Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co v. Mosby

• Decision Date: 16 April 1896
• Citation: 93 Va. 93,24 S.E. 916
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: CHESAPEAKE & O. RY. CO. v. MOSBY.

24 S.E. 916

93 Va. 93

CHESAPEAKE & O. RY. CO.

v.MOSBY.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

April 16, 1896.

Equity—Rescission—Quantum of Proof.

1. Where an employe injured in defendant's service was competent to appreciate and understand the nature and effect of a release of a claim for damages, and no unfair methods were used to induce him to sign the release, the fact that the transaction was unwise on his part is immaterial.

2. A release of claim for damages which provides that the defendant company shall re employ defendant after the expiration of six months in his former position, and that, if he is incapable of filling the same, he shall be given other employment is not invalid for uncertainty.

Appeal from chancery court of Richmond.

Suit by Edgar W. Mosby against the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company. There was a decree for complainant, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

P. W. Christian, W. J. Robertson, H. T. Wickham, and Henry Taylor, Jr., for appellant.

Robert Stiles and Wm. Ellyson, for appellee

HARRISON, J. Pending his action for damages, the plaintiff, who was conductor of a freight train on the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, and while thus engaged was seriously injured in a collision, has instituted this suit in chancery to set aside a release of all claim for damages suffered by him in that accident on the ground that at the time of executing said release he was mentally incompetent and that the defendant company took advantage of his incapacity to procure the release. The case was heard by the chancellor without the intervention of a jury, upon depositions only; and the petition for appeal contains no other assignment of error but that the chancery court erred in coming to the conclusion, upon the evidence, that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief asked in his bill.

"The law presumes that there is in every one capacity to contract, and accordingly, where exemption from liability to fulfill an engagement is claimed by reason of the want of such capacity, this fact must be strictly established on the part of him who claims the exemption. Moreover, it is only in certain prescribed cases that this protection can be claimed; and therefore weakness of mind short of insanity, or immaturity of reason in one who has attained full age, or the mere absence of experience or skill upon the subject of the particular contract, affords per se no ground for relief at law or in equity." 1 Chit. Cont. 186. The same author from whom this general rule has been quoted states its qualification thus: "Although weakness of intellect, short of insanity, in one of the contracting parties, is no ground per se for invalidating a contract, it may have that effect if additional facts, betraying an intention to overreach, can be proved." 2 Chit. Cont. p. 1050.

This rule, with its qualification, is substantially adopted by this court in Greer v. Greers, 9 Grat 330. It was there said that, although the person may labor under no legal incapacity to do a valid act or make a contract, yet, if the whole transaction, taken together with all the facts, —mental weaknessbeing one of them, —showed that consent, the very essence of the act, was wanting, it would be void. Where a legal capacity is shown to exist, that the party had sufficient understanding to clearly comprehend, that he consented freely to the special matter about which he was engaged, and no fraud or undue influence is shown to have been used to bring about the result, the validity of the act cannot be impeached, however unreasonable or imprudent it may seem to others. It is not the propriety or impropriety of the act, but the capacity to do the act freely, that must control the judgment of the court.

These general principles are entirely applicable, and are all that need be invoked in considering the case before us.

The plaintiff was very seriously injured in a collision between two trains on the road of the defendant, he being conductor on one of the said trains. In addition to a broken arm, he had an injury to his head, and, as a result of the latter, the use of the other arm was for some time greatly impaired; besides being otherwise bruised about the body. He was confined to the house about one month, and continued to suffer more or less for about twelve months. It satisfactorily appears from the evidence that about two months after the accident the plaintiff went to the office of the superintendent of the defendant company, and agreed upon a settlement of his claim for damages against the company. This agreement was that the plaintiff should receive for six months $75 per month, and if, after the expiration of that time, he did not feel able to resume his position as freight conductor, the defendant would furnish him less laborious labor until such time as be did feel able to resume his former position. About two months after this agreement was made, the plaintiff went to the office of the superintendent, and collected $300 on account of this settlement, and gave a receipt therefor, which fully describes the accident, and admits that his injuries were received under circumstances exonerating the company from responsibility.

On the 22d of September, 1891, the plaintiff again went to the office of the superintendent, and collected the remaining $150 due under the agreement, and gave a final voucher therefor, which is a more elaborate paper than the first, reciting that the injuries were received under circumstances completely exonerating the company from liability, and that the amount was...