Canady et al. v. Bossier Parish School Board

• Decision Date: 23 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-31318,99-31318
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2001) DIANA CANADY, BILLY JONES, PAMELA JONES, THOMAS ATTAWAY, EARL HODGKINS, ELIZABETH FISHER, CAROL AYERS, DIANE JONES, TONY NEESE, DELLA MCCRORY, VERONICA WALSH, MICHAEL WALSH, PATRICIA VIDAL, DAVID TURNER, LORI WRIGHT, TIM BRODERICK, KEN HENDERSON, JULIE CHRISTEN, DIANE ALLEN, CAROL WILHELM, BECKY EMERSON, TONJA DAVIS, KIRA HIGGINBOTHAM, BRIAN SHOEBRIDGE, ED WALKER, NANCY KIRKPATRICK, WILTON LERITTE, KAREN BUTTERFIELD, JANICE HARVILLE, MARIAN TYSON, JONI HASSLE, MARY VANCE, KEN FOSTER, BRUCE DOMINQUE, TERRY MONROE, THERESA HARMON, CINDY MCCARL, DARLY MCCARL, VICKI ALLEN, BONNIE MONROE, ALL PLAINTIFFS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 437

240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001)

DIANA CANADY, BILLY JONES, PAMELA JONES, THOMAS ATTAWAY, EARL HODGKINS, ELIZABETH FISHER, CAROL AYERS, DIANE JONES, TONY NEESE, DELLA MCCRORY, VERONICA WALSH, MICHAEL WALSH, PATRICIA VIDAL, DAVID TURNER, LORI WRIGHT, TIM BRODERICK, KEN HENDERSON, JULIE CHRISTEN, DIANE ALLEN, CAROL WILHELM, BECKY EMERSON, TONJA DAVIS, KIRA HIGGINBOTHAM, BRIAN SHOEBRIDGE, ED WALKER, NANCY KIRKPATRICK, WILTON LERITTE, KAREN BUTTERFIELD, JANICE HARVILLE, MARIAN TYSON, JONI HASSLE, MARY VANCE, KEN FOSTER, BRUCE DOMINQUE, TERRY MONROE, THERESA HARMON, CINDY MCCARL, DARLY MCCARL, VICKI ALLEN, BONNIE MONROE, ALL PLAINTIFFS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99-31318

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT

January 23, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Louisiana.

Before DUHE and PARKER, Circuit Judges and FOLSOM^*, District Judge.

ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

This Court is called on once again to assess the steps taken by school officials to improve the quality of education in our nation's public schools. While maintenance of order and promotion of acceptable standards of classroom conduct are synonymous with ensuring an adequate education system, school officials are not given free reign to abridge students' constitutional rights. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-14 (1969). In this case we review the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Bossier Parish School Board. The district court concluded that the school board's rule implementing a mandatory school uniform policy did not violate the First Amendment rights of its students.

I.

In 1997, the Louisiana Legislature amended section 17:416 of the Louisiana Revised Civil Statutes to allow parish school boards the discretion to implement mandatory uniforms, provided the school board gives the students' parents written notice explaining the dress requirements. See La. Rev. Civ. Stat. § 17:416.7 (1997). In the 1998-1999 school year, the Bossier Parish School Board required sixteen of its schools to adopt mandatory uniforms in order to determine the effect of the uniforms on the learning environment. After receiving favorable results, the School Board implemented mandatory school uniforms in all of the parish public schools beginning with the 1999-2000 school year. The average uniform consisted of a choice of two colors of polo or oxford shirts and navy or khaki pants. The schools alerted parents by letter about the dress specifications, provided a list of local vendors supplying the required clothing, and displayed an example of the uniform at each school.

