Robinson v. Union Pacific RR.

• Decision Date: 13 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-1240,00-1240
• Citation: 245 F.3d 1188
• Parties: (10th Cir. 2001) ROBERT ROBINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, Defendant-Appellee, UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, Defendant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1188

245 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2001)

ROBERT ROBINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, Defendant-Appellee, UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, Defendant.

No. 00-1240

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

April 13, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO. (D.C. No. 99-K-841)

Jeffrey Menter, Littleton, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brenda J. Council and Conal L. Hession of Kutak Rock LLP, Omaha, Nebraska for Defendant-Appellee.

Before SEYMOUR, BALDOCK, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Robert Robinson appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant-appellee Union Pacific Railroad (UP) on his claim that Public Law Board 5914, convened under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 153 First (i), exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction in arbitrating his grievance against UP. The district court concluded that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board's decision. We have jurisdiction over Mr. Robinson's appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291, and we affirm.¹

I.

Mr. Robinson was employed as a hostler/engineer for Southern Pacific Lines,² when, on November 18, 1994, he caused an unauthorized reverse movement of a locomotive without prior warning. Following an investigation of the incident, Mr. Robinson's employment was terminated. On November 28, 1994, the United Transportation Union (UTU) filed a complaint with Southern Pacific on Mr. Robinson's behalf, seeking reinstatement and back pay and benefits for time lost. After some delay, Public Law Board 5914 (the Board) was convened pursuant to the mandatory arbitration procedures of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. 153 First (i), to consider Mr. Robinson's grievance of Southern Pacific's actions.

Following review, the Board found that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Robinson was guilty of the rules violation. Because of his sixteen-years' seniority and the fact that the incident did not pose a danger to any other worker, however, the Board concluded that Southern Pacific's termination of Mr. Robinson was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. The Board then ordered Mr. Robinson reinstated without back pay. In so doing, the Board reasoned that although Mr. Robinson's rules violation did not warrant termination, it did warrant a lengthy suspension, and that the period between his dismissal and his reinstatement would be sufficient.

On April 30, 1999, Mr. Robinson filed a complaint in federal district court against the Board, UP, and the UTU, presenting several claims involving the procedure and result of the Board's arbitration of his grievance. The district court struck Mr. Robinson's initial complaint and ordered him to file an amended complaint. Mr. Robinson complied, filing a second amended complaint on May 6, 1999. UP filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. UTU filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court entered an order granting UP's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Robinson v. Public Law Bd. No. 5914, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1272 (D. Colo. 1999).

On January 4, 2000, the district court granted Mr. Robinson's motion to file a third amended complaint, naming UP and UTU as defendants and asserting claims for a breach of duty and fair representation and petitioning for review of the Board's award. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court denied Mr. Robinson's motion for summary judgment, granted the summary judgment motions of UP and the UTU, and dismissed Mr. Robinson's petition for review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (D. Colo. 2000). Although the parties posit the issues on appeal somewhat differently, we determine that the only issue before this court is whether the district court erred in concluding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board's arbitration award.³

II.

Initially, we must determine our standard of review of the district court's decision. UP moved, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), for summary judgment, alleging that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. It is permissible to move under either Rule 12(b)(6) for dismissal for failure to state a claim or Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 for summary judgment when the moving party requests that the court consider materials outside the complaint. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 19 F.3d 514, 518 n.8 (10th Cir. 1994). When the motion to dismiss is grounded in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however, the motion must be brought under Rule 12(b)(1). Id. "Seeking summary judgment on a jurisdictional issue . . . is the equivalent of asking a court to hold that because it has no jurisdiction the plaintiff has lost on the merits." Id.

An exception exists, however "[w]hen[, as here,] subject matter jurisdiction is dependant upon the same statute which provides the substantive claim in the case." Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 259 (10th Cir. 1987). In such cases, the issue of jurisdiction and the merits of the case are considered to be intertwined. Id. Because we determine that the question of whether the Board exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction in interpreting the parties' collective bargaining agreement is both a jurisdictional issue and a substantive factual determination, and because the court relied on evidence outside the complaint, the motion was properly considered as one for summary judgment. See id. Mr. Robinson's burden of proof remains essentially the same--he "must present affidavits or other evidence sufficient to establish the court's subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1160 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999).

"We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard that would be used by the district court." Id. at 1160. We also review a claim of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Id. "Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, we presume no jurisdiction exists absent an adequate showing by the party invoking federal jurisdiction." Id.

III.

Under the RLA, employee grievances regarding termination are categorized as minor disputes and are to be resolved by arbitration. Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1972). In this case, the arbitrator was a special adjustment board as provided for in 45 U.S.C. 153 Second. The parties do not challenge the submission of this matter to the Board, or the manner in which the Board was selected.

Title 45, section 153 Second of the RLA provides that the Board's decisions "shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute." An adverse decision may be appealed to the federal district court on only three grounds: "(1) failure of the Adjustment Board to comply with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act; (2) failure of the Adjustment Board to conform, or confine itself to matters within the scope of its jurisdiction; and (3) fraud or corruption." Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 93 (1978) (citing 153 First (q)); accord Watts. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 796 F.2d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1986). In Sheehan, the Supreme Court stated, "[w]e have time and again emphasized that this statutory language means just what it says." 439 U.S. at 93. Likewise, this court has emphasized that this statutory standard of review "is among the narrowest known to the law." Watts, 796 F.2d at 1243 (quotation omitted). Of paramount importance to our decision here is our holding in Watts that "[t]he reviewing court is not to determine whether the Board's decision is correct, but may only consider its decision in light of the circumstances enumerated by the statute." Id. On appeal, Mr. Robinson asks the court to find the Board's decision to be incorrect and therefore outside its scope of jurisdiction. This we decline to do.

The Board's award was based on its interpretation of Article 34(J) & (M) of the parties' "Contract of Wages and Working Conditions." Article 34(J) states:

(J) In case discipline is found to be unjust, the fireman or hostler involved, if dismissed will be reinstated with full pay for the time he has been out of service. Full pay will mean one day's pay for each 24 hours at the rate pertaining to his class of service. If disciplines by demerit mark or reprimand, all such notations will be removed from his record.

Appellant's App at 27. Adopting a system of "Discipline by Record," Article 34(M)(1) & (2) state:

(1) The application of "Discipline by Record" in lieu of actual suspension will be hereafter applied to the following classes of employees:

. . . .

Hostlers and Hostler Helpers

. . . .

(2) Discipline will be maintained by Reprimands, Demerits and Dismissal. Record of Reprimands, Demerits or Dismissal will be made in accordance with the Investigation Rules of the various employee working agreements as heretofore, or as hereafter amended. A reprimand or record of Demerits, will not be entered in an employee's record without written notice to him.

Id. at 28-29.

Here, the Board found that although Mr. Robinson "acted carelessly, we do not find that anybody was endangered as a result of his failure to follow all the rules." Id. at 44. For this reason, and because Mr. Robinson had sixteen years' seniority, the Board concluded that UP's decision to terminate him was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. Id. at 45. The Board then ordered that Mr. Robinson be returned to full employment after being retrained, and that his discipline be a lengthy suspension equal to the time between his termination and his reinstatement. Id. The thrust of Mr. Robinson's argument on appeal is that the...