U.S.A. v. Hernandez
Decision Date | 01 August 2000 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 00-1317 |
Citation | 242 F.3d 110 |
Parties | (2nd Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. DANILO HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Appeal from a judgment of conviction entered on April 21, 2000, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Loretta A. Preska, Judge). The defendant contends that the district court erred by refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea on account of ineffective assistance of counsel. Affirmed.
B. ALAN SEIDLER, Nyack, N.Y., for Appellant.
RICHARD C. DADDARIO, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York (Mary Jo White, United States Attorney, Baruch Weiss, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), New York, N.Y., for Appellee.
Before: WALKER, Chief Judge, and PARKER and KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.
Danilo Hernandez appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on April 21, 2000, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Loretta A. Preska, Judge), following his plea of guilty to one court of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On May 24, 1999, Hernandez pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement. The agreement stipulated a base offense level of 36 and a reduction of five total levels based on Hernandez's timely acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), and playing a minor role in the offense, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b)(2). Given his stipulated criminal history category, the plea agreement found that the expected Guidelines range was 108-135 months, but that the statutory mandatory minimum raised the lower end of the range from 108 to 120 months. The parties further agreed that the defendant could seek "safety valve" relief but that, absent certain circumstances, no downward or upward departures would be sought. Finally, the parties agreed that the defendant would not appeal any sentence within or below the stipulated Guidelines range of 120-135 months, and the government would not appeal any sentence within or above that range. The agreement was signed by the defendant, his then-attorney, and lawyers for the government.
Several months later but before sentencing, Hernandez moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney misled him as to the consequences of his plea. More specifically, he stated that he did not speak English and had only five minutes to review the agreement through an interpreter before entering the courtroom. Further, Hernandez affirmed that his attorney told him he would only be sentenced to two years in prison and did not explain either that his guilty plea was binding or that he was waiving his appellate rights and the right to make downward departure motions. In an oral ruling, the district court denied Hernandez's motion, finding these factual assertions inconsistent with his statements under oath at the plea allocution. On April 20, 2000, the district court sentenced Hernandez to 87 months in prison, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Hernandez now appeals on the ground that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
We review a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1529 (2d Cir. 1997). Where a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is made before sentencing, the court may grant the motion if "the defendant shows any fair and just reason." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e); see also Maher, 108 F.3d at 1529. The court must give due regard to any prejudice the government might suffer as a result. See Maher, 108 F.3d at 1529. To evaluate a claim that a guilty plea was involuntary or unknowing due to ineffective assistance of counsel, we use the familiar framework established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985) ( ). A defendant must first establish that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Second, the defendant must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 59. "The question of whether a defendant's lawyer's representation violates the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo." United States v. Triana, 205 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir.) (quoting United States v. Blau, 159 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1998)), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 378 (2000); see also United States v. Stantini, 85 F.3d 9, 16 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1000 (1996).
We agree with the district court that the defendant has not shown deficient performance by his attorney. Hernandez describes his motion to withdraw his guilty plea as based on the assertion that he "was mislead [sic] about the consequences of his plea by his then attorney." But the district court was entitled to rely upon the defendant's sworn statements, made in open court with the assistance of a translator, that he understood the consequences of his plea, had discussed the plea with his attorney, knew that he could not withdraw the plea, understood that he was waiving his right to appeal a sentence below 120 months, and had been made no promises except those contained in the plea agreement. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (); see also United States v. DeJesus, 219 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (, )cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 502 (2000); United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir. 1997) (). Having considered all of the defendant's contentions regarding his guilty plea, we are persuaded that the district court did not err in denying the motion to withdraw.
Although Hernandez has raised no substantial question about the voluntary and knowing nature of his guilty plea or his counsel's performance, we feel it necessary to pause to address the government's argument that the plea agreement forecloses the defendant's right to take this appeal. It is by now well established that a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal is generally enforceable. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 166 F.3d 519, 521 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); United States v. Yemitan, 70 F.3d 746, 747 (2d Cir. 1995). However, our precedents indicate that "specifically in the context of claimed waivers of appellate rights... plea agreements are to be applied 'narrowly' and construed'strictly against the Government.'" United States v. Tang, 214 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 556, 559 (2d Cir. 1996)); accord United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam), cert. denied, --U.S.---, 121 S.Ct. 1245, ---L.Ed.2--- (2001).
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