Williams v. U.S., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

• Citation: 240 F.3d 1019
• Decision Date: 16 February 2001
• Docket Number: 1255,00-1254,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,No. 99-1572,DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,99-1572
• Parties: (Fed. Cir. 2001) SPENCER WILLIAMS, AUBREY E. ROBINSON, JR., C. CLYDE ATKINS, LOUIS C. BECHTLE, SANDRA S. BECKWITH, LUCIUS D. BUNTON, III, WILLIAM M. BYRNE, JR., ADRIAN G. DUPLANTIER, IRVING HILL, MORRIS E. LASKER, THOMAS C. PLATT, JR., JOHN W. REYNOLDS, WALTER H. RICE, MARVIN H. SHOOB, JOSEPH L. TAURO, LAUGHLIN E. WATERS, LEE R. WEST, CHARLES WIGGINS AND HENRY R. WILHOIT, JR.,, v. UNITED STATES,
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Page 1019

240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001) SPENCER WILLIAMS, AUBREY E. ROBINSON, JR., C. CLYDE ATKINS, LOUIS C. BECHTLE, SANDRA S. BECKWITH, LUCIUS D. BUNTON, III, WILLIAM M. BYRNE, JR., ADRIAN G. DUPLANTIER, IRVING HILL, MORRIS E. LASKER, THOMAS C. PLATT, JR., JOHN W. REYNOLDS, WALTER H. RICE, MARVIN H. SHOOB, JOSEPH L. TAURO, LAUGHLIN E. WATERS, LEE R. WEST, CHARLES WIGGINS AND HENRY R. WILHOIT, JR., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,

Page 1020

v.
UNITED STATES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. No. 99-1572, 00-1254,-1255 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit February 16, 2001

Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of Columbia

Senior Judge John Garrett Penn

Page 1021

Copyrighted Material Omitted

Page 1022

Copyrighted Material Omitted

Page 1023

Kevin M. Forde, Kevin M. Forde, Ltd., of Chicago, Illinois, argued for plaintiffs-apellees. With him on the brief were Janice R. Forde, and Kevin R. Malloy. Of counsel on the brief were Richard J. Prendergast and Deirdre N. Close, Richard J. Prendergast, Ltd., of Chicago; and John S. Guttmann, Jr., Beveridge & Diamond, of Washington, DC.

Douglas N. Letter, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, Department of Justice, of Washington, Dc, argued for defendant- appellant.

Richard William Austin, Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, of Chicago, Illinois, for amicus curiae National, State, and Local Bar Associations.

Before Clevenger, Circuit Judge, Plager, Senior Circuit Judge, ^* and Gajarsa, Circuit Judge.

Clevenger, Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge CLEVENGER. Dissenting Opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge PLAGER.

The United States appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia holding that Plaintiffs Spencer Williams, et al. ("the Judges") are entitled to back pay and future cost-of-living pay increases under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. See Williams v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d. 52, 65 (1999). In the four years involved in this case, Congress enacted legislation providing cost-of-living pay increases for federal employees, including federal judges, with the increases payable the following January 1. But in each of those years, Congress also enacted specific legislation, before the end of the year, which denied such pay increases to federal judges, while allowing the increase to be paid to other federal employees. Ruling in favor of Plaintiffs, the district court held that the statutes which denied the pay increases to federal judges violate section 1 of Article III of the United States Constitution, a provision that bars Congress from diminishing the compensation of federal judges. Because clear and unavoidable precedent from the Supreme Court permits Congress to block planned increases in the compensation of federal judges, so long as the blocking statutes are enacted before the planned increases become due and payable to federal judges, the district court erred. We reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the United States.

I.

In 1989, the Ethics Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 ("the 1989 Act"), put in place a system by which federal judges, under certain circumstances, were to obtain, beginning in 1991, yearly cost- of-living pay increases ("COLAs"). The COLA provisions of the 1989 Act were but one part of a host of important reforms. Key reforms of the 1989 Act included extension of post-employment "revolving door" restrictions to the legislative and executive branches, a ban on receipt of honoraria by all federal employees (except members of the Senate), limitation on the outside income for employees in all three branches to avoid any appearance of unethical behavior, increased financial disclosure by federal employees, limitations on gifts and travel, creation of conflict-of-interest rules for legislative branch staff, and, of course, important adjustments to compensation for all three branches. Federal judges received significant increases in base pay, to make up for the adverse effect of inflation on previous levels of base pay and to catch up for COLAs previously

Page 1024

withheld from the federal judges by Congress. See Statement by President of the United States Upon Signing of H.R. 3660, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1225 (synopsizing key features of the 1989 Act).

Pursuant to the 1989 Act, once a determination was made by Congress in a given year that a COLA would be paid to federal employees on the General Schedule, a COLA became payable to federal judges. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 461 (1994) (adjusting judicial pay "[e]ffective at the beginning of the first applicable pay period commencing on or after the first day of the month in which an adjustment takes effect under section 5303 of title 5 in the rates of pay under the General Schedule"). The increases would take effect--that is, they would be payable--starting on the first day of the following calendar year. See id.; 5 U.S.C. §§ 5303(a) (1994) (increases are "[e]ffective as of the first day of the first applicable pay period beginning on or after January 1 of each calendar year"). This procedure began in 1991. See Pub. L. No. 101- 194, §§ 704(b), 103 Stat. 1716, 1769. In January of 1991, 1992 and 1993, federal judges received COLAs. For 1994, Congress awarded no COLA to the General Schedule, and consequently none became payable to federal judges on January 1 of that year.

For 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999, such automatic COLA pay increases were set to go into effect for General Schedule employees and federal judges, as of the first day of the calendar year. But for those years, to the disappointment of the federal judges, the Congress passed separate laws, and the President signed them into effect, that expressly barred the payment of the COLAs to federal judges. See Pub. L. No. 103- 329, §§ 630(a)(2), 108 Stat. 2382, 2424 (1994), Pub. L. No. 104-52, §§ 633, 109 Stat. 468, 507 (1995), Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 637, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-364 (1996), Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 621, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681- 518 (1998). Each of those "blocking" acts became law before the January 1 effective date of the COLA pay increases.

The Judges responded by bringing this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Their suit alleges that the deprivation of the pay increases, as a result of Congress' blocking acts, violates Article III of the United States Constitution. Article III, of course, protects judicial compensation: "The Judges . . . shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. Const., art. III, §§ 1. The history of this provision, and its significance to the functioning of an independent federal judiciary, has been recounted eloquently and at length elsewhere, and need not be repeated here. See, e.g., Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 249- 54 (1920); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-21 (1980).

The theory of the Judges' suit is that Congress "diminished" judicial compensation by specifically denying federal judges the COLA raises that would have been paid under the statutory scheme of the 1989 Act, but for the acts of Congress that nullified the otherwise automatic increases. The asserted logic of this theory is that the judicial COLA increases became vested--that is, the Judges became entitled to them for later dates of receipt--before the dates that Congress acted to block them. The Judges thus allege that the laws depriving them of the COLAs are void as unconstitutional under Article III, section 1, and that they are therefore entitled to the COLAs, in the form of back pay and a current increase in salary. The Judges also request a declaration that the COLA provisions of the 1989 Act must be followed in future years.

The district court, on cross-motions for summary judgment, held in favor of the Judges, ruling that "[t]he Ethics Reform Act granted federal judges a COLA . . . adjustment, effective at the time of the enactment of the Act in 1989." See

Page 1025

Williams, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 59. Because it considered the COLAs to have become "part of the compensation due and payable to Article III judges," id. at 59 (citation omitted), on the date that the 1989 Act became law, the district court granted monetary judgment in favor of the Judges and ordered the government to award COLAs to federal judges in the future whenever COLAs are awarded to the General Schedule. See id. at 65. Thus, under the district court's order, whenever Congress in the future awards a COLA to the General Schedule, Article III requires that a COLA be paid to federal judges.

The government then brought these appeals, ¹. over which we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(2) (1994).

II.

Before turning to the merits of the case, we address the preliminary issues of jurisdiction over this appeal and our potential disqualification.

A.

The Judges invoked the jurisdiction of the district court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2) (1994). That provision, commonly known as the Little Tucker Act, vests the district court with jurisdiction over a "claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount." In its brief to this court, the government suggests that the individual plaintiff judges would each receive in excess of $10,000 were we to affirm the judgment of the district court. At oral argument, the government withdrew its jurisdictional challenge at least as to the Judges' prayer for relief for the 1995 year, since each individual judge would receive less than $10,000 for the unpaid COLA for that year. We agree that the district court possessed Little Tucker Act jurisdiction at least to that extent, if not to the entirety of the complaint. See Hatter v. United States, 953 F.2d 626, 628-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Because sufficient jurisdiction is established in the district court to authorize its ruling as to 1995, and because...