property by eminent domain thereby necessitating the payment of compensation. We are unable to accept this argument believing the preferable view to be that, while such governmental action is invalid because of its excess, remedy by way of damages in eminent domain is not thereby made available. This conclusion is supported by a leading authority (1 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d rev. ed. 1978) Nature and Origin of Power, section 1.42(1), pp. 1-116 through 1-121), who expresses his view in this manner: "Not only is an actual physical appropriation, under an attempted exercise of the police power, in practical effect an exercise of the power of eminent domain, but if regulative legislation is so unreasonable or arbitrary as virtually to deprive a person of the complete use and enjoyment of his property, it comes within the purview of the law of eminent domain. Such legislation is an invalid exercise of the police power since it is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. It is invalid as an exercise of the power of eminent domain since no provision is made for compensation." (Italics added.)
We have previously pointed to the general nature of the appropriate remedy in such cases. In State of California v. Superior Court (Veta) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237 [115 Cal.Rptr. 497], real parties had been granted a permit to develop their coastal lands by a regional commission. They brought suit when a permit was denied following an appeal to the California Coastal Zone Commission. We held that declaratory relief was an appropriate remedy by which to seek a
declaration that a statute controlling development of coastal lands was facially unconstitutional. Further, insofar as the challenge was to the constitutionality of the act's application to the lands of the complaining parties, we concluded that the proper and sole remedy was administrative mandamus.
Similarly, a landowner alleging that a zoning ordinance has deprived him of substantially all use of his land may attempt through declaratory relief or mandamus to invalidate the ordinance as excessive regulation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 19, of the California Constitution. He may not, however, elect to sue in inverse condemnation and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid. (See Friedman v....
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