242 N.Y. 176, Brown v. Shyne

Citation242 N.Y. 176
Party NameCLARA E. BROWN, Respondent, v. FRANCIS T. SHYNE, Appellant.
Case DateFebruary 24, 1926
CourtNew York Court of Appeals

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242 N.Y. 176

CLARA E. BROWN, Respondent,

v.

FRANCIS T. SHYNE, Appellant.

New York Court of Appeal

February 24, 1926

Argued January 20, 1926.

Page 177

COUNSEL

Leo O. Coupe and James Coupe for appellant. The trial court erred in submitting to the jury the proposition that the failure of the defendant to obtain a license to practice medicine and surgery in New York was evidence that defendant negligently performed a chiropractic adjustment on the plaintiff when there was no evidence to show that it was the proximate cause of the injury complained of. (Clark v. Doolittle, 205 A.D. 697; Knupfle v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 N.Y. 488; Weinberger v. Kratzenstein, 71 A.D. 155; Hyde v. McCreery, 145 A.D. 729; Silman v. Lewis, 49 N.Y. 383; Kock v. Fox, 71 A.D. 288; Brazil v. Isham, 12 N.Y. 9; N.Y. C. Ins. Co. v. Nat. Prot. Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 486; Newell v. Salmons, 22 Barb. 647; Clark v. Post, 113 N.Y. 17; Hall v. U.S. Reflector Co., 30 Hun, 375; Antowill v. Friedman, 197 A.D. 230; Brown v. Goffe, 125 N.Y. 458.)

William R. Lee for respondent. The trial court committed no error prejudicial to defendant in his charge to the jury on the proposition of the effect of his failure to possess a license to practice medicine in New York State on the question of negligence. (Knupfle v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 N.Y. 488; Cummings v. R. R. Co., 104 N.Y. 669; Donnelly v. Rochester, 166 N.Y. 315; Meyers v. Barrett, 167 A.D. 170; Massoth v. D. & H. C. Co., 64 N.Y. 532; McRickard v. Flint, 114 N.Y. 222; Marino v. Lehmaier, 173 N.Y. 530; Amberg v. Kinley, 214

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N.Y. 535; Beisegel v. N.Y. C. R. R. Co., 14 Abb. Pr. [N. S.] 29; Hoffman v. U. F. Co., 47 N.Y. 176; Platz v. City of Cohoes, 89 N.Y. 219; Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164.)

LEHMAN, J.

The plaintiff employed the defendant to give chiropractic treatment to her for a disease or physical condition. The defendant had no license to practice medicine, yet he held himself out as being able to diagnose and treat disease, and under the provisions of the Public Health Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 45) he was guilty of a misdemeanor. The plaintiff became paralyzed after she had received nine treatments by the defendant. She claims, and upon this appeal we must assume, that the paralysis was caused by the treatment she received. She has recovered judgment in the sum of $10, 000 for the damages caused by said injury.

The plaintiff in her complaint alleges that the injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence. If negligence on the part of the defendant caused the injury, the plaintiff may recover the consequent damages. Though the defendant held himself out, and the plaintiff consulted him, as a chiropractor and not as a regular physician, he claimed to possess the skill requisite for diagnosis and treatment of disease, and in the performance of what he undertook to do he may be held to the degree of skill and care which he claimed to possess. At the trial the plaintiff gave testimony in regard to the manner in which she was treated. She supplemented this testimony by evidence that the treatment was not in accordance with recognized theory or practice, that it produced the injury which followed and that a person qualified to treat disease should have foreseen that the treatment might have such result. Though her testimony was contradicted, the jury might well have resolved the conflict in her favor, and if the only question submitted to the jury had been whether or not this evidence showed that

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plaintiff's injury was caused by the defendant's negligence, the defendant could not complain of any substantial error at the trial. Indeed, it would seem that in some respects the rulings of the trial judge may have been too favorable to the defendant.

At the close of the plaintiff's case the plaintiff was permitted to amend the complaint to allege 'that in so treating the plaintiff the defendant was engaged in the practice of medicine contrary to and in violation of the provisions of the Public Health Law of the State of New York in such case made and provided, he at the time of so treating plaintiff not being a duly licensed physician or surgeon of the State of New York.' Thereafter the trial judge charged the jury that they might bring in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff if they found that the evidence established that the treatment given to the plaintiff was not in accordance with the standards of skill and care which prevail among those treating disease. He then continued: 'This is a little different from the ordinary malpractice case, and I am going to allow you, if you think proper under the evidence in the case, to predicate negligence upon another theory. The public health laws of this State prescribe that no person shall practice medicine unless he is licensed so to do by the Board of Regents of this State and registered pursuant to statute * * *. This statute to which I have referred is a general police regulation. Its violation, and it has been violated by the defendant, is some evidence, more or less cogent, of negligence which you may consider for what it is worth, along with all the other evidence in the case. If the defendant attempted to treat the plaintiff and to adjust the vertebrae in her spine when he did not possess the requisite knowledge and skill as prescribed by the statute to know what was proper and necessary to do under the circumstances, or how to do it, even if he did know what to do, you can find him negligent.' In so charging the jury that from the violation of the statute

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the jury might infer negligence which produced injury to the plaintiff, the trial justice in my opinion erred.

The provisions of the Public Health Law prohibiting the practice of medicine without a license granted upon proof of preliminary training and after examination intended to show adequate knowledge, are of course intended for the protection of the general public against injury which unskilled and unlearned practitioners might cause. If violation of the statute by the defendant was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, then the plaintiff may recover upon proof of violation; if violation of the statute has no direct bearing on the injury, proof of the violation becomes irrelevant. For injury caused by neglect of duty imposed by the penal law there is civil remedy; but of course the injury must follow from the neglect.

Proper formulation of general standards of preliminary education and proper examination of the particular applicant should serve to raise the standards of skill and care generally possessed by members of the profession in this State; but the license to practice medicine confers no additional skill upon the practitioner; nor does it confer immunity from physical injury upon a patient if the practitioner fails to exercise care. Here, injury may have been caused by lack of skill or care; it would not have been obviated if the defendant had possessed a license yet failed to exercise the skill and care required of one practicing medicine. True, if the defendant had not practiced medicine in this State, he could not have injured the plaintiff, but the protection which the statute was intended to provide was against risk of injury by the unskilled or careless practitioner, and unless the plaintiff's injury was caused by carelessness or lack of skill, the defendant's failure to obtain a license was not connected with the injury. The plaintiff's cause of action is for negligence or malpractice. The defendant undertook to treat the plaintiff for a physical condition which seemed to require

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remedy. Under our law such treatment may be given only by a duly qualified practitioner who has obtained a license.

The defendant in offering to treat the plaintiff held himself out as qualified to give treatment. He must meet the professional standards of skill and care prevailing among those who do offer treatment lawfully. If injury follows through failure to meet those standards, the plaintiff may recover. The provisions of the Public Health Law may result in the exclusion from practice of some who are unqualified. Even a skilled and learned practitioner who is not licensed commits an offense against the State; but against such practitioners the statute was not intended to protect, for no protection was needed, and neglect to obtain a license results in no injury to the patient and, therefore, no private wrong. The purpose of the statute is to protect the public against unfounded assumption of skill by one who undertakes to prescribe or treat for disease. In order to show that the plaintiff has been injured by defendant's breach of the statutory duty, proof must be given that defendant in such treatment did not exercise the care and skill which would have been exercised by qualified practitioners within the State, and that such lack of skill and care caused the injury. Failure to obtain a license as required by law gives rise to no remedy if it has caused no injury. No...

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