U.S. v. Richards
Decision Date | 13 March 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 99-3966,99-3966 |
Citation | 241 F.3d 335 |
Parties | (3rd Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. DON RICHARDS, APPELLANT |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands (Divisions of St. Thomas and St. John) District Judge: Honorable Thomas K. Moore
Counsel for Appellee: James A. Hurd, Jr. United States Attorney Carl F. Morey (Argued) Assistant U.S. Attorney Office of the United States Attorney 1108 King Street, Suite 201 Christiansted, St. Croix Usvi, 00820
Counsel for Appellant: Richard Della Fera, Esquire (Argued) Alvin E. Entin, Esquire Entin, Margules & Della Fera, P.A. 200 East Broward Boulevard Suite 1210 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
Before: Mansmann and Alito, Circuit Judges, and Ackerman, District Judge.*
Don Richards appeals his conviction for crimes involving the robbery1 of a Brink's armored van in St. Thomas, the Virgin Islands. He contends that he is entitled to a new trial for three separate reasons: (1) violation of his Sixth Amendment right arising from the admission of an out-of-court statement given by a non-testifying co-defendant; (2) violation of the Jencks Act based on the government's failure to produce an FBI agent's written report concerning the co-defendant's oral statements; and, (3) juror misconduct.
We conclude that the admission of the co-defendant's statement violated Richards' Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Richards' failure to object to this admission during trial, however, allows him relief only if the plain error tenets of Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) apply. Under this doctrine, we find that the error was not reversible. Overwhelming evidence of Richards' guilt exists independent of the statement; therefore, no manifest injustice occurred at trial.
The Jencks Act argument fails for the identical reason. We hold that the government's failure to produce the FBI agent's written report of the co-defendant's oral statement violated the Act, but Richards' concomitant failure to object necessitates plain error review. As with the Sixth Amendment issue, because the fairness of the trial was not seriously affected, a new trial is not justified.
Finally, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying two motions for mistrial based on juror misconduct. Deciding the first motion alleging intra-jury influence would require the court delving into the jurors' deliberative process -- an inquiry prohibited by Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). The second motion alleging juror bias was unfounded. The juror acknowledged during voir dire that he knew one of the government witnesses but remained capable of impartially evaluating the evidence. There is no evidence to demonstrate that the juror disregarded his obligation to remain unbiased.
We will, therefore, affirm.
Don Richards and Theodore Greenaway were tried jointly on offenses arising from the robbery of the Brink's armored van. According to the trial testimony, Richards and Greenaway ambushed the Brink's messenger, Mark Kuffy, and Richards put a gun to Kuffy's head, demanding money. Richards hit Kuffy in the head with the gun and knocked him to the floor of the van. He then collected the bags of money from the van and tossed them to Greenaway.
Two days after the robbery, the driver of the van, Ignatius Stevens, confessed to being the inside man in the robbery. He identified Richards as the person who assaulted Kuffy and Greenaway as his accomplice.
Greenaway was arrested and interviewed by law enforcement officers. In his interview Greenaway revealed that "Don and the other guy who works for Brink's planned the robbery." Greenaway then signed a written confession conceding participation in the robbery, but withholding the name of the individual collaborating in the crime. FBI Special Agent Steven Harker documented the interview, including Greenaway's oral statement, in an FBI FD302 report. When Richards was arrested later that day he made no statement.
Richards and Greenaway were tried jointly. In pretrial discovery, Richards' counsel received a report authored by Special Agent Harker, which informed that Greenaway confessed that he and his "friend" had committed the robbery. The report noted that Greenaway declined to give a name to his "friend."
At trial, Stevens, the Brink's driver, testified that he and Richards planned the robbery for two weeks. On the day of the crime, he observed Richards walk by the van, turn around and walk back. Although Richards was sporting Rastafarian dreadlocks and sunglasses, Stevens recognized Richards by his distinctive walk (a pronounced limp).
Stevens then testified that on the following morning he met with Richards, who told him that he hid Stevens' share of the money, $25,000, in a particular location. At that designated spot, Stevens retrieved the money.
Special Agent Harker testified next and read Greenaway's written statement into the record. The portion relevant to this appeal follows:
The first time I heard about the idea of robbing the Brink's armored van was when a friend, whom I do not wish to name, spoke to me about it. He and I talked and my friend told me it would be easy to rob the armored car since there was an inside man.... The next time I met with my friend was on the day of the robbery.
The statement continued with the description of the different roles Greenaway and his "friend" played in the robbery.
On cross-examination, Richards' attorney asked Special Agent Harker whether Greenaway had mentioned Richards by name. The exchange was as follows:
At this point, the attorney for the government requested a side bar conference:
On redirect, the government further explored the mention of Richards in Harker's interview with Greenaway:
Then, on recross, it was first ascertained by the defense that Harkin's FD302 report reiterated Greenaway's oral statement implicating Richards.
When the government was questioned about Harker's FD 302 Report, it responded that although the document had been produced in discovery, it was not disclosed because the government had made a conscious decision that the evidence should not go in to avoid the Sixth Amendment dilemma which surfaces in joint trials of co-defendants. The report was then provided to defense counsel.
After some discussion of the complication posed by Harker's testimony, the court asked the parties how they wished to proceed. Both defense counsel concurred that they were ready to proceed and no objection was made.
The trial progressed. The remaining significant testimony introduced by the prosecution was elicited from Richards' mother, who testified that Greenaway and Richards were "friends." This testimony obviously led the jury to assume that the "friend" mentioned in Greenaway's statement was Richards.
When it came time to instruct the jury, at the government's request, the District Court instructed the jury not to consider the portion of Special Agent Harker's testimony relating to Greenaway's statement referring to "Don." There were...
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