Huges v. Long

Decision Date27 February 2001
Docket NumberNo. 99-2037,99-2037
Parties(3rd Cir. 2001) PETER J. HUGHES, JR., APPELLANT V. LYNN E. LONG; KATHLEEN LACEY; PATRICK J. MCHUGH
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA District Judge: The Honorable Harvey Bartle, III

Attorney for Appellant: Lek Domni, Esq. (Argued) Suite 1001 1429 Walnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19102

Attorneys for Appellees: L. Rostaing Tharaud, Esq. (Argued for Lynn E. Long) Jonathan F. Ball, Esq. (Argued for Patrick J. McHugh) Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin 1845 Walnut Street 21st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103

Before: Nygaard, and Stapleton, Circuit Judges, and DEBEVOISE,* District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Nygaard, Circuit Judge.

This is the second time we have been asked to resolve issues stemming from divorce and custody proceedings involving Peter and Pamela Hughes. In this appeal, Peter J. Hughes challenges the District Court's grant of summary judgment, dismissing his civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985 and his state law claims against defendants Lynn Long and Patrick McHugh. Hughes argues that the District Court erroneously granted defendants absolute prosecutorial and witness immunity for his civil rights claims and that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's recent decision in LLMD of Michigan, Inc. v. Jackson-Cross Co., 559 Pa. 297, 740 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1999), precludes immunity for his state law claims. We affirm the District Court's dismissal of Hughes's civil rights claims, although for reasons different from those set forth by the District Court;1 we also affirm the District Court's dismissal of Hughes's state law claims because we predict that, if faced with the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not extend its holding in LLMD to court-appointed witnesses.

I.

Hughes's claims against Long and McHugh stem from an acrimonious child custody proceeding that took place in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County between Hughes and his former wife, Pamela Hughes. The custody dispute began when, in the midst of her divorce from Hughes, Pamela filed a Petition for Temporary Custody of the children. In response to this Petition, the court scheduled a Conciliation Conference before a Custody Conciliator. The Custody Conciliator recommended that appellee Long, a licensed clinical social worker, conduct a full custody evaluation. The court adopted this recommendation, ordering Hughes and Pamela to participate in psychological evaluations with Long. According to the order, Long was to report the results of the psychological evaluations to the court and make any recommendations appropriate to a child custody determination. Although the court appointed Long to conduct the evaluation, Long entered into a private contract with the parties whereby each agreed to pay fifty percent of her fee.

In accordance with the court's order, Long conducted the evaluation. She interviewed Hughes, Pamela, the children, and others. She also referred Hughes and Pamela to Kathleen Lacey, a psychologist who worked with Long in her custody evaluations, for psychological testing. Because Lacey was not licensed at the time of the evaluations, she practiced under the supervision of appellee McHugh, a licensed clinical psychologist. McHugh did not directly supervise the tests administered by Lacey, but he did review the results and approved her recommendations.

It is not clear what occurred at the conclusion of the psychological testing. Apparently, after completing the psychological tests, Long informally told Hughes her custody recommendation for the children. For reasons unexplained, Hughes was dissatisfied with this recommendation and therefore he hired his own expert, Dr. Gerald Cooke, to evaluate the results of the tests that Long and Lacey administered. According to Hughes, Long and Lacey refused to give Dr. Cooke the information upon which they based their conclusions, despite repeated requests and a court order. Hughes claims that, rather than complying, Long fabricated new data to support her report and that Lacey and McHugh produced new psychological tests and results that were more favorable toward Pamela. He contends that Long, Lacey, and McHugh gave these false reports to Dr. Cooke and destroyed the original data.

During the custody hearing, Hughes presented his allegations of fraudulent behavior by Long, Lacey, and McHugh. All three testified during the hearing and denied creating false reports, destroying any originals, or intentionally failing to comply with the court's order to release their raw data. Long testified in person and the depositions of Lacey and McHugh were read. Despite Hughes's allegations of fraud, the court adopted Long's formal recommendation and awarded joint custody to Hughes and Pamela.

Hughes appealed the order of joint custody to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania but later withdrew the appeal. After abandoning his state court appeal, he filed suit against the appellees2 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging interference with his familial rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1985(3). Hughes also alleged the following state law violations: (1) abuse of legal process; (2) defamation, false light, and invasion of privacy; (3) civil conspiracy; (4) fraud; (5) tortious interference with familial relations; (6) breach of contract; and (7) breach of implied contract. In response to Hughes's complaint, appellees filed their respective motions to dismiss. The District Court granted those motions on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which holds that a federal court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to review the final adjudications of a state's highest court or to evaluate constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state court's custody proceeding. In dismissing Hughes's claims, the court relied solely on this doctrine and did not rule on appellees' arguments that they are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity pursuant to our decision in Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1997).

On appeal, we reversed the District Court with respect to its holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine warranted a dismissal of Hughes's claims. See Hughes v. MacElree, 168 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1998). We also refused to affirm the dismissal of Hughes's complaint on the alternative basis that Long and McHugh are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity under Ernst. We found that an evidentiary record of appellees' precise functions with respect to their participation in the underlying custody case had not been developed.

On remand, Long and McHugh filed a motion for summary judgment, reasserting their argument that they are entitled to prosecutorial immunity under Ernst. The District Court granted Long's and McHugh's motions, agreeing that they are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from Hughes's SS 1983 and 1985 claims. Alternatively, the court held that Long and McHugh were entitled to witness immunity. The court also held that under Pennsylvania law, Long and McHugh were entitled to immunity from Hughes's supplemental state law claims. On December 9, 1999, Hughes filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

II.

Hughes first argues that the District Court erred by holding that Long and McHugh are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity pursuant to our holding in Ernst. He argues that appellees did not function as "advocates" for the "state" like prosecutors and child welfare workers. Further, he argues that, in contrast to prosecutors and child welfare workers who initiate criminal and dependency proceedings, appellees did not initiate the custody proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over a District Court's grant of summary judgment. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1224 (3d Cir. 1994).

Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects... any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On its face, it contains no defense of official immunity. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376, 71 S.Ct. 783, 788 (1951), however, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend S 1983 to abrogate immunities "well grounded in history and reason." In determining whether an immunity meets this standard, a court must first determine whether "an official was accorded immunity from tort actions at common law when the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1871." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1095 (1986). If a common-law counterpart is found, a court must next determine whether § 1983's history or purposes nonetheless discourage recognition of the same immunity in § 1983 actions. See id.

Even if an official did not enjoy absolute immunity at common law, she may still be entitled to immunity if she performs "special functions" that are similar or analogous to functions that would have been immune when Congress enacted S 1983. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 406, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911 (1978). This "functional approach" looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it and evaluates the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of that function. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542 (1988). The official seeking immunity bears the burden of showing that it is justified by the function in question. See id.

Under its historical and functional approach, the Supreme Court has recognized the defense of...

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