Farwell v. Keaton
Decision Date | 01 April 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 2,2 |
Citation | 396 Mich. 281,240 N.W.2d 217 |
Parties | Richard M. FARWELL, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Richard Murray Farwell, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald KEATON et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Young, O'Rourke, Bruno & Bunn, by James C. Bruno, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.
William G. Jamison, Martin, Bohall, Joselyn, Halsey, Rowe & Jamieson, P.C., Deftroit, for defendants-appellees.
There is ample evidence to support the jury determination that David Siegrist failed to exercise reasonable care after voluntarily coming to the aid of Richard Farwell and that his negligence was the proximate cause of Farwell's death. We are also of the opinion that Siegrist, who was with Farwell the evening he was fatally injured and, as the jury found, knew or should have known of his peril, had an affirmative duty to come to Farwell's aid. 1
On the evening of August 26, 1966, Siegrist and Farwell drove to a trailer rental lot to return an automobile which Siegrist had borrowed from a friend who worked there. While waiting for the friend to finish work, Siegrist and Farwell consumed some beer.
Two girls walked by the entrance to the lot. Siegrist and Farwell attempted to engage them in conversation; they left Farwell's car and followed the girls to a drivein restaurant down the street.
The girls complained to their friends in the restaurant that they were being followed Six boys chased Siegrist and Farwell back to the lot. Siegrist escaped unharmed, but Farwell was severely beaten. Siegrist found Farwell underneath his automobile in the lot. Ice was applied to Farwell's head. Siegrist then drove Farwell around for approximately two hours, stopping at a number of drive-in restaurants. Farwell went to sleep in the back seat of his car. Around midnight Siegrist drove the car to the home of Farwell's grandparents, parked it in the driveway, unsuccessfully attempted to rouse Farwell, and left. Farwell's grandparents discovered him in the car the next morning and took him to the hospital. He died three days later of an epidural hematoma.
At trial, plaintiff contended that had Siegrist taken Farwell to the hospital, or had he notified someone of Farwell's condition and whereabouts, Farwell would not have died. A neurosurgeon testified that if a person in Farwell's condition is taken to a doctor before, or within half an hour after, consciousness is lost, there is an 85 to 88 per cent chance of survival. Plaintiff testified that Siegrist told him that he knew Farwell was badly injured and that he should have done something.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and awarded $15,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Siegrist had not assumed the duty of obtaining aid for Farwell and that he neither knew nor should have known of the need for medical treatment.
Two separate, but interrelated questions are presented:
A. Whether the existence of a duty in a particular case is always a matter of law to be determined solely by the Court?
B. Whether, on the facts of this case, the trial judge should have ruled, as a matter of law, that Siegrist owed no duty to Farwell?
'A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.' Prosser, Torts (4th ed.), § 53, p. 324.
The existence of a duty is ordinarily a question of law. However, there are factual circumstances which give rise to a duty. The existence of those facts must be determined by a jury. 2 In Bonin v. Gralewicz, 378 Mich. 521, 526--527, 146 N.W.2d 647 649 (1966), this Court reversed a directed verdict of no cause of action where the trial court had determined as a matter of law that the proofs were insufficient to establish a duty of care:
This same rule was stated more recently in Davis v. Thornton, 384 Mich. 138, 142, 180 N.W.2d 11, 13 (1970).
Without regard to whether there is a general duty to aid a person in distress, there is a clearly recognized legal duty of every person to avoid any affirmative acts which may make a situation worse. Prosser, Supra, § 56, pp. 343--344. 'Where performance clearly has been begun, there is no doubt that there is a duty of care.' Id. 346.
In a case such as the one at bar, the jury must determine, after considering all the evidence, whether the defendant attempted to aid the victim. If he did, a duty arose which required defendant to act as a reasonable person.
'Before any duty, or any standard of conduct may be set, there must first be proof of facts which give rise to it,' Prosser, Supra, § 37, p. 205. Whether those facts have been proved is a question for the jury.
2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, p. 1060.
There was ample evidence to show that Siegrist breached a legal duty owed Farwell. Siegrist knew that Farwell had been in a fight, and he attempted to believe Farwell's pain by applying an ice pack to his head. While Farwell and Siegrist were riding around, Farwell crawled into the back seat and laid down. The testimony showed that Siegrist attempted to rouse Farwell after driving him home but was unable to do so.
In addition, Farwell's father testified to admissions made to him by Siegrist:
'Q. Witness, just before the jury was excused, I asked whether you had any conversation with Mr. Siegrist after this event occurred. You answered, 'Yes, the day after in the living room of Mrs. Grenier's (the deceased's mother) home.' Then, the jury was excused, and we made a special record, and now I would like to ask you some questions that I asked and that you answered out of the presence of the jury.
'A. Yes.
'Q. What did Mr. Siegrist say, how did the conversation go?
'A. I asked him why he left Ricky (the deceased) in the driveway of his grandfather's home.
'Q. What did he say?
'A. He said, 'Ricky was hurt bad, I was scared.' I said, 'Why didn't you tell somebody, tell his grandparents?' He said, 'I know I should have, I don't know." (Emphasis added).
The question at trial came down to whether, siegrist acted reasonably under all the circumstances. Davis v. Thornton, 384 Mich. 138, 142--143, 180 N.W.2d 11, 13 (1970).
The jury in this case found that Siegrist did not act reasonably, and that his negligence was the proximate cause of Farwell's death.
' Clark v. Dalman, 379 Mich. 251, 263, 150 N.W.2d 755 (1967).
Siegrist contends that he is not liable for failure to obtain medical assistance for Farwell because he had no duty to do so.
Courts have been slow to recognize a duty to render aid to a person in peril. 3 Where such a duty has been found, it has been predicated upon the existence of a special relationship between the parties; 4 in such a case, if defendant knew or should have known of the other person's peril, 5 he is required to render reasonable care under all the circumstances. 6
In Depue v. Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907), the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed an order of the trial court dismissing the cause of action and said that if the defendants knew their dinner guest was ill, it was for the jury to decide whether they were negligent in refusing his request to spend the night and, propping him on his wagon with the reins thrown over his shoulder, sending him toward home.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hutchinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103, 106 (C.A. 6, 1947), said that a host had an affirmative duty to attempt to rescue a guest who had fallen off his yacht. The host controlled the only instrumentality of rescue. The Court declared that to ask of the host anything less than that he attempt...
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