Davison v. Williams
Decision Date | 04 December 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 1268S200,1268S200 |
Citation | 242 N.E.2d 101,251 Ind. 448 |
Parties | , 38 A.L.R.3d 521 Henry DAVISON, Appellant, v. Herman L. WILLIAMS, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
This is a civil action brought by Herman L. Williams for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him as a result of a collision which occurred when an automobile driven by Henry Davison, the Defendant and Petitioner herein, crashed into the rear-end of Williams' automobile. After trial by jury, Williams was awarded damages in the amount of $7,500. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Appellate Court of Indiana, Division I. Davison v. Williams (1968), Ind.App., 235 N.E.2d 90. The case is now before this Court on a petition to transfer. Rule 2--23, Rules of the Supreme Court of Indiana.
The evidence offered at trial revealed that Plaintiff-Respondent Williams was driving to work on the day of the collision traveling over rather hilly terrain when it became necessary for him to stop his automobile on the traveled portion of the highway to await the passage of a train. The Defendant-Petitioner, who was traveling in the same direction behind Respondent, upon making a curve in the road, saw that Respondent's auto was stopped for the train. However, Petitioner's brakes failed completely, causing him to collide with the rear-end of Respondent's auto.
In his petition to transfer, Petitioner asserts that the Appellate Court's opinion in this case contravenes the ruling precedent of this Court by approving the following instructions given by the trial court to the jury:
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION 5,
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION 6,
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION 7,
At the same time, the trial court refused to give Defendant's Instruction 8, which reads as follows:
The opinion of the Appellate Court suggests that its refusal to accept Petitioner's claim of error on the part of the trial court in giving Plaintiff's Instructions 5, 6 and 7, above, was based primarily upon Petitioner's failure at trial to tender instructions which would have corrected the mistakes he was objecting to in the instructions submitted by Plaintiff. In so holding the Appellate Court cites the following language from Wiltrout, Indiana Practice:
'A party cannot complain of an instruction given by the court which, although incomplete, is a correct statement of the law so far as it goes, where such party did not tender a more full instruction on the subject.' 2 Wiltrout, Indiana Practice, § 1400(5), p. 342 (1967)
However, it should be noted that the next sentence appearing in Wiltrout makes the above statement inapplicable to the present case. The next sentence reads:
'Except as to mandatory instructions, ambiguity, inaccuracy or incompleteness of one instruction may be cured by another instruction, where they are not inconsistent with each other.' 2 Wiltrout, supra. (Emphasis added.)
The exception relating to mandatory instructions is classicly applicable to the case here before us.
'A mandatory instruction is one which unequivocally charges the jury that if they find from a preponderance of the evidence that a certain set of facts exists, they must render a verdict in accordance therewith either for the plaintiff or defendant.' 2 Wiltrout, Indiana Practice, § 1400(8), p. 344 (1967)
Plaintiff's Instructions 5, 6 and 7 can only be viewed as mandatory instructions. They had the effect of instructing the jury that if they found from the evidence that Petitioner violated a safey regulation they could only find that Petitioner had been 'guilty of negligence as a matter of law,' and upon a finding of proximate cause they were required to grant damages to the Respondent. No mention was made of the Indiana law regarding excuse or justification in cases of alleged negligence involving violation of safety regulations.
As noted above, it is well-settled in Indiana that a mandatory instruction must set out all elements essential for recovery, and if an essential element is omitted, the instruction is erroneous and cannot be cured by other instructions. Taylor v. Fitzpatrick (1956), 235 Ind. 238, 132 N.E.2d 919; Redd v. Indianapolis Railways (1951), 121 Ind.App. 472, 97 N.E.2d 501. As the discussion below will indicate, information regarding the effect of excuse or justification in statutory negligence cases was essential to the completeness of all three of the above-quoted Plaintiff's instructions.
In approving the giving of the mandatory Plaintiff's Instructions 5, 6 and 7, and in approving the refusal to give Defendant's Instruction 8, the Appellate Court, in effect, declared the law of Indiana to be as follows: the violation of the provisions of a statute in the operation of a motor vehicle on a public highway, which violation is the proximate cause of the injury, is negligence per se and, once such violation is proved, as a matter of law the violator is liable for all injuries thereby caused. Since 1916, the law of Indiana has been to the contrary. Conder v. Griffith (1916), 61...
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