Turkey Run Fuels v. United States

Citation243 F.2d 147
Decision Date14 March 1957
Docket NumberNo. 11973.,11973.
PartiesTURKEY RUN FUELS, Inc. v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Hilbert P. Zarky, Louise Foster, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C. (W. Wilson White, U. S. Atty., Alan J. Swotes, Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for the United States.

Paul W. Bruton, Philadelphia, Pa., (Richard W. Ledwith, Jeremy E. Goldstein, MacCoy, Evans & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.

Philip Zimet, New York City (Frederick F. Greenman, Robert H. Haines, Bernard Bressler, Greenman, Shea & Zimet, New York City, on the brief), for Philadelphia & Reading Corp.

Before MARIS and KALODNER, Circuit Judges, and WORTENDYKE, District Judge.

MARIS, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by the Government from a judgment in favor of the taxpayer, Turkey Run Fuels, Inc., in a suit brought by the taxpayer in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to recover allegedly excessive income taxes paid pursuant to deficiency assessments for the fiscal years ended August 31, 1948 and August 31, 1949. The facts were stipulated and so far as pertinent are as follows:

The taxpayer is a Pennsylvania corporation and was organized on October 31, 1939. Its stock is all owned by the West Shenandoah Land Co., another Pennsylvania corporation. On December 30, 1939, the latter deeded the property involved here to the taxpayer in return for the taxpayer's stock. The property covered by the deed is the southerly portion of that known as the Moore & Miller Tract. The West Shenandoah Land Co. had acquired that tract from the individual owners on December 1, 1938, in an exchange whereby the owners received stock in the West Shenandoah Land Co. in proportion to their respective interests in the tract. Those owners were then holding the tract as heirs or the trustees for heirs of the two individuals who had acquired title to the tract in 1863 and 1865.

The mining of coal from the Moore & Miller Tract first began in 1870 through the operation of three principal collieries known as West Shenandoah, Turkey Run and Kohinoor. Subsequently, in 1874, the Moore & Miller Tract was leased to the Philadelphia and Reading Coal & Iron Company, and the latter company conducted mining operations thereon until 1938 when it instituted bankruptcy proceedings and had its lease cancelled prior to December 1st of that year. From December 1, 1938 until sometime in 1941, the portion of this tract which is now owned by the taxpayer under its deed of December 30, 1939, was not actively operated. During that period the property comprised underground coal workings which had been worked by the prior lessee, coal, culm and refuse banks placed on the surface of the property by the prior lessee, and coal stripping areas. The coal, culm and refuse banks were accumulated prior to October 1932 and principally between 1902 and 1919.

Under a lease executed February 11, 1941, the taxpayer leased to the Kohinoor Coal Company certain coal, culm and refuse banks which had been accumulated during the course of previous mining operations on the property. This lease and the parties are those referred to in the case of Kohinoor Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 Cir., 1948, 171 F.2d 880, certiorari denied 337 U.S. 924, 69 S.Ct. 1168, 93 L.Ed. 1732. On November 15, 1945 the same parties entered into a new lease. The taxpayer on January 13, 1947, leased the remaining portion of its property to the Mahanoy Valley Coal Company. On February 10, 1948 that lease was assigned to the Gilberton Coal Company.

During the two taxable years in question all of taxpayer's property was operated under the leases. The lessees were engaged in three operations, namely, the extraction of coal from underground coal workings, the extraction of coal from coal, culm and refuse banks and from coal stripping operations. During each of the taxable years in question the taxpayer received a majority of its coal royalty income from coal extracted from coal, culm and refuse banks by the lessees. The taxpayer, in its income tax returns for these two years, claimed a deduction for percentage depletion based upon 5 percent of the coal royalties earned during the year from coal extracted from the coal, culm and refuse banks as well as from the underground workings and the stripping operations. The Commissioner allowed the deductions for percentage depletion on royalties due from coal extracted from the underground workings and from the stripping operations but disallowed the depletion deductions claimed on royalties due to coal extracted from the coal, culm and refuse banks. He assessed a deficiency for the taxable year 1948 in the sum of $1,655.58 with interest and for the taxable year 1949 in the sum of $1,603.73 with interest. These deficiencies, which were largely due to the disallowance of a portion of the claimed depletion deductions, were paid on September 3, 1952. Claims for refund of taxes attributable to the disallowed deductions were filed on December 15, 1952, and were disallowed on July 2, 1953. The present suit was instituted on July 31, 1953. On consideration of the stipulated facts the district court concluded that the taxpayer was entitled to the depletion deductions with respect to the coal extracted from the coal, culm and refuse banks which the Commissioner had disallowed. The court accordingly entered judgment in favor of the taxpayer. 139 F.Supp. 43. The present appeal by the Government followed.

