State v. Williams, 58421

Decision Date30 June 1976
Docket NumberNo. 58421,58421
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Rasberry (NMN) WILLIAMS, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Walter W. Rothschild, Waterloo, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Earl W. Roberts, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and David J. Dutton, County Atty., for appellee.

Heard by MOORE, C.J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, REYNOLDSON and mc,CORMICK, JJ.

REYNOLDSON, Justice.

July 20, 1974, defendant Rasberry Williams fatally shot Lester 'lamp Light' Givhan in front of George's Pool Hall in Waterloo, Iowa. This daytime incident resulted from a quarrel over a claimed indebtedness and was witnessed by several persons, some of whom attempted to dissuade defendant. The facts surrounding the crime have no further significance: the only issues raised concern trial court's adverse rulings on defendant's motion for psychiatric examination at State expense, and his objections to the petit jury panel. We affirm his first degree murder conviction.

I. Should trial court have ordered a psychiatric examination at State expense.?

Defendant argues trial court's failure to provide him with a psychiatric examination constituted an abuse of discretion in depriving him of his statutory right under § 775.5, The Code, and violated his constitutional rights to effective counsel, due process and equal protection.

The constitutional rights of effective assistance of counsel and equal protection, preserved for an accused by both the federal and state constitutions, are implemented in Iowa by § 775.4 and § 775.5, The Code. State v. Campbell, 215 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Iowa 1974). We have consistenlty construed those statutes to carry out the constitutional objectives. See Schmidt v. Uhlenhopp, 258 Iowa 771, 140 N.W.2d 118 (1966) (defendant entitled to court-appointed counsel despite his mother's deposit of cash in lieu of bail); State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834, 844 (Iowa 1973) (appointed attorney is entitled to reasonable compensation); Woodbury County v. Anderson, 164 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Iowa 1969) (the court making the appointment determines the extent of the county's liability, leaving no discretion to the county officers); Furey v. Crawford County, 208 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 1973) (trial court's determination of reasonable compensation is reviewed in this court on original writ of certiorari).

In State v. Hancock, 164 N.W.2d 330, 332 (Iowa 1969) we said a court-appointed attorney should not be required to incur personal expenses in preparing and conducting a meaningful and conscientious defense for the accused. We there held trial court erroneously overruled defendant's application for funds to obtain an independent expert analysis of her handwriting for comparison with the allegedly forged check. Id. at 333.

We reversed again in State v. Campbell, supra, for trial court's refusal to provide a transcript of the trial of an alleged accomplice, stating, 215 N.W.2d at 229, the right to effective counsel 'means not only providing defendant with a lawyer; it also means providing that lawyer with the opportunity--in both time and tools--to perform his often onerous task competently and conscientiously.'

We held requests for such trial preparation assistance must be on a showing the expense was 'necessary in the interest of justice.' State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 1973); State v. Hancock, supra, 164 N.W.2d at 332. In a related decision based solely on equal protection we ruled no showing of necessity was required when the issue was the availability of a transcript of a pre-trial proceeding in defendant's case:

'(E)qual protection requires that a verbatim record be made of preliminary hearing at public expense, when timely requested by an indigent defendant, unless the State shows a record of sufficient completeness can otherwise be kept.'

--State v. Lewis, 215 N.W.2d 293, 295 (Iowa 1974).

Finally, in State v. McGhee, 220 N.W.2d 908, 913 (Iowa 1974) we articulated the definitive standard to be applied in considering an application for psychiatric evaluation. The McGhee standard, Inter alia, requires trial court to give considerable weight to the application but permits it to 'effect an objective evaluation * * * taking into consideration all relevant factors, including but not limited to (a) defendant's prior medical history as to any mental or emotional instability, (b) his past conduct, and (c) defendant's apparent mental state and demeanor as observed by the trial judge.' 220 N.W.2d at 913. We there said:

'If trial court, focusing upon needs of defense counsel, finds the application is reasonable then it should be granted, but if found to be frivolous, unreasonable or Without underlying factual support then a denial is in order.' (Emphasis supplied.)

