People v. Meir, Docket No. 23252

Decision Date26 February 1976
Docket NumberDocket No. 23252
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Lee MEIR, Defendant-Appellant. 67 Mich.App. 534, 241 N.W.2d 280
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

[67 MICHAPP 535] Reid & Reid by Joseph D. Reid, Lansing, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Raymond L. Scodeller, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before KAUFMAN, P.J., and T. M. BURNS and CAVANAGH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

After jury trial, defendant was found guilty of the offense of delivery of heroin M.C.L.A. § 335.341(1)(a); M.S.A. § 18.1070(41)(1)(a). He was sentenced to a term of from five to twenty years in prison and appeals of right. Defendant claims that the prosecuting attorney's remarks to the jury were prejudicial, inflammatory, and irrelevant, deprived him of a fair trial and require that his conviction be reversed. We agree.

The principal prosecution witness was a former drug addict and paid police informant. The witness testified that he was receiving money from the police for a series of investigations regarding narcotics traffic in the state, and that on the day in question he and an undercover police officer purchased heroin from the defendant, who himself was a user. In his closing argument, the prosecution defended the actions and credibility of this witness, informing the jury that the use of the so-called confidential informant was the only way to stop narcotics traffic in the state. Defense counsel, in his closing argument, asked the jury not to convict the defendant, since he and the informer were essentially the same type of individual the [67 MICHAPP 536] only difference being that the informer had managed to shake his habit and go to work for the police. He also argued that the Controlled Substances Act was to combat the big pusher of narcotics, and not simple users like the defendant. Defense counsel's argument was basically an appeal to the sympathy of the jury.

In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor ridiculed defense counsel's theory of equal justice, asking the jury how the defendant had ever benefited the community except by his delivery of heroin. The prosecutor asked the jury who the ultimate victim of this offense would be, stating that some day the defendant might have to sell heroin to the prosecutor's children or even the children of the jurors in order to support his habit. Upon timely objection by defense counsel, the trial judge told the prosecutor to stay with the evidence, but did not instruct the jury to disregard this remark. The prosecutor then warned the jury that if they returned a verdict of not guilty, they were condoning drug usage and forbidding the police from using confidential informants. The result would be that the defendant would tell all his friends that they could continue to sell narcotics. Defense counsel again objected, and the judge chastised the prosecutor, again without instructing the jury to disregard this inflammatory remark. In his charge to the jury, the judge did inform them that the comments and remarks of the attorneys could not be considered evidence.

Where the prejudicial effect of an improper remark by the prosecutor could be cured by a cautionary instruction, this Court will rule that no miscarriage of justice has occurred. People v. Blassingame, 59 Mich.App. 327, 336, 229 N.W.2d 438 (1975). In that case, the prosecutor had asked the [67 MICHAPP 537] jury to weigh the security of society in their deliberations, noting that if defendant had committed the crime in question, the jury should consider whether he might not continue to engage in this type of violent crime, rape. This Court stated that the remark was improper, but noted that the jury was emphatically instructed that the comments and argument of counsel are not evidence. In other contexts, we have noted that where the prosecutor has engaged in improper argument primarily in response to remarks of defense counsel, that no reversible error will result. People v. Pomranky, 62 Mich.App. 304, 310--311, 233 N.W.2d 263 (1975). In the Pomranky case, the prosecutor's remark was deemed improper, but had been provoked by equally improper remarks of defense counsel. That decision rested upon a line of cases which recognized that, given the intense pressure of litigation, it would be natural for an attorney to reply to improper argument with argument of the same quality. See People v. Allen, 351 Mich. 535, 544, 88 N.W.2d 433 (1958).

In this case, we find that, unlike the Pomranky decision and the cases cited therein, the prosecutor cannot justify his intemperate remarks by alleging that he had a right to reply to those of defense counsel. Although the argument of defense counsel that defendant deserved the sympathy of the jury does not seem appropriate, nevertheless there was nothing improper...

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8 cases
  • People v. Wise
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 12 Julio 1984
    ...by the prosecutor, it must be made in response to an equally (or more) improper argument by defense counsel. In People v. Meir, 67 Mich.App. 534, 536, 241 N.W.2d 280 (1976), the defense counsel appealed to the jury's sympathy by arguing that the Controlled Substance Act was not meant to pun......
  • People v. Bahoda
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 22 Marzo 1995
    ...N.W.2d 315.53 Id., pp. 596-597, 296 N.W.2d 315; People v. Biondo, 76 Mich.App. 155, 158, 256 N.W.2d 60 (1977); People v. Meir, 67 Mich.App. 534, 537-538, 241 N.W.2d 280 (1976); People v. Gloria Williams, 65 Mich.App. 753, 755-756, 238 N.W.2d 186 (1975) (citing People v. Farrar, 36 Mich.App.......
  • People v. Ullah, Docket No. 180408
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 17 Mayo 1996
    ...to review the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. Stanaway, supra at 687, 521 N.W.2d 557. See, e.g., People v. Meir, 67 Mich.App. 534, 538, 241 N.W.2d 280 (1976), People v. Green, 74 Mich.App. 601, 607, 254 N.W.2d 788 (1977), opinion on remand 79 Mich.App. 186, 261 N.W.2d 253 (1......
  • State v. Piper
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 19 Diciembre 1977
    ...v. Gulke, 76 N.D. 653, 38 N.W.2d 722 (1949); People v. Pomranky, 62 Mich.App. 304, 233 N.W.2d 263, 266 (1975); People v. Meir, 67 Mich.App. 534, 241 N.W.2d 280, 281 (1976). See also, 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1090, p. 128; and 24A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1902(1), p. We point out that any prej......
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