People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 29 January 1969
• Docket Number: No. 41131,41131
• Citation: 41 Ill.2d 511,244 N.E.2d 197
• Parties: , 31 A.L.R.3d 920 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Willie E. WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 197

244 N.E.2d 197

41 Ill.2d 511, 31 A.L.R.3d 920

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Willie E. WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 41131.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 29, 1969.

Stanley A. Bass and Melvin B. Goldberg, Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and John J. Stamos, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and Oliver D. Ferguson, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellee.

HOUSE, Justice.

The sole question raised by this appeal is whether imprisonment of an indigent defendant to satisfy his fine constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law under the rationale of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891.

On August 16, 1967, defendant, Willie E. Williams, was convicted of theft of property not from the person and not exceeding $150 in value in a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County. The court sentenced him to one year imprisonment in the county jail and imposed a fine of $500, a maximum sentence for this offense (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 38, par. 16--1), and $5 costs. The judgment order provides that in default of payment of the fine and costs defendant should stand committed to jail to satisfy the fine and costs at the rate of $5 per day of imprisonment.

On November 29, 1967, defendant filed a petition under section 72 of the Civil Practice Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, c. 110, § 72, alleging under oath that he was indigent at all stages of the proceedings, that he was without counsel or funds to hire counsel at the trial and that he will be able to get a job and earn funds to pay the fine and costs if he is released from jail upon expiration of his one-year sentence. He prayed that the trial court vacate that portion of the order directing that he stand committed to jail in default of the payment of the fine and costs. The court denied the petition because of its legal insufficiency and defendant appealed directly to this court alleging that the denial of his petition deprived him of equal protection of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution.

The authority for imprisonment to enforce payment of a fine comes from section 1--7(k) of the Criminal Code of 1961. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 38, par. 1--7(k).) This section provides, 'Working out Fines. A judgment of a fine imposed upon an offender may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment entered in a civil action; Provided, however, that in such judgment imposing the fine the court may further order that upon non-payment of such fine, the offender may be imprisoned until the fine is paid, or satisfied at the rate of $5.00 per day of imprisonment; Provided, further, however, that no person shall be imprisoned under the first proviso hereof for a longer period than 6 months.'

The basis of defendant's equal-protection theory seems to find its origin in a dissenting opinion in Wildeblood v. United States (1960), 106 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 284 F.2d 592. It was there stated: 'When the person sentenced cannot pay the fine and is therefore imprisoned, the constitutional question arises. The answer seems clear. The cases on which the court (the majority opinion) relies were decided many years ago, (Ex parte Jackson, 1877, 96 U.S. 727, 24 L.Ed. 877; Bowles v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App.1943, 33 A.2d 629,) (Wampler, 1936, 298 U.S. 460, 56 S.Ct. 760, 80 L.Ed. 1283; Yeager v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App. 1943, 33 A.2d 629,) and the constitutional question does not appear to have been raised. More recently, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 'invidious discriminations' in the administration of criminal justice are unconstitutional. Griffin v. Illinois, 1956, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891; Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 1958, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269; Burns v. Ohio, 1959, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209. Specifically, the Court has held that 'There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.' Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891. Few would care to say there can be equal justice where the kind of punishment a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.' (284 F.2d 592, 594.) The majority in Wildeblood followed cases decided prior to Griffin wherein imprisonment for non-payment of a fine was permitted and simply stated, 'We do not think these cases are overruled by Griffin v. Illinois * * *.' 284 F.2d 592, 598.

In United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross (S.D.N.Y.), 239 F.Supp. 118, aff'd (2d cir.) 345 F.2d 533, cert. denied 382 U.S. 911, 86 S.Ct. 254, 15 L.Ed.2d 163, the issue raised in the Wildeblood dissent was again decided adversely to the indigent defendant. After noting that a defendant 'has no constitutional right that another defendant, no matter what his economic status, rich or poor, receive the same sentence for the same offense,' the court stated: 'No different conclusion is required by the line of cases beginning with Griffin v. People of State of Illinois. Those decisions making review of criminal convictions available to the indigent have not yet been construed to compel government, State or Federal, to eradicate from the administration of criminal justice every disadvantage caused by indigence.' (239 F.Supp. 118, 120--121.) In support of this statement the court cited 'Norvell v. State of Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 456 (1963); United States ex rel. Marshall v. Wilkins, 338 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1964) (no absolute right to appointment of counsel on habeas corpus petitions); United States ex rel. Combs v. Denno, 231 F.Supp. 942, 945 (S.D.N.Y.1964); Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965, 84 S.Ct. 1128, 11 L.Ed.2d 982 (1964) (may impose bail on those without funds); Pilkinton v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45 (8th Cir.1963); Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 219 (3d ed. 1962) (no right to appointment of counsel on petition for certiorari).' 239 F.Supp. 118, 121 n. 12.

In view of this holding in Kross which was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and to which a writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, we do not feel justified in holding that imprisonment of an indigent defendant to satisfy his fine constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment. Defendant urges us to follow the reasoning and holding of People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972, 218 N.E.2d 686. In that case, like this one, defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor and given the maximum sentence of one year of imprisonment and required to pay a fine of $500, the fine if not paid, to be served out at the rate of one day's imprisonment for each dollar remaining unpaid. The sentencing court knew defendant was without funds or property and was unable to pay the fine. The New York Court stated, 'We do not hold illegal every judgment which condemns a defendant to confinement if he does not pay his fine. We do hold that, when payment of a fine is impossible and known by the court to be impossible, imprisonment to work out the fine, if it results in a total imprisonment of more than a year for a misdemeanor, is unauthorized by the Code of Criminal Procedure and violates the defendant's right to equal protection of the law, and the constitutional ban against excessive fines.' 18 N.Y.2d 101, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975, 218 N.E.2d 686, 688.

A limitation similar to that used in Saffore was applied in Sawyer v. District of Columbia (D.C.C.A.), 238 A.2d 314, was there held that 'in every case in which the defendant is indigent, a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of a fine which exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed under the substantive statute as an original sentence is an invalid exercise of the court's discretion for the reason that its only conceivable...