North American Van Lines v. United States, 12856.

• Citation: 243 F.2d 693
• Decision Date: 10 April 1957
• Docket Number: No. 12856.,12856.
• Parties: NORTH AMERICAN VAN LINES, Inc., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

243 F.2d 693 (1957)

NORTH AMERICAN VAN LINES, Inc., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 12856.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

April 10, 1957.

Leonard A. Weakley, Cincinnati, Ohio, Albert F. Beasley, Washington, D. C., Paul Clarke, Fort Wayne, Ind., on brief, for appellant.

Thomas Stueve, Hugh K. Martin, U. S. Atty., Cincinnati, Ohio, Nicholas P. Mauro, Interstate Commerce Commission, Nashville, Tenn., on brief, for appellee.

Before ALLEN, MARTIN and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

MARTIN, Circuit Judge.

The appellant, North American Van Lines, Inc., was convicted by verdict of a jury on 24 counts of an information charging violation of section 306(a), Title 49, U.S.C.A.,¹ and was fined by the United States District Judge a total of $2,400 for knowingly and wilfully engaging in interstate commerce without the required certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Code section prescribing the punishment numbered 322 is set forth in the margin.²

The alleged offenses were committed during a period from June of 1953 to December of the same year. The counts specified in the information may be classified into three typical groups: (1) the transportation of "new metal bank equipment parts" by motor vehicle on public highways from Hamilton, Ohio, to points in other states; (2) the interstate transportation of "new metal hospital equipment parts" likewise by motor vehicle on public highways from Hamilton, Ohio; and (3) the interstate transportation of "new metal desks and bank equipment parts", in the same manner, from Hamilton, Ohio.

The appellant was operating under a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing it to transport "Household goods as defined in Practices of Motor Common Carriers of Household Goods, 17 M.C.C. 467, over irregular routes, Between points and places in the United States."

The definition by the Interstate Commerce Commission of "household goods" is found in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (1949 Ed.), Part 176, section 176.1: "The term `household goods' means personal effects and property used or to be used in a dwelling when a part of the equipment or supply of such dwelling: furniture, fixtures, equipment and the property of stores, offices, museums, institutions, hospitals, or other establishments when a part of the stock, equipment, or supply of such stores, offices, museums, institutions, hospitals, or other establishments; and articles, including objects of art, displays, and exhibits, which because of their unusual nature or value require specialized handling and equipment usually employed in moving household goods."

The foregoing definition of "household goods" divides into three parts: the first relating to property to be used in a dwelling; the second relating to office, museum, institutional or hospital properties and equipment; and the third part relating to articles requiring specialized handling and the use of equipment usually employed in moving household goods.

Appellant conceded that it had transported in interstate commerce the 24 shipments in question, but insisted that each of the shipments embraced "household goods" as defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission; and, in the alternative, appellant urged that if it should be held that the shipments did not consist of "household goods", appellant was under the bona fide belief that the shipments had so qualified under the definition and therefore was not guilty of "knowingly and wilfully violating" the statute upon which the information against it was based.

Each shipment was the transportation in interstate commerce of the products of Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Company from its plant in Hamilton, Ohio, where it manufactured safes, bank-vault equipment, and the like, as well as hospital and institutional furniture and fixtures, classified by the company as custom-built metal-case work. The safe company had contracted in each instance with a bank, hospital, or other institution to install at the destination point specially designed or assembled equipment in the building of the bank, hospital, or other institution to which the shipment was made. In all shipments, the safe company was both consignor and consignee. The President of Herring-Hall-Marvin testified that the company manufactures and assembles its products to fit specified dimensions, using to that end various standard types of cabinets, cases and desks.

As to the method of handling the shipments, appellant's employees entered the plant of the company and, after final adjustments and inspections had been made, took the goods, uncrated, to the van into which they were loaded, wrapped in pads, and secured with straps. After transporting the goods to the destination point, appellant's employees unloaded the shipments and took pieces indicated by markings to the number and floor where they were to be installed. The goods were there received by the shipper's employees and subsequently installed.

It would seem unnecessary to elaborate the testimony, except to say that there was nothing secretive in the actions of the appellant. In "Transport Topics" a national newspaper circulated among motor freight carriers and among officials of the Interstate Commerce Commission of January 18, 1954, appellant publicized the fact that it had obtained orders from the safe company for the transportation of a large number of van loads of the company's products. The products publicized were similar to those previously shipped, on which the informations here were based. Shortly after publication of that copy of "Topics," a district supervisor of the Bureau of Motor Carriers of the Interstate Commerce Commission notified appellant that the goods were, in his opinion, not "household goods", with the resultant that appellant had no authority to haul them.

At the trial, the testimony of the General Manager of a movers' trade organization, to the effect that in his opinion the shipments involved fell within the ambit of the second or third parts, or both parts, of the definition of "household goods", was offered by appellant but rejected by the court. In contrast, the testimony of the District Supervisor of the Commission was received in evidence.

Upon careful consideration of the entire record in the case, we fail to find any conflict in the evidence as to material controlling facts. In our view, the interpretation of the regulations in issue was a question of law for the court; and, therefore, there was reversible error in submitting the case to the jury.

It is true, as argued by appellee, that the construction placed by an administrative agency upon its regulations is entitled to great weight; but, it must be remembered, also, that it has long been recognized that in the construction of a penal statute, all reasonable doubts concerning its meaning must operate in favor of the accused. Harrison v. Vose, 9 How. 372, 50 U.S. 372, 378, 13 L.Ed. 179. Statutes creating crimes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused, and may not be held to...