Several parents of students in the Bossier Parish School System filed this suit in federal court seeking an injunction against the schools' enforcement of the uniform policy. The parents claimed that the dress code violated their children's First Amendment rights to free speech, failed to account for religious preferences, and denied their children's liberty interest to wear clothing of their choice in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Both the parents and the School Board filed for summary judgment. The parents presented affidavits arguing that their children's constitutional rights were violated and that the School Board's reasons for implementing the uniform policy were unfounded. The School Board offered affidavits of school teachers and principals who concluded that the uniform policy reduced behavior problems and increased test scores. The school officials recounted statistics showing the reduction in disciplinary actions and rise in test scores after the School Board adopted uniforms. Based on these affidavits, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the School Board. The court concluded that the mandatory uniform policy did not violate the student's First Amendment rights and that the summary judgment evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the effectiveness of the uniform policy.

The parents' argument on appeal is two-fold. The parents first argue that the trial court erred by concluding that the enforcement of the school uniform policy did not violate their children's constitutional rights. The parents also claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying them additional time to conduct discovery.

II. First Amendment

We review a district court's order granting a motion for summary judgment de novo. Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Board of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 356 (5th Cir. 2000). A district court properly grants summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Although we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings, but must respond by setting forth specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial." Kennedy, 224 F.3d at 365 (quoting Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir. 1999). The substantive law dictates which facts are material. See Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 1991).

A.

Before determining whether the School Board properly imposed the mandatory uniform policy, we must ascertain whether a person's choice of attire qualifies as speech protected by the First Amendment. "The question of the protected status of speech is one of law, and as such, we review the issue de novo." Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101, 109 (5th Cir. 1997).

The district court, relying on Karr v.Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972), concluded that choice of clothing is a matter of personal taste or style and is not afforded First Amendment protection. See also Littlefield v. Forney Indep. School Dis., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (concluding that a student's choice of clothing was not protected by the First Amendment). In Karr, this Court held that a male student's choice of hair length did not convey sufficient communicative content to warrant First Amendment coverage. See Karr, 460 F.2d at 613-14. The Court reasoned that "[f]or some, no doubt, the wearing of long hair is intended to convey a discrete message to the world. But for many, the wearing of long hair is simply a matter of personal taste or the result of peer group influence." Id. The district court concluded that clothing and hair length were essentially the same for purposes of constitutional protection. We disagree. While a person's choice of clothing may be predicated solely on considerations of style and comfort, an individual's choice of attire also may be endowed with sufficient levels of intentional expression to elicit First Amendment shelter.

The Supreme Court recognizes that conduct coupled with communicative content raises First Amendment concerns. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1965). However, the First Amendment does not safeguard a limitless variety of behavior. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. "In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we [must] ask[] whether '[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.'" Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.).¹ When assessing the appellants' claim, we look to the particular activity, combined with the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10; Cabrol, 106 F.3d at 109.

A person's choice of clothing is infused with intentional expression on many levels. In some instances, clothing functions as pure speech. A student may choose to wear shirts or jackets with written messages supporting political candidates or important social issues. Words printed on clothing qualify as pure speech and are protected under the First Amendment. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971); Board of Airport Comm'r of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575 (1987).

Clothing may also symbolize ethnic heritage, religious beliefs, and political and social views.² Individuals regularly use their clothing to express ideas and opinions. Just as the students in Tinker chose to wear armbands in protest of the Vietnam War, students may wear color patterns or styles with the intent to express a particular message. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-14. The choice to wear clothing as a symbol of an opinion or cause is undoubtedly protected under the First Amendment if the message is likely to be understood by those intended to view it. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.

Finally, students in particular often choose their attire with the intent to signify the social group to which they belong, their participation in different activities, and their general attitudes toward society and the school environment. While the message students intend to communicate about their identity and interests may be of little value to some adults, it has a considerable affect, whether positive or negative, on a young person's social development. Although this sort of expression may not convey a particularized message to warrant First Amendment protection in every instance, we cannot declare that expression of one's identity and affiliation to unique social groups through choice of clothing will never amount to protected...