--Id.

In this case defendant filed four applications for psychiatric evaluation. He concedes his first did not comply with the requirements of McGhee and was properly denied. The second application alleged counsel had learned defendant sustained a head injury 'approximately two years ago which they believe to be an important factor in defendant's alleged behavior.'

Upon defendant's written application the court made an in-camera inspection of defendant's medical and hospital records relating to this injury, then ruled defendant should be examined by Dr. Robert Kyle of Cedar Falls, his treating neurosurgeon, 'for an evaluation of his present condition, as it relates to any residual effect from the head injury sustained by said Defendant in June, 1968, particularly as the Defendant's present condition may relate to his ability to stand trial, to distinguish between right and wrong, to cooperate with and assist his counsel in his defense, and such other matters as may relate to Defendant's mental condition at this time and at the time the alleged criminal activity in this case occurred on or about July 20, 1974.'

Defendant never offered the report of this examination. We assume it was unfavorable. His 'Renewed Motion' for a psychiatric examination, filed a week later, reported, 'Dr. Kyle is unable to provide the information sought by Defendant's counsel.' This motion was denied for failure to comply with the McGhee guidelines.

The fourth motion again alleged defendant's head injury and counsel's belief defendant suffered mental disease on the basis 1) he was unable to recall certain events, 2) he behaved bizarrely, 3) his statements were frequently unrealistic, and 4) he failed to keep appointments.

At the hearing on the motion defendant did not appear in person. No evidence was introduced. Trial court's detailed, adverse ruling included the findings defendant's medical history and hospital records did not show a mental or emotional instability; Dr. Kyle's report was not submitted; defendant did not appear at the hearing, and allegations of the motion were conclusory as opposed to statements of specific facts.

The question here is close. However, we conclude trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the motion which, as in McGhee, 'dealt in conclusory allegations rather than factual statements which might have aided trial court in objectively effecting a decision.' 220 N.W.2d at 914.

In so ruling, we again advise trial courts (as we did in Williams, 207 N.W.2d at 106 and McGhee, 220 N.W.2d at 911) to consider carefully the federal statutes designed to implement the same constitutional safeguards, and specifically, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e).

II. Did trial court err in overruling defendant's objection to the jury panel?

Defendant's objections to the jury panel were based on the procedure used to prepare the jury list. The parties stipulated the evidentiary record made on submission of a similar motion in another pending criminal case should apply here.

On appeal defendant argues § 609.1(2), The Code, required the jury commissioners to select the list of jurors from the whole body of electors in the county and not from the registered voter list. He also asserts because deprived persons are less likely to vote, use of the registered voter list eliminates from jury service 'the poor, black, and other deprived minorities in society,' in violation of defendant's constitutional rights.

Section 609.1 relevantly provides:

'609.1 Jury lists. The appointive jury commission shall * * * prepare, select, and return * * * the following lists, to-wit:

1. Grand jurors. * * *

2. Petit jurors. A list of names and addresses of electors equal to oneeighth of the whole number of qualified electors in the county as shown by the election registers of the previous general election, from which to select petit jurors.

3. Talesmen. * * *'

In Buchmeier v. Pickett, 258 Iowa 1224, 1228, 142 N.W.2d 426, 428 (1966) we observed '(t)he meaning of 'electors' is not subject to arguments, it is a word of art which we have construed to refer to the definition in Article II, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution.' We ruled wherever the legislature employed the word 'elector' without qualification or explanation the word has reference to a person authorized by the constitution to exercise the elective franchise; that all voters must be electors, but the converse is not true. Id., 258 Iowa at 1228--1229, 142 N.W.2d at 429.

The record on submission of defendant's objections disclosed the jury commission did employ a print-out of the registered...

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