The appeal raises the issue whether the district court erred in holding that the taxpayer was entitled to depletion deductions under section 23(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S. C. § 23(m)1 from royalties received by the taxpayer for coal extracted from coal, culm and refuse banks on its property which had been created many years before in mining operations by lessees of its predecessors in title.

In Kohinoor Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 Cir., 1948, 171 F.2d 880, certiorari denied 337 U.S. 924, 69 S.Ct. 1168, this court had before it a similar claim by a lessee of the present taxpayer. Under its lease Kohinoor had merely the right to load, prepare and take away the coal contained in the coal, culm and refuse banks. We held that since Kohinoor had no economic interest in the coal in place, its interest being confined solely to the coal in the culm or refuse banks which had already been extracted from the earth, it was not entitled to the depletion allowance granted with respect to coal mines by the Internal Revenue Code. Our decision was based upon the firmly settled propositions that an economic interest in a mine is a prerequisite to the allowance of a depletion deduction from the income derived therefrom,2 and that a culm or refuse bank deposited on the surface in the course of mining operations is not itself a mine within the meaning of section 23(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.3 We fully adhere to our decision in the Kohinoor case and to the legal premises upon which it was based. However, for reasons which will be stated we cannot accept the argument of the Government that the legal rules applied in that case are applicable here.

In the present case the taxpayer is the owner of the coal, culm and refuse banks in question, of the land upon which they lie and of the coal mines from which they were extracted. It, therefore, has the economic interest therein which the Internal Revenue Code requires and which Kohinoor as lessee did not have. It is immaterial here that the coal, culm and refuse banks are not themselves mines since the actual mines from which they were extracted are also owned by the taxpayer. The extraction of coal from the banks was but a final step in the process of mining, as defined in section 114(b) (4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C. § 114(b) (4) (A, B),4 which began when the material comprising the banks was extracted from the mines and deposited on the surface. The royalties received by the taxpayer for the coal extracted from the banks therefore constituted income from mining from which the depletion allowance was deductible.

The fact that an interval of time elapsed between the original mining from the earth of the material comprising the banks and the final extraction of the coal from the banks is immaterial. Commissioner of Internal Rev. v. Kennedy Min. & M. Co., 9 Cir. 1942, 125 F. 2d 399. In the case just cited, which involved a depletion claim in connection with gold mining, Judge Mathews said at page 400:

"The Commissioner\'s contention must be rejected. The tailings from which the taxpayer derived part of its gross income and all of its net income during 1935 and 1936 were ores. They were ores from the taxpayer\'s mine, just as were the newly mined ores which the taxpayer treated in 1935 and 1936. Income derived from the ores called tailings, as well as that derived from the newly mined ores, was income from the mine.
"It is true, but not material, that the ores called tailings were mined prior to 1935. The mining of ores and the receipt of income therefrom are seldom, if ever, simultaneous. The two events are usually months apart and not infrequently years apart. Thus income from a mine during a taxable year may, and usually does, include income from ores mined prior to that year.
"Nor is it material that these ores (now called tailings) were, prior to 1935, subjected to treatment whereby part of their gold content was removed. The ores so treated remained after such treatment, as they were before, the property of the taxpayer and were thereafter, as theretofore, ores from the taxpayer\'s mine. Income derived from their subsequent treatment was income from the mine, just as was that derived from their first treatment."

We are in accord with these views of our brethren of the...

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  • ST. JOSEPH LEAD COMPANY v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • February 13, 1962
    ...held that income from the processing of chat is to be taken into account for percentage depletion purposes. Turkey Run Fuels v. United States, 243 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1957). The Commissioner formally conceded the correctness of these decisions in Rev.Rul. 60-176, 1960-1 Cum.Bull. 686 3 Income......

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