Valley Steamship Company v. John Wattawa No 469 Valley Steamship Company v. Joseph Mraz No 470

• Decision Date: 21 May 1917
• Docket Number: Nos. 469 and 470,s. 469 and 470
• Parties: VALLEY STEAMSHIP COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. JOHN J. WATTAWA. NO 469. VALLEY STEAMSHIP COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. JOSEPH MRAZ. NO 470
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

244 U.S. 202

37 S.Ct. 523

61 L.Ed. 1084

VALLEY STEAMSHIP COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v JOHN J. WATTAWA.

NO 469.

VALLEY STEAMSHIP COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v. JOSEPH MRAZ.

NO 470.

Nos. 469 and 470.

Argued January 10 and 11, 1917.

Decided May 21, 1917.

Messrs. Tracy H. Duncan and Frank S. Masten for plaintiff in error.

Mr. George H. Eichelberger for defendants in error.

Memorandum opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds:

Number 469.

Seeking damages under the laws of Ohio, defendant in error, Wattawa, brought this action in the common pleas court of Cuyahoga county. He alleged that, by reason of the Steamship Company's negligence, he suffered personal injuries in September, 1913, while employed by it as a deck hand on the Edwin N. Ohl, then lying at Sandusky, Ohio; and that although an employer of more than five men, the company was not a subscriber or contributor to the state insurance fund provided for by the Act of May 31, 1911, the first Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act. In defense the company elaimed that, although employing more than five men, it was engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore was not required to subscribe to the state insurance fund; denied negligence; and alleged that the accident resulted wholly from the employee's want of care; and moreover, that he had assumed the risk. Upon motion the allegation as to assumption of risk was stricken out.

The court charged that as the company had not accepted the Compensation Act, it could not rely upon common-law defenses based on the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, or contributory negligence. Judgment upon a verdict for $5,200 was affirmed by the court of appeals, and petitions in error and for certiorari were denied by the supreme court.

We are asked to reverse the action of the court of appeals upon two grounds: First, because the company was engaged in interstate commerce and therefore could not be subjected to the Compensation Act without burdening such commerce, contrary to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Second, because article 3, § 2 of the Constitution extended judicial power to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and thereby rendered the general maritime law part of the Federal laws not subject to alteration by state statutes.

The first point relied upon is entirely without merit, and inadequate to support our jurisdiction. In the absence of congressional legislation the settled general rule is that, without violating the commerce clause, the...