POTTER v. VANDERPOOL

Decision Date05 October 2010
Docket NumberNo. 2 CA-SA 2010-0047,2 CA-SA 2010-0048.,2 CA-SA 2010-0047
Citation240 P.3d 1257,225 Ariz. 495
PartiesCarol Ann POTTER, Petitioner, v. Hon. Janna L. VANDERPOOL, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pinal, Respondent, and The State of Arizona, by and through the Pinal County Attorney, Real Party in Interest. Debra Joy Merryman, Petitioner, v. Hon. Janna L. Vanderpool, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pinal, Respondent, and The State of Arizona, by and through the Pinal County Attorney, Real Party in Interest.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Mary Wisdom, Pinal County Public Defender By Lisa M. Surhio, Florence, Attorneys for Petitioners.

James P. Walsh, Pinal County Attorney By Michael C. Larsen, Florence, Attorneys for Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

KELLY, Judge.

¶ 1 In these consolidated special actions, we are asked to determine whether a superior court judge may refuse to appoint at least two mental health experts to assess a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial, after a court of limited jurisdiction has found, pursuant to Rule 11.2(c), Ariz. R.Crim. P., there are reasonable grounds to conduct a full competency examination. Based on the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 11.2(d), we hold that the superior court does not have the authority to review a lower court's decision and substitute its own reasonable grounds determination, but instead must order a full examination of the defendant and conduct additional proceedings consistent with Rule 11 to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial.

Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 These special actions have arisen from separate criminal prosecutions brought against the two petitioners in Apache Junction Justice Court. Petitioner Carol Ann Potter was cited for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), driving with an alcohol concentration (AC) of .08 or more,and driving with an AC of .15 or more (extreme DUI). Potter's appointed counsel filed a motion pursuant to Rule 11, requesting a preliminary examination or “prescreening” to assess Potter's competency to stand trial, stating counsel had concerns based on Potter's “long mental health history.” Noting that a motion had been “filed for a Preliminary Examination pursuant to Rule 11.2(c), [Ariz. R.Crim. P.],” Justice of the Peace Dennis Lusk granted the motion and appointed Dr. Leo Munoz to conduct a prescreening examination of Potter “to determine whether reasonable grounds exist to order further examination of the Defendant.” Dr. Munoz evaluated Potter and, in the report he sent to Judge Lusk, opined Potter was not competent to stand trial and recommended a [f]ull Rule 11 evaluation. Thereafter, Potter filed a motion for a “full Rule 11 evaluation, which Judge Lusk granted, implicitly finding “reasonable grounds exist[ed] for further competency hearings.” Ariz. R.Crim. P. 11.2(d).

¶ 3 Consistent with Rule 11.2(d), the case was transferred to Pinal County Superior Court. The respondent judge reviewed Dr. Munoz's report and stated in her minute entry ruling that “the actual information as to the defendant's understanding of the proceedings and her ability to adequately assist her attorney in this matter” did not support his opinion. The respondent judge added she could “find no reasonable cause to order further evaluations,” found Potter “competent to stand trial,” and ordered the matter “returned to the lower court for resolution, including the immediate setting of a trial/change of plea date.” Potter filed a motion to reconsider the ruling and requested a full competency evaluation, which she asserted was mandatory under Rule 11.2(d). The respondent denied the motion and again ordered the matter returned to the justice court for final disposition.

¶ 4 Petitioner Debra Joy Merryman's case followed a path essentially parallel to Potter's. Merryman was cited for DUI and driving with a drug or its metabolite in her body. Her appointed counsel, the same attorney who represented Potter, requested a prescreening evaluation pursuant to Rule 11 based on Merryman's “mental health history” and counsel's “concern as to whether she is competent to stand trial.” As he did in Potter's case, Judge Lusk noted that a request had been made pursuant to Rule 11.2(c) for a preliminary competency examination and granted the motion, appointing Dr. Munoz to evaluate Merryman to determine “whether reasonable grounds exist to order further examination of the Defendant.” Dr. Munoz evaluated Merryman, found she was not competent to stand trial, and recommended a full Rule 11 evaluation. Thereafter, Judge Lusk granted the state's motion for a “full Rule 11 evaluation,” implicitly finding “reasonable grounds exist[ed] for further competency hearings” pursuant to Rule 11.2(d) and transferring the case to Pinal County Superior Court. As in Potter's case, the respondent judge reviewed Munoz's report, disagreed with his conclusion, and found Merryman competent to stand trial. The respondent concluded no further evaluations were “necessary” and ordered the case returned to justice court “for further proceedings, including the setting of a firm trial date.” Merryman filed a motion to reconsider the ruling and requested a “full Rule 11 evaluation.” After a hearing, the respondent denied the motion.

¶ 5 In seeking special action review, both Potter and Merryman contend that the respondent judge lacked the authority to review Judge Lusk's finding of reasonable grounds for further competency examinations and that Rule 11 required the respondent to appoint at least two mental health experts and to conduct further proceedings to determine petitioners' competency to stand trial. The state has filed a response to Merryman's petition in which it has taken no position on these issues. 1 Because the issues and arguments in both cases are the same, we have consolidated these special actions. And, for the reasons stated below, we accept jurisdiction and grant relief.

