Batey v. Stone

Decision Date05 July 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-6264,93-6264
Citation24 F.3d 1330
Parties65 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1161 Thelma W. BATEY, an individual a/k/a Virginia Batey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M.P.W. STONE, Secretary of the Army, an agency of the United States government, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Kenneth M. Parnell, Birmingham, AL, for appellant.

Jack W. Selden, Caryl P. Privett, Jenny L. Smith U.S. Attys., Birmingham, AL, Amy M. Frisk, Arlington, VA, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before KRAVITCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

In this appeal from the Northern District of Alabama, Thelma M. Batey contests three orders entered against her by the district court. With respect to two separate orders cumulatively granting summary judgment for the defendant-appellee, the Secretary of the Army (the "appellee"), we reverse and remand as to Batey's discriminatory treatment claims and affirm as to her disparate impact claim. With respect to the court's order denying Batey's claims pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, we affirm.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual Background

Batey, a white female, has been employed by the United States Army, Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama ("ANAD") since 1958. She began her civilian career with the Army as a clerk stenographer and has since risen steadily. Since October 1988, Batey, a GS-12, 1 has served as the Chief of the Production, Planning & Control Division ("Production, Planning & Control") in the Directorate of Supply ("Supply"). She is the first female to hold this position.

At the time of the events underlying this action, the other relevant division chiefs within Supply were all males: Howard Rhodes, GM-13 (Transportation Division), Fred Fomby, GM-13 (General Supply Division), and Gary Kendrick, GS-12 (Support Equipment Division). Batey and the other division chiefs report to the Director of Supply. The current Director is a male, Lieutenant Colonel ("LTC") James R. Grogan, who replaced another male, Robert Jerre Webb, when Webb retired in October 1990. 2 LTC Billy Johnson, who is also male, served as Acting Director of Supply from approximately May 1, 1991 through November 18, 1991 while LTC Grogan was temporarily deployed abroad.

Just before retiring, Webb promoted Rhodes, who had been a GS-12, to Traffic Manager, a GM-13 position. 3 At that time, the position of Deputy Director of Supply was open. Upon becoming Director of Supply, LTC Grogan stated that a full-time Deputy Director was unnecessary because the function of the Deputy Director was to act as Acting Director when Grogan was unavailable and a division chief could effectively serve as Acting Director when necessary. In choosing an Acting Director for periods when he was unavailable, Grogan used seniority as the primary criteria. 4 As Rhodes, a GM-13, was then the highest ranking official in Supply, he served as the Acting Director, unless he was unavailable. After Rhodes, Fomby and Kendrick were the next highest ranked officials. Consequently, only Rhodes, Kendrick, and Fomby served as Acting Director from October 1990 to May 1991. 5

On or about May 1, 1991, LTC Grogan informed Batey that he was going to write "acting director" into Fomby's position as Chief of General Supply Division ("General Supply"), that he intended to abolish the full-time Deputy Director of Supply position, and that he was going to promote Fomby to GM-13. 6 Contemporaneous to abolishing the Deputy Director position, LTC Grogan created a new job description that fused the job description of Chief of General Supply with that of Deputy Director and thus consolidated the two positions. LTC Grogan allegedly merged the two positions because the Chief of General Supply managed the most people and handled the "logistics" functions for Supply. 7 Webb contradicted this reasoning, however, stating that Production, Planning & Control, not General Supply, performed logistical functions. Webb stated that he would not "dual-hat" the Deputy Director position at all, but, if a merger were created, he would merge the duties of the Deputy Director with the Chief of Production, Planning & Control.

Because the new "dual-hatted" position was required to be filled permanently through the Army's Career Referral Program, in May 1991, a career referral list was requested from the United States Total Army Personnel Command. As originally received, the list omitted the names of both Batey and Fomby; however, an ANAD personnel officer noted the error, and LTC Johnson, who was then the Acting Director of Supply, received a corrected list. LTC Johnson used a system of two qualifications matrices to select the person to fill the new position. Much of the criteria that Johnson employed to evaluate the candidates concerned the job elements of the previous position of Chief of General Supply. That is, LTC Johnson sought a person having experience with 300-500 employees and "operational" supervisory experience. LTC Johnson promoted Fomby to Deputy Director/Chief of General Supply, GM-13, effective October 1991. 8

B. Procedural History

In January 1992, Batey filed suit against the appellee, based in part upon sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. Secs. 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1981 & 1993 Supp.) and section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. In March 1992, the appellee filed an answer to the complaint, along with a motion to strike Batey's causes of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, her prayer for compensatory and punitive damages, and her jury request. The court granted the appellee's motion, holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not apply retroactively. In two separate orders, in January 1993 and in March 1993, the court granted motions for partial summary judgment by the appellee. This timely appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Batey raises two issues on appeal: (1) the district court erred by granting summary judgment for the appellee against her; and (2) the court erred by holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply retroactively and thus was inapplicable to this lawsuit. 9

We review de novo a district court's grant of a motion for summary judgment. Warren v. Crawford, 927 F.2d 559, 561 (11th Cir.1991). We "must determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. All evidence and reasonable factual inferences drawn therefrom are reviewed in the light most favorable to the party opposed to the motion." Id. at 561-62 (citation omitted). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (setting out summary judgment standard).

A. Summary Judgment for the Secretary

Batey contends that the district court erroneously ruled that the appellee did not discriminate against her on the basis of sex in its employment decisions. In particular, in claiming that the appellee treated her differently because of her sex, Batey attacks LTC Grogan's decisions (1) to abolish the position of Deputy Director of Supply, (2) to "dual-hat" the former duties of that job with those of the Chief of General Supply, and (3) to prevent her from serving as Acting Deputy Director of Supply.

Title VII forbids discrimination on the basis of sex, race, or national origin in a wide range of employment practices, including hiring, discharge, and promotion. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1526 (11th Cir.1992). 10 The United States Supreme Court's disparate treatment cases, such as McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), provide the appropriate framework for evaluating claims of sex-based discrimination under Title VII. Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1018-19 (11th Cir.1994). The McDonnell Douglas analysis requires a Title VII plaintiff to establish an intent to discriminate on the part of her employer. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). Because a genuine issue of material facts exists concerning whether the appellee's employment decisions intentionally discriminated against Batey, we reverse the court's summary judgment for the appellee.

Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. 11 Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id. The employer's burden of production in rebutting the prima facie case is " 'exceedingly light.' " Meeks, 15 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir.1983)). Once such a justification is proffered, the plaintiff must, by either direct or circumstantial evidence, demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer had a discriminatory intent. Id. Proof of discriminatory motive " 'can in some circumstances be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.' " Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1529 (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)). Moreover, if the defendant's proffered reasons are rejected, the trier of fact may infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. Hicks, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 (1993) ("The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima...

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