Lamb v. State

Citation243 S.E.2d 59,241 Ga. 10
Decision Date07 March 1978
Docket NumberNo. 33000,33000
PartiesRandall Ray LAMB v. The STATE.
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

On February 5, 1976, the appellant along with a male friend drank several beers, then went to a club in Atlanta, had another beer or two and then came back home and began to watch television. As he was watching the police drama, Barnaby Jones, he had a certain urge "to get his gun and blow somebody away." He took a .410 gauge shotgun from his closet, got some shells and went to the nearby home of Mrs. Sylvia Yancey. Looking through a window he saw her lying on the couch, raised his gun and fired it at her head. After he fired the gun, the appellant broke the window and went in the side door. As Mrs. Yancey attempted to get up from the couch, the appellant took the butt of the gun and hit her over the head several times, causing a fracture of the skull and exposure of the brain. When it seemed like she was still breathing, the appellant went to the kitchen, grabbed a couple of knives and made twenty-two stab wounds in her body. He then picked her up by her feet and threw her on the floor.

A subsequent autopsy revealed that Mrs. Yancey had suffered a shotgun wound to the top of her head, twenty-two stab wounds primarily on the left side of her body, and blunt force injury to the left side and back of her head. Medical testimony was that death resulted from a combination of blunt force injuries and the stab wounds; that the shotgun blast was not the immediate cause of death but would have eventually caused death if the other injuries had not intervened.

Mrs. Yancey's seventeen-year-old daughter, Shelley, who lived in the home with her, returned home about 10:30 p. m. that night and upon entering the home found her mother's body. Just at that time she received a telephone call from the appellant Lamb, who was a neighbor and friend. She advised him that something terrible had happened and that he must hang up so she could call the police. After she called the police the appellant called again and asked her if she wished him to come to the house. She replied that she did and the appellant immediately came to the scene. He checked Mrs. Yancey's pulse, ascertained that she was dead, and waited with Shelley until the police arrived. He appeared calm and did most of the talking to the police since Shelley was almost hysterical. The appellant remarked to the police that this was the most horrible crime he had ever It was discovered that Lamb had access to a .410 gauge shotgun and had indeed attempted to pawn it to a neighbor on the very day of the murder. After being fully advised of his rights Lamb confessed that he killed Mrs. Yancey. He led the officers to where he discarded the shotgun. The bloodstained gloves that the appellant wore and a spent shell casing were also recovered from his home. The appellant was 20 years of age at the time.

seen and that a person who would do such a thing should be "burnt." After taking a routine statement from the appellant and other neighbors, a police detective noticed a discrepancy in the timing of his call to Shelley and Shelley's call to the police. This and other discrepancies eventually caused the police to focus on the appellant as a suspect.

The appellant did not present any evidence at the guilt phase of the trial. His defense was insanity, premised essentially on the contention that there was no motive for the crime and that a sane, rational person would not perform such an act. The only possible motive disclosed by the record was Shelley's testimony that the appellant frequently called her on the telephone at 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning; that her mother objected to these calls; and that she had communicated her mother's displeasure to the appellant.

During the sentencing phase of the trial, the appellant presented several character witnesses.

1. During the voir dire examination the district attorney stated to prospective jurors that the State expected to introduce demonstrative evidence that the victim was shot, beaten and stabbed and inquired if this aggravated situation would cause any reluctance on the part of any of them to serve as a juror. No jurors were excused for this reason and the appellant assigns error on the basis that the statement was prejudicial to him.

In all criminal cases "both the State and the defendant shall have the right to an individual examination of each juror from which the jury is to be selected prior to interposing a challenge. . . . (I)n such examination the counsel for either party shall have the right to inquire of the individual jurors examined touching any matter or thing which would illustrate any interest of the juror in the cause, including any opinion as to which party ought to prevail, the relationship or acquaintance of the juror with the parties or counsel therefor, any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning or bias which the juror might have respecting the subject-matter of the suit, or counsel or parties thereto, and religious, social and fraternal connections of the juror." Code Ann. § 59-705.

We note that also during the voir dire examination the appellant's counsel questioned jurors as to whether or not any of them had ever been the victim of a crime, had their house burglarized, or ever had anything stolen from them, or anything of that nature.

These inquiries by the district attorney and defense counsel were professionally advanced and appear to be nothing more than an attempt to establish a basis for the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges during the jury selection. There is no indication of any effort to prejudice or inflame the passions of the jurors by either the district attorney or counsel for the appellant. Both the fact that a juror does not want to serve because of the nature of the offense and the fact that he has been the victim of a crime could arguably be taken as a "fact or circumstance indicating any information, leaning or bias which the juror might have respecting the subject matter of the suit."

The control of the voir dire examination is vested in the sound legal discretion of the trial judge and will not be interfered with by this court unless the record clearly shows an abuse of that discretion. We find no such abuse here. Pierce v. State, 231 Ga. 731, 204 S.E.2d 159 (1974).

2. The appellant enumerates error on the court allowing into evidence three photographs of the deceased, contending that The photographs were made during the autopsy and depict the extent and nature of the wounds suffered by the victim. The location of wounds is material to the issues in a homicide case and the trial court did not err in admitting them though there was other evidence from the examining physician as to the nature and location of the wounds. Floyd v. State, 233 Ga. 280, 283, 210 S.E.2d 810 (1974); Allen v. State, 231 Ga. 17(5), 200 S.E.2d 106 (1973).

the sole purpose of the photographs was [241 Ga. 13] to inflame the minds of the jurors and prejudice them against the defendant.

3. The court charged "I charge you that every person is presumed to be of sound mind and discretion, but the presumption may be rebutted." The appellant contends this was error in that it deprived him of his entitlement to a presumption of innocence, that it excused the state from its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that it afforded the state a presumption to which it was not entitled, that it denied the defendant his rights of due process, and that the charge was incomplete.

The appellant requested the following charge: "Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, I charge you that in every criminal case the presumption is that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the crime, and the burden of proof rests upon him to show to the contrary. He must show that, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury."

The charge as given included the presumption but was silent as to who had the burden on the question of sanity. The general charge included a charge as to reasonable doubt and in all discussion of the burden of proof in any manner it was made clear that the burden was on the state. Considering the charge in its totality we find that no burden was placed on the appellant or that any portion of the charge was burden-shifting. On the issue of sanity the trial court did charge as follows: "I further charge you, Ladies and Gentlemen, that the act itself may be so utterly senseless and abnormal as to furnish satisfactory proof...

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