Wittey v. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 April 1890
• Citation: 123 Ind. 411,24 N.E. 141
• Parties: Wittey v. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

123 Ind. 411

24 N.E. 141

Wittey

v.Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 24, 1890.

Appeal from superior court, Marion county; L. C. Walker, Judge.

Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § 5501, provides that “all promissory notes, bills of exchange, bonds, or other instruments in writing, signed by any person who promises to pay money, * * * shall be negotiable by indorsement.”

Thomas Hanna, for appellant. Horace Speed, for appellee.

Berkshire, J.

This is an action brought by the appellee against the appellant on the following writing: “$147.70. Indianapolis, Ind., Nov. 28th, 1883. Four months after date I promise to pay to the order of the Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Company ------ dollars, and five per cent. attorney's fees thereon per annum from date until paid, value received, without relief from valuation or appraisement laws of the state of Indiana. The indorsers jointly and severally waive presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest, and non-payment of this note, and expressly agree, jointly and severally, that the holder may renew or extend the time of payment hereof from time to time, and receive interest, in advance or otherwise, from either of the makers or indorsers for any extension so made, without releasing them hereon. Negotiable and payable at ------. J. B. Wittey. Nov. 28th-31-84. Indiana.” The appellee in its complaint did not ask for a reformation of the instrument, but relied on it as a promissory note complete in itself. The appellant answered by the general denial only. The cause was submitted to the court at special term, and a finding made for the appellee. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which the court overruled, and he excepted. An appeal was taken to general term, and upon the errors assigned the judgment at special term was affirmed, and from the judgment in general term this appeal is prosecuted.

There is but one question presented for our consideration: Is the written instrument, as it appears in the record, an enforceable obligation? We are of the opinion that it is; if not so, otherwise, by virtue of section 5501, Rev. St. 1881, and is negotiable by indorsement. It is signed by the appellant, and, when taken as an entirety, we think it contains a promise to pay $147.70, together with 5 per cent. attorney's fees. By the very terms of the instrument the appellant obligates himself to pay to the appellee “dollars,” and it is expressly recited that the promise rests upon a valuable consideration. No one can read the writing without at once coming to the conclusion that the appellantintended to obligate himself to the appellee for the payment of some definite amount of money, and that the appellee understood that it was receiving such an obligation. Though there may be some formal imperfections in the written obligation or contract which parties have entered into, if it contains matter sufficient to enable the court to ascertain the terms and conditions of the obligation or contract to which the parties intended to bind themselves, it is sufficient. In the language of Lord Campbell in ...