Brooks Shoe Mfg., Inc. v. Byrd, 54855

Decision Date05 December 1977
Docket NumberNo. 1,No. 54855,54855,1
Citation241 S.E.2d 299,144 Ga.App. 431
PartiesBROOKS SHOE MANUFACTURING, INC. v. R. D. BYRD
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Kilpatrick, Cody, Rogers, McClatchey & Regenstein, Albert C. Ruehmann, III, Atlanta, for appellant.

Chambers & Cooper, John W. Chambers, Atlanta, for appellee.

SHULMAN, Judge.

Defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss plaintiff-appellee's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction was denied. This court granted the application for interlocutory appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Certain facts are not in dispute. Defendant is a Pennsylvania corporation manufacturing athletic shoes. Defendant has never established warehouses, offices, facilities or other places of business in Georgia, and at the time of suit was not authorized to do or transact business in this State. Plaintiff is a Georgia resident and was defendant's exclusive sales representative in the Southeast from mid 1973 to late 1975. Plaintiff solicited orders in Georgia subject to approval in Pennsylvania. Defendant's shipments were made F.O.B. Pennsylvania. Payments were made directly to Pennsylvania. On occasion, at defendant's request, plaintiff collected defendant's accounts receivable in Georgia. In 1973, 1974 and 1975, defendant's executive officers attended trade shows in Atlanta in order to assist plaintiff in the solicitation of potential customers.

The complaint in this action was brought in three counts. Count 1 alleges that defendant breached its contract by terminating plaintiff's employment without complying with contractual notice requirements and by failing to remit commissions allegedly owing. Count 2 sounds in tort and is predicated on defendant's alleged unreasonable and unlawful interference with plaintiff's business (soliciting orders) without legal excuse or justification. Count 3 sounds in tort and complains of defendant's unauthorized use and conversion of customer and account lists compiled by plaintiff while soliciting pursuant to the contract.

The issue before us is whether our Long Arm Statute (Code Ann. § 24-113.1), confers in personam jurisdiction under the facts of this case.

1. " '(T)he Long Arm Statute contemplates that jurisdiction shall be exercised over non-resident parties to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process. (Cit.)' " Cox v. Long, 143 Ga.App. 182(2), 237 S.E.2d 672, 673. See also Value Engineering Co. v. Gisell, 140 Ga.App. 44(3), 230 S.E.2d 29 (excellent statement by Judge Clark of judicial philosophy regarding Long Arm jurisdiction). "(T)he trend of the opinions is to construe long arm 'transacting any business' statutes most liberally and to uphold the jurisdiction of the court . . . in actions, arising, either directly or indirectly, out of such transactions." Davis Metals, Inc. v. Allen, 230 Ga. 623, 626, 198 S.E.2d 285, 287. See also Porter v. Mid-State Homes, Inc., 133 Ga.App. 706 at 707, 213 S.E.2d 10 (even though transaction, i. e., advertising in local paper, was not directly made with plaintiffs, transaction was connected with plaintiffs' claim and is relevant in determination that jurisdiction exists under Code Ann. § 24-113.1(a)).

2. There is no case in Georgia involving this precise fact situation. We hold that under the totality of the circumstances there were sufficient contacts to confer personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant under § 24-113.1(a). A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, LDA 24 A.D.2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (actions of officers of foreign corporation in coming to New York to work with New York independent-contractor broker in transacting business on behalf of corporation constituted transaction of business in connection with contract sufficient to confer jurisdiction; acts of independent broker, mailing letter of acceptance from New York, shipment of goods to New York residents not sufficient to confer jurisdiction). Cf. Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Dateline Electric Co., Ltd., 461 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1972) (regular attendance at houseware shows for business purposes was sufficiently meaningful contact to authorize in personam jurisdiction over contract dispute; three meetings coming about because of attendance constituted "transacting business" within meaning of Illinois Long Arm Statute even though contract executed outside of Illinois was not to be performed in Illinois and was governed by Connecticut law).

Our decision in Storey v. Seffelaar & Looyen, Inc., 142 Ga.App. 873, 237 S.E.2d 236 does not require a contrary result. There, the nonresident corporation's activities were "unaccompanied by a local performance." Storey, supra at 874, 237 S.E.2d 236. That case, therefore, was decided in accordance with the proposition that ". . . when the unilateral actions of a...

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  • Hayes v. Irwin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • June 4, 1982
    ...to the limits of due process, Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosiac Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973); Brooks Shoe Manufacturing, Inc. v. Byrd, 144 Ga.App. 431, 241 S.E.2d 299 (1977), an interpretation which is consistent with the holding in J. C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 230 Ga. 140, 196 ......
  • Four Seasons Gardening & Landscaping, Inc. v. Crouch
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    • December 19, 1984
    ...S.E.2d 524, 525 (1982); Davis Metals, Inc. v. Allen, 230 Ga. 623, 198 S.E.2d 285, 287-88 (1973); and Brooks Shoe Manufacturing, Inc. v. Byrd, 144 Ga.App. 431, 241 S.E.2d 299, 300 (1977). See also Interstate Paper Corp. v. Air-O-Flex Equipment Co., 426 F.Supp. 1323, 1324-25 (S.D.Ga.1977). Af......
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    • October 28, 1988
    ...("... it is clear that the Georgia courts consider the `totality of circumstances.'"), citing, Brooks Shoe Manufacturing, Inc. v. Byrd, 144 Ga.App. 431, 433, 241 S.E.2d 299 (1977). In a number of federal cases, the courts have stated that the Georgia long-arm statute extends personal jurisd......
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    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
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    ...and the cases which have construed that statute to extend as far as due process permits. See, e.g., Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Inc. v. Byrd, 144 Ga.App. 431, 241 S.E.2d 299 (1977). NABET does strongly argue that there is no adequate statutory basis for venue in this district. The Court belie......
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