People v. Overton

• Decision Date: 23 April 1969
• Citation: 249 N.E.2d 366,301 N.Y.S.2d 479,24 N.Y.2d 522
• Parties: , 249 N.E.2d 366 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Carlos OVERTON, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 479

301 N.Y.S.2d 479

24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Carlos OVERTON, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 23, 1969.

Leonard Rubenfeld, Dist. Atty. (James J. Duggan, White Plains, of counsel), for appellant.

David C. Gilberg and Michael H. Gilberg, Mount Vernon, for respondent.

BURKE, Judge.

We ordered reargument in this case so that we might reconsider our initial determination (20 N.Y.2d 360, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22, 229 N.E.2d 596) in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797. The single issue before us is whether the search that was conducted in this case may be sustained without a warrant.

The facts, critical to our determination, are quite simple. Three detectives of the Mount Vernon Police Department had obtained a warrant directing the search, Inter alia, of two high school students and their lockers at the Mount Vernon High School. The detectives presented the warrant to Dr. Adolph Panitz, the vice-principal of the school, who summoned the two students to his office. The detectives searched the boys and found nothing. After a brief interrogation, two of the detectives took one youth to his locker, leaving the defendant in the presence of the vice-principal and the remaining detective. At this time, the defendant was asked if he had marijuana in his locker. The youth did not answer, but merely nodded in an uncertain manner. The detective persisted, so that the youth replied either 'I guess so' or 'Maybe'. The detective, Dr. Panitz, the school custodian and the defendant then went to the latter's locker. Dr. Panitz opened the locker with his master key and the detective found marijuana cigarettes in the defendant's jacket.

Subsequently, it was held that the warrant was ineffective insofar as the search of the locker was concerned. The defendant then moved to suppress the use of the cigarettes as evidence in a youthful offender proceeding. The Trial Judge denied the motion, stating in part that 'The Board of Education, through Dr. Panitz, retained dominion over the use of the lockers and the Court finds that the search was legal.' The Appellate Term disagreed, stating in a Per Curiam opinion that 'The search was illegal and cannot be justified upon the theory of consent on the part of the vice-principal of said school' (51 Misc.2d 140, 273 N.Y.S.2d 143). In our initial determination, we reversed the Appellate Term and sustained the denial of the motion to suppress. Judge Keating, writing for a majority of the court, concluded that Dr. Panitz consented to the search and that such consent was binding upon defendant. In his opinion, he pointed out that the locker searched was assigned to defendant Overton at the beginning of the school year. He was given a combination lock, but was required to disclose the combination to his official teacher. In addition, both Dr. Panitz and the school custodian possessed a master key to all lockers in the school. Also, regulations governed the use of this facility so that each student had exclusive possession of the locker only vis-a-vis other students. In summarizing the supervisory position retained by the school, Judge Keating observed, 'Not only have the school authorities a right to inspect but This right becomes a duty when suspicion arises that something of a illegal nature may be secreted there. When Dr. Panitz learned of the detectives' suspicion he was obligated to inspect the locker. This interest, together with the nonexclusive nature of the locker, empowered him to consent to the search by the officers.' (20 N.Y.2d, p. 363, 283 N.Y.S.2d, p. 25, 229 N.E.2d, p. 598, emphasis supplied.) The dissenters argued that 'the principal opened the door, not because he was exercising a free supervisory control over the locker in the interest of the school program, but because he felt the invalid warrant compelled him to do so.' (20 N.Y.2d, Supra, at p 364, 283 N.Y.S.2d, at p. 28, 229 N.E.2d, at p. 598.)

Following our decision, the Supreme Court decided Bumper v. North Carolina (391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797. Thereafter, a petition for certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court of the United States where, on October 28, 1968, that court granted the writ in a Per Curiam opinion, vacated the judgment and remanded this case for further consideration in light of the Bumper decision. (393 U.S. 85, 89 S.Ct. 252, 21 L.Ed.2d 218.)

We are of the opinion that our initial decision, holding that the defendant is not entitled to suppress the cigarettes, was proper when rendered and is unaltered by the spirit, if not the language of Bumper v. North Carolina (supra).

The facts in Bumper illustrate the true meaning of what was written therein. In Bumper, an elderly Negro woman, living in a house located in a rural area at the end of an isolated mile-long dirt road in North Carolina, was confronted by four white law enforcement officials--the County Sheriff, two deputies and a State investigator--who claimed the right to enter her premises pursuant to a search warrant. The 66-year-old woman did not attempt to prevent them, as she meekly replied 'Go ahead'. In that case, as in the present situation, the prosecutor later attempted to sustain the search on the ground of consent. It was also argued that the search was valid because of what was uncovered. (391 U.S., Supra, at p. 548, n. 10, 88 S.Ct. 1788.) The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. In refusing to find a consent to the search, the court recited in detail the factual setting of the case and then declared that 'When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion--albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.' (391 U.S., Supra, at p. 550, 88 S.Ct., at p. 1792.) As we indicated before, it is undisputed that these words, as presented in Bumper, seem applicable and thus determinative here.

A close analysis of the facts in this case, however, discloses that there is lacking here even the 'lawful coercion' which was found objectionable in Bumper. In the City of Mount Vernon, title to all school buildings and properties is in the Board of Education. The administrators of the various schools operate them as representatives of the owner. Dr. Panitz, an experienced administrator and educator, is that representative in the Mount Vernon High School. Under his direction and supervision, desks and lockers are assigned to students for their use, under predetermined conditions, one of which prohibits the storage of material which violates the law. In this case, the detectives approached him and requested his permission to speak with the defendant. With his assistance, they first questioned the defendant and after the colloquy described above--wherein the defendant indicated that there was marijuana in his locker--Dr. Panitz...