Special Action Jurisdiction

¶ 6 Whether to accept special action jurisdiction is for this court to decide in the exercise of our discretion. See State v. Campoy, 220 Ariz. 539, ¶ 2, 207 P.3d 792, 795 (App.2009). We do so here for a variety of reasons. First, “the issues raised ... involve questions of law relating to the interpretation and application of procedural rules and are ‘of statewide importance to the judiciary and the litigants who come before it on criminal matters.’ Id., quoting Bergeron ex rel. Perez v. O'Neil, 205 Ariz. 640, ¶ 12, 74 P.3d 952, 958 (App.2003); see also ChartOne, Inc. v. Bernini, 207 Ariz. 162, ¶¶ 8, 14, 83 P.3d 1103, 1106-07, 1108 (App.2004) (noting questions of law, such as interpretation of procedural rule, particularly appropriate for de novo review by special action). Second, when, as here, a trial judge commits an error of law, the judge abuses her discretion, see Campoy, 220 Ariz. 539, ¶ 37, 207 P.3d at 804, one of the bases for granting special action relief, see Ariz. R.P. Spec. Actions 3(c).

¶ 7 Similarly, we may grant relief when a court has acted in excess of its legal authority or jurisdiction, as the respondent judge has here. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Actions 3(b). And, from the respondent's having entered the same order in two cases, we can infer the error is likely to recur. Cf. Francis v. Sanders, 222 Ariz. 423, ¶ 9, 215 P.3d 397, 400 (App.2009) (listing likely recurrence of issue among reasons for accepting special action jurisdiction). Additionally, the challenged orders are interlocutory, and the petitioners have no “equally plain, speedy, [or] adequate remedy by appeal.” See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Actions 1(a); see also Mendez v. Robertson, 202 Ariz. 128, ¶ 1, 42 P.3d 14, 15 (App.2002) (stating defendant had no adequate remedy on appeal from interlocutory order).

Discussion

¶ 8 [W]e interpret court rules according to the principles of statutory construction.” Bolding v. Hantman, 214 Ariz. 96, ¶ 16, 148 P.3d 1169, 1173 (App.2006). Consequently, we are required to give effect to our supreme court's intent in promulgating a rule, keeping in mind that the best reflection of that intent is the plain language of the rule. Lopez v. Kearney, 222 Ariz. 133, ¶ 12, 213 P.3d 282, 285 (App.2009). “If the language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to that language and do not employ other methods of ... construction.” Fragoso v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 427, ¶ 7, 111 P.3d 1027, 1030 (App.2005).

¶ 9 Rule 11.2(a) provides that a party may, anytime after a defendant has been charged with an offense, request an evaluation to determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial. In response to such a request, Rule 11.2(c) permits the court to order a “preliminary examination” of the defendant, often referred to as a prescreening evaluation, “pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4503(C) to assist the court in determining if reasonable grounds exist to order further examination of the defendant.” Subsection (d) of Rule 11.2, entitled “Jurisdiction,” states as follows:

Should any court determine that reasonable grounds exist for further competency hearings, the matter shall immediately transfer to the superior court for appointment of mental health experts; the superior court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all competency hearings. If any court determines that competence is not an issue, the matter shall be immediately set for trial. 2

Rule 11.3(a) states, “If the court determines [pursuant to Rule 11.2] that reasonable grounds for an examination exist, it shall appoint at least two mental health experts to examine the defendant and to testify regarding the defendant's mental condition.” The remaining provisions of Rule 11.3 define the term “mental health expert,” prescribe the procedure for nominating experts, and direct how other aspects of the competency proceedingsshall be conducted. 3 Other subsections of Rule 11...

To continue reading

Request your trial
48 cases
  • State v. Mendoza
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • November 21, 2019
    ..., 232 Ariz. 208, 210, ¶ 10, 303 P.3d 519, 521 (2013), and "according to the principles of statutory construction," Potter v. Vanderpool , 225 Ariz. 495, 498, ¶ 8, 240 P.3d 1257, 1260 (App. 2010) (quoting Bolding v. Hantman , 214 Ariz. 96, 100, ¶ 16, 148 P.3d 1169, 1173 (App. 2006) ). "If a ......
  • Devlin v. Browning
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • June 5, 2020
    ...¶6 "Whether to accept special action jurisdiction is for this court to decide in the exercise of our discretion," Potter v. Vanderpool , 225 Ariz. 495, ¶ 6, 240 P.3d 1257 (App. 2010), and "[a] primary consideration is whether the petitioner has an equally plain, speedy and adequate remedy b......
  • Lear v. Fields
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • January 12, 2011
    ...action. We do so for the following reasons. First, the order from which Lear is seeking relief is interlocutory in nature. See Potter v. Vanderpool, 225 Ariz. 495, ¶ 7, 240 P.3d 1257, 1260 (App.2010). Second, and more importantly, we agree with the parties that this special action involves ......
  • Gutierrez v. Fox
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • April 13, 2017
    ...224, 227, ¶ 13, 119 P.3d 1027 (2005). "[W]e interpret court rules according to the principles of statutory construction." Potter v. Vanderpool, 225 Ariz. 495, 498, ¶ 8, 240 P.3d 1257 (App. 2010). If the language of a statute or rule is unambiguous, "we apply it as written." Roberto F. v. DC......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT