N.Y. v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 20 February 1896
• Citation: 24 S.E. 264,92 Va. 606
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: NEW YORK, P. & N. R. CO. v. THOMAS et al.

24 S.E. 264

92 Va. 606

NEW YORK, P. & N. R. CO.

v.THOMAS et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Feb. 20, 1896.

Instructions—Railroads—Liability for Fires.

1. It is not error for a court to refuse to give, without modification, instructions which single out isolated facts that a part only of the evidence tends to prove, and charge that such facts alone do not establish liability, though the legal propositions stated may be correct.

2. Where there is any evidence tending to prove a material fact, the party in whose favor it would be has the right to have the court instruct as to the law applicable to such fact.

3. A railroad company that negligently permits inflammable matter to accumulate on its right of way, which, being ignited from its engines, communicates fire to adjoining property, is liable for the damages resulting, though it exercised the highest degree of care in the construction and operation of its engines.

4. Instructions are to be interpreted in the light of the evidence, and an instruction that a jury might consider other fires caused by the engines of a railroad company, as bearing on the question of negligence in causing the one complained of, without limiting the inquiry as to time, is not erroneous when the evidence before the jury is within the proper limits.

5. An instruction was proper, in an action to recover damages resulting from a fire caused by an engine of defendant railroad company, permitting the jury to consider evidence of other fires caused by defendant's engines, either before or since the date of the one in question, for the purpose of determining whether or not there was negligence on the part of defendant's employes, or defects in its engines, and also for the purpose of showing a negligent habit of its officers and agents.

Error to circuit court, Northampton county.

Action by Sally C. Thomas and Lettie B. Thomas against the New York, Philadelphia & Norfolk Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

E. J. Spady, for plaintiff in error.

Fletcher & Gunter, for defendants in error.

RIELY, J. The first assignment of error relates to the refusal of the court to give instructions numbered 1 and 2 in the form they were asked for by the plaintiff in error, and in giving them with certain amendments. The instructions, as asked for, were as follows: "(1) If the jury believe from the evidence that the woods, on the land of the plaintiffs adjoining the railway were ignited by particles of fire that issued from the defendant's engine, and by means thereof the shatters, woods manure, and down timber on said land were consumed, and the growing trees thereon injured, and stumps and butts of trees upon said woodland burnt down into the ground, leaving large and dangerous holes in many places in said woodland. This does not of itself justify the inference of negligence, but thefact of negligence must be established by additional evidence, and the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to show it. (2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the right of way of the defendant was as clear of inflammable matter as it reasonably could be, running through a large body of woodland, and that the fire was communicated by the defendant's engine to the plaintiffs' woodland, and injuring the same, by first igniting on the defendant's right of way, this of itself does not establish the fact that the defendant was guilty of negligence in this case." The court gave the first instruction with this amendment: "But the above circumstances are to be considered along with the other circumstances attending said fire, in determining whether there was negligence or not." And it amended the second instruction by substituting for the conclusion, "this of itself does not establish the fact that the defendant was guilty of negligence in this case, " the following: "Then such fact, along with any other facts, if any, is to be considered in determining whether or not the defendant company was guilty of negligence." The instructions in the form they were asked for were erroneous, in this: that each of them singled out certain facts which a part only of the evidence tended to prove, and ignored all the other facts which the remainder of the evidence tended to prove, and were equally important in determining whether the defendant was guilty of negligence or not; and announced to the jury that such isolated facts did not in themselves constitute negligence. A single fact may, but rarely does, constitute negligence, any more than a single link makes a chain; but a number of facts, which, viewed separately, would not make out a case of negligence, when considered together, may establish negligence as clearly as a number of links, when coupled together, surely form a chain. It was eminently proper of the court to amend the instructions asked for by the defendant in the manner it did. Calling the special attention of the jury to a part only of the evidence, and the particular fact or facts it may tend to prove, and ignoring the residue of the evidence and the facts it may tend to prove, gives undue prominence to such recited evidence, and disposes the jury to regard it and the fact it tends to prove as the particular evidence, and the fact to be relied on in determining the issue before them, and thus misleads them. Instructions in writing are carried by the jury to their room when they retire to consider of the verdict, and, if they contain a rehearsal of a part only of the evidence, their tendency is to impress unduly on the jury such part of the evidence to the disadvantage of the other evidence in the case, which may be equally or more important in determining the issue, but rests only in the memory of the jury. The instructions ask ed for were objectionable and improper, and the court did not err in refusing to give them as asked for and in giving them as amended by it. Brown v. Rice, 76 Va. 629, 659; Railroad Co. v. Joyner (decided at the present term) 23 S. E. 773; and Sack. Instruct. Juries (2d Ed.) 18.

The next error assigned is in regard to instructions numbered 2 and 3, given by the court to the jury at the instance of the plaintiffs, which are as follows: "(2) The court instructs the jury that, although the jury may believe from...