Collins v. Nuzzo Jr

• Decision Date: 08 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-1776,00-1776
• Citation: 244 F.3d 246
• Parties: (1st Cir. 2001) GARY J. COLLINS, D/B/A CAR PLACE WHOLESALERS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. FRANK NUZZO, JR., JEANNE M. CHRISTIANO, MICHAEL MARCHESE, JOHN RAGUCCI, DAVID RAVANESI, GILBERT DELLISOLA, AND DAVID RAGUCCI, AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF EVERETT, Defendants, Appellees. Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 246

244 F.3d 246 (1st Cir. 2001)

GARY J. COLLINS, D/B/A CAR PLACE WHOLESALERS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. FRANK NUZZO, JR., JEANNE M. CHRISTIANO, MICHAEL MARCHESE, JOHN RAGUCCI, DAVID RAVANESI, GILBERT DELLISOLA, AND DAVID RAGUCCI, AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF EVERETT, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 00-1776

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

Heard February 8, 2001

Decided April 5, 2001

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Isaac H. Peres, with whom Ghioldi & Peres was on brief, for appellant.

John J. Cloherty, III, with whom John J. Davis and Pierce, Davis & Perritano were on brief, for appellees.

Before Selya, Lynch, and Lipez, Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

Gary Collins was once a used car dealer, operating a lot called The Car Place along the Revere Beach Parkway in Everett, Massachusetts. He did so by grace of a license from Everett's Board of Aldermen. Collins fell out of grace, having repeatedly violated the terms of his license, and his relationship with the Board was marked by acrimony and litigation. The Board in 1996 denied his application for a new annual license. Collins thought the Board was retaliating for his having sued them. To make matters worse in Collins's eyes, the new licensee who operated on Collins's old site was given more generous license terms.

Collins responded by filing this § 1983 suit against the Board in late 1996. The complaint alleged that the Board denied Collins's application arbitrarily and maliciously, partly in retaliation for his lawsuit, depriving him of his constitutional rights. One Board member, David Ravanesi, was singled out as having particular personal animosity against Collins and as having defamed him. In 1992 Collins heard that someone, he suspected Ravanesi, was spreading the word that Collins sold more than cars at the lot and Collins, understandably, did not like the suggestion he was selling drugs. Thus, he amended his complaint in 1997 to add a state law claim for defamation against Ravanesi.

Invoking the stringent standards for substantive due process and equal protection claims against public officials for denying licenses, the district court concluded that Collins's evidence did not meet the mark. The court reached the same conclusion on the retaliation claim. The court also concluded that Collins should have acted sooner on the defamation claims in light of the applicable statute of limitations, and rejected Collins's claim that the discovery rule excused his late filing. Summary judgment was entered against Collins. He appeals. The civil rights claims are easily disposed of, and we affirm. Application of the statute of limitations to the defamation claim in light of the discovery rule presents a closer question.

I.

On review of a grant of summary judgment, we "consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Thomas v. Eastman Kodak, 183 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1161 (2000).

The Massachusetts statute governing licenses for dealing in used automobiles provides that the licensing authorities of cities and towns "may grant" a license to a "proper person" to engage in the motor vehicle business if that "business is or will be his principal business" and he "has available a place of business suitable for the purpose." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 59. Licenses expire after one year. Seeid. Section 59 also provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved by any action of the licensing board" may appeal to a Massachusetts superior court within ten days of an adverse action. Id. The City of Everett has designated its Board of Aldermen to serve as its licensing authority under § 59.

In 1991, Collins first obtained a used car dealer's license from the Everett Board of Aldermen, permitting him to operate a lot in Everett. The license limited the lot to having fifteen cars for sale at one time. Collins's lot was called The Car Place. In late 1991, Alderman David Ravanesi became concerned that Collins was exceeding the fifteen car limit and, along with the Everett police, inspected Collins's dealership from time to time. A Massachusetts statute authorizes the Board to inspect licensees such as Collins for compliance with the license terms. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 66. The number of vehicles on Collins's lot at various times ranged from twenty-two to fifty-two, according to Everett police reports. Collins was called before the Board in December 1991 about his non-compliance with the terms of his license. At about the same time, several other used car dealers also were haled before the Board to answer for license violations.

