240 U.S. 1 (1916), 140, Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
|Docket Nº:||No. 140|
|Citation:||240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493|
|Party Name:||Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company|
|Case Date:||January 24, 1916|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued October 14, 15, 1915
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Under proper averments, a stockholder's suit to restrain a corporation from voluntarily paying a tax charged to be unconstitutional is not violative of Rev.Stat. § 3224, and the district court has jurisdiction to entertain the action. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429.
In this case -- that of a stockholder against a corporation to restrain the latter from voluntarily paying the income tax imposed by the Tariff Act of 1913 -- the defendant corporation notified the government of the pendency of the action and the United States was heard as amicus curiae in support of the constitutionality of the Act.
The Sixteenth Amendment was obviously intended to simplify the situation and make clear the limitations on the taxing power of Congress and not to create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system.
The Sixteenth Amendment does not purport to confer power to levy income taxes in a generic sense, as that authority was already possessed,
or to limit and distinguish between one kind of income tax and another, but its purpose is to relieve all income taxes when imposed from apportionment from consideration of the source whence the income is derived.
The Income Tax provisions of the Tariff Act of 1913 are not unconstitutional by reason of retroactive operation, the period covered not extending prior to the time when the Amendment was operative, nor are those provisions unconstitutional under the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment, nor do they deny due process of law, nor equal protection of the law by reason of the classifications therein of things or persons subject to the tax.
The provisions for collecting income at the source do not deny due process of law by reason of duties imposed upon corporations without compensation in connection with the payment of the tax by others.
The uniformity of taxation required by the federal Constitution is geographical. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41.
The Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution.
Arguments as to the expediency of levying a tax which is within the power of Congress to levy are beyond judicial cognizance.
When there are differences between the subjects that are taxed, Congress does not transcend the limit of its taxing power by taxing them differently.
A want of due process of law does not arise from want of wisdom in Congress in levying taxes, and thus give the courts power to overrule the action of Congress by declaring it to be unconstitutional.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Sixteenth Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and the constitutionality of the income tax provisions of the Tariff Act of October 9, 1913, are stated in the opinion.
WHITE, J., lead opinion
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
As a stockholder of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the appellant filed his bill to enjoin the corporation from complying with the income tax provisions of the tariff act of October 3, 1913 (§ II., c. 16, 38 Stat. 166). Because of constitutional questions duly arising, the case is here on direct appeal from a decree sustaining a motion to dismiss because no ground for relief was stated.
The right to prevent the corporation from returning and paying the tax was based upon many averments as to the repugnancy of the statute to the Constitution of the United States, of the peculiar relation of the corporation to the stockholders, and their particular interests resulting from many of the administrative provisions of the assailed act, of the confusion, wrong, and multiplicity
of suits and the absence of all means of redress which would result if the corporation paid the tax and complied with the act in other respects without protest, as it was alleged it was its intention to do. To put out of the way a question of jurisdiction, we at once say that, in view of these averments and the ruling in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, sustaining the right of a stockholder to sue to restrain a corporation under proper averments from voluntarily paying a tax charged to be unconstitutional on the ground that to permit such a suit did not violate the prohibitions of § 3224 Rev.Stat. against enjoining the enforcement of taxes, we are of opinion that the contention [36 S.Ct. 239] here made that there was no jurisdiction of the cause, since to entertain it would violate the provisions of the Revised Statutes referred to, is without merit. Before coming to dispose of the case on the merits, however, we observe that the defendant corporation having called the attention of the government to the pendency of the cause and the nature of the controversy and its unwillingness to voluntarily refuse to comply with the act assailed, the United States, as amicus curiae, has at bar been heard both orally and by brief for the purpose of sustaining the decree.
Aside from averments as to citizenship and residence, recitals as to the provisions of the statute, and statements as to the business of the corporation, contained in the first ten paragraphs of the bill, advanced to sustain jurisdiction, the bill alleged twenty-one constitutional objections specified in that number of paragraphs or subdivisions. As all the grounds assert a violation of the Constitution, it follows that, in a wide sense, they all charge a repugnancy of the statute to the Sixteenth Amendment, under the more immediate sanction of which the statute was adopted.
The various propositions are so intermingled as to cause it to be difficult to classify them. We are of opinion, however,
that the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the Sixteenth Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation -- that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced in argument to support it, as follows: (a) The Amendment authorizes only a particular character of direct tax without apportionment, and therefore if a tax is levied under its assumed authority which does not partake of the characteristics exacted by the Amendment, it is outside of the Amendment, and is void as a direct tax in the general constitutional sense because not apportioned. (b) As the Amendment authorizes a tax only upon incomes "from whatever source derived," the exclusion from taxation of some income of designated persons and classes is not authorized, and hence the constitutionality of the law must be tested by the general provisions of the Constitution as to taxation, and thus again the tax is void for want of apportionment. (c) As the right to tax "incomes from whatever source derived" for which the Amendment provides must be considered as exacting intrinsic uniformity, therefore no tax comes under the authority of the Amendment not conforming to such standard, and hence all the provisions of the assailed statute must once more be tested solely under the general and preexisting provisions of the Constitution, causing the statute again to be void in the absence of apportionment. (d) As the power conferred by the Amendment is new and prospective, the attempt in the statute to make its provisions retroactively apply is void because, so far as the retroactive period is concerned, it is governed by the preexisting constitutional requirement as to apportionment.
But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions
under it, if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to...
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