United States v. Herman Oppenheimer

Citation37 S.Ct. 68,61 L.Ed. 161,242 U.S. 85
Decision Date04 December 1916
Docket NumberNo. 412,412
PartiesUNITED STATES, Plff. in Err., v. HERMAN H. OPPENHEIMER et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Assistant Attorney General Warren and Mr. A. J. Clopton for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Benjamin Slade, L. Laflin Kellogg, and Abram J. Rose for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant in error and others were indicted for a conspiracy to conceal assets from a trustee in bankruptcy. Act of July 1, 1898, chap. 541, § 29, 30 Stat. at L. 544, 554, Comp. Stat. 1913, §§ 9585, 9613. The defendant Oppenheimer set up a previous adjudication upon a former indictment for the same offense that it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in the Bankruptcy Act for offenses against that act, § 29d,—an adjudication since held to be wrong in another case. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 59 L. ed. 1211, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 682. This defense was presented in four forms entitled respectively, demurrer, motion to quash, plea in abatement, and plea in bar. After motion by the government that the defendant be required to elect which of the four he would stand upon, he withdrew the last-mentioned two, and subsequently the court granted what was styled the motion to quash, ordered the indictment quashed, and discharged the defendant without day. The government brings this writ of error, treating the so-called motion to quash as a plea in bar, which in substance it was. United States v. Barber, 219 U. S. 72, 78, 55 L. ed. 99, 101, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209.

The defendant objects that the statute giving a writ of error to the United states from the decision or judgment sustaining a special plea in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy, Act of March 2, 1907, chap. 2564, 34 Stat. at L. 1246, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 1704, is limited like the earlier clauses to judgments based on the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded. But that limitation expressly in each of the two preceding paragraphs of the statute is not repeated here. The language used in United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, 399, 53 L. ed. 230, 245, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 123, had reference only to the construction of the indictment and to its sufficiency upon matters not involving a statute, in cases brought up by the United States under the earlier clauses of the act. That quoted from United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 54 L. ed. 1168, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124, so far as material also meant that the sufficiency of the indictment would not be considered here upon a writ of error to the allowance of a plea in bar. In view of our opinion upon the merits we do not discuss the preliminary objections at greater length.

Upon the merits the proposition of the government is that the doctrine of res judicata does not exist for criminal cases except in the modified form of the 5th Amendment, that a person shall not be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; and the conclusion is drawn that a decision upon a plea in bar cannot prevent a second trial when the defendant never has been in jeopardy in the sense of being before a jury upon the facts of the offense charged. It seems that the mere statement of the position should be its own answer. It cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liability in debt. It cannot be that a judgment of acquittal on the ground of the statute of limitations is less a protection against a second trial than a judgment upon the ground of innocence, or that such a judgment is any more effective when entered after a verdict than if entered by the...

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346 cases
  • State v. Ellis
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 10 Septiembre 1985
    ...charged. The state concedes, and we have no doubt, that those charges were dismissed "on the merits." United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916). But a pretrial dismissal, based on the statute of limitations, is not the logical or practical equivalent of a f......
  • Com. v. Stephens
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 8 Mayo 2008
    ...the applicability of the doctrine may derive either from the common law, with roots in civil proceedings, United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916); Commonwealth v. Williams, 431 Mass. 71, 74, 725 N.E.2d 217 (2000) (direct estoppel)4; Commonwealth v. Cerven......
  • State v. Erwin
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • 11 Diciembre 1941
    ... ... See ... [120 P.2d 294] ... States v. Cruikshank , 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed ... 588; United States v. Hess ... 159, 180 A ... 266, 185 A. 350; United States v ... Oppenheimer , 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161, ... 3 A. L.R. 516; United ... ...
  • Commonwealth v. Hogan
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • 5 Octubre 1978
    ... ... Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania ... Constitutions would be violated by a retrial ... United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct ... 68, 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916). Thus, mistrials ... ...
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