In 1992, Collins applied to have his license renewed. The Board referred his application to an investigative committee, which monitored Collins's compliance. At a Board hearing on August 24, 1992, Ravanesi voiced his concern about the excessive number of cars on Collins's lot, and called Collins a "liar." Alderman Frank Nuzzo expressed interest in the possibility of a different business occupying Collins's lot, and Alderman David Ragucci criticized Collins for not "giving to the community." The seven member Board, by unanimous vote, denied Collins's application for several reasons, most of them related to his failure to comply with the license restrictions.

Collins appealed the denial and obtained a state court injunction preventing the City from issuing a cease and desist order against him, the usual aftermath of a denial of a license renewal. The injunction, which remained in force between 1992 and 1996, required Collins to comply with the fifteen car limit while the litigation was pending. The Board continued to monitor Collins and documented several additional violations.

The relationship between Collins and the Board remained publicly contentious. At Board meetings, some of the Aldermen discussed their frustration over the injunction and Collins's persistent violations of the license terms. Their comments were sometimes reported in the local newspaper. Ravanesi described the injunction as "preventing us from enforcing the rules and ordinances of this city" and stated that he was "sick and tired of watching this guy flaunt the law." Ravanesi later stated that he "[didn't] know of a sane judge who would issue such an order" and that he "want[ed] some action." Alderman Jeanne Cristiano expressed her displeasure over a letter Collins had written to the Board accusing it of being influenced by Ravanesi's personal animus toward Collins. Collins, too, voiced his displeasure over the situation and made some statements to the local paper.

In 1992, Collins learned from his attorney that someone was spreading rumors that Collins was selling "more than just cars" from his lot, statements which Collins took to mean that he was selling drugs from the lot. Collins suspected at the time that the statements were attributable to Ravanesi.

Collins interacted with Ravanesi occasionally at Board meetings and when Ravanesi visited his business. Collins also listened to two telephone conversations between Collins's attorney and Ravanesi. Collins never heard Ravanesi state that he disliked Collins or wanted to drive him out of business. At a meeting between Collins and Ravanesi arranged by Collins's attorney, Ravanesi told Collins he would vote in favor of Collins's license application if Collins complied with the license terms.

In 1995, the Massachusetts Superior Court, finding that Collins had exceeded the fifteen car limit imposed by his license, upheld as appropriate the Board's 1992 non-renewal of Collins's license, and dissolved the injunction. The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed, and the Supreme Judicial Court denied further appellate review in 1996. Collins v. Board of Aldermen, 664 N.E.2d 883 (Mass. App. Ct.), further review denied, 667 N.E.2d 1158 (Mass. 1996). The City of Everett then ordered Collins to cease conducting business as of July 31, 1996. This prompted Collins to file a new application for a used car dealer license. On October 15, 1996, the Board unanimously denied Collins's application for eleven reasons, including Collins's history of non-compliance and procedural rules requiring Collins to wait at least one year after a license denial before reapplying.

In November, 1996, the Board granted a license to another used car dealer, John's Auto Sales, Inc., to operate at the location formerly occupied by Collins's lot. John's license imposed an eighteen car limit, a three car increase from the restriction in Collins's license. The limit was later increased, in September 1997, to twenty-six.

In June 1997, Richard Barry, whom Collins previously did not know, told Collins that it was in fact Ravanesi who had made statements in 1991 accusing Collins of "selling more than cars out of that place," and that Ravanesi had also said that "everybody in the joint is a 'cokehead.'" Barry also reported Ravanesi as stating his intention to "boot him [Collins] right out of this City" and to "stomp him right out of business and bury him."¹

II.

Our analysis starts with the claims on which federal jurisdiction is based. We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Thomas, 183 F.3d at 47. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

A. Constitutional Claims under Section 1983

To sustain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Collins must show both: "(i) that the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and (ii) that this conduct worked a denial of...