Smith v. State, 46174
| Citation | 245 So.2d 583 |
| Decision Date | 01 March 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 46174,46174 |
| Parties | Will Allen SMITH v. STATE |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
David H. Nutt, Prewitt & Braddock, Vicksburg, for appellant.
A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by John M. Kinard, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Will Allen Smith was convicted in the Circuit Court of Warren County upon an indictment charging him with the murder of Mildred Mae Glidewell. By its verdict the jury fixed his punishment at life imprisonment and accordingly he was so sentenced by the court. From that conviction and sentence he appeals.
The case is here for the third time. On appeal from the first conviction this Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The opinion of the Court is reported as Smith v. State, 198 So.2d 220 (Miss.1967). Upon retrial following that reversal, appellant was again convicted. Again he appealed and again this Court reversed and awarded a new trial. The opinion of the Court on the second appeal is reported as Smith v. State, 220 So.2d 313 (Miss.1969).
The present appeal is from appellant's third conviction on the charge. Upon each of his three trials, appellant's defense has been insanity at the time of the commission of the homicide. It is not contended that he was mentally incapable of standing trial. As on his two former appeals, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict. Two of the three assignments of error relate to this alleged deficiency. The first of these assignments is to the effect that the trial court was in error in overruling appellant's motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the evidence offered in chief by the prosecution. The second is that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
The facts of the homicide are set forth in considerable detail in the two former opinions of this Court, already mentioned, and will not be repeated here at length. It is enough to say that there is no question whatever that appellant shot and killed the decedent, a woman with whom he was enamored. Moreover, it is clear from the undisputed evidence in the record that the killing was premeditated and was murder, unless, at the time, appellant was insane. No defense other than insanity was interposed or suggested.
The record reflects that appellant was in love with the woman he killed, that he desired to marry her and that she had led him to believe and to expect that she intended to marry him. Appellant was older than Mildred Mae Glidewell, had been giving her money and other valuable gifts and was in the course of assisting her financially in obtaining a divorce from her husband in order that they might carry out their plans and be married. Three days before the homicide this woman informed appellant that she had changed her mind, would not marry him, and, in fact, was going to marry another man. On the day of the homicide appellant placed a pistol in a paper bag and drove to the restaurant where this woman worked as a waitress. Arriving there, he entered and had a conversation with a friend while he drank a coca cola. At that time the restaurant was crowded. He and the friend went out of the restaurant, stopped in front, and continued to converse with each other. At this time appellant seemed somewhat preoccupied and nervous and more talkative than usual. Meanwhile the restaurant cleared. Appellant went to his car and took from it the paper bag containing the pistol. Reentering the restaurant he walked up to the woman as she stood behind the counter and said to her 'Mildred, I hate to do this,' shooting her several times and killing her instantly. He then left the restaurant and drove to the county courthouse, where he told the officers what he had done and surrendered himself to them. At this time he was in a highly emotional state obviously overcome with remorse, and expressing a wish that he might be executed immediately for his crime.
At the conclusion of the state's case appellant's motion for a directed verdict was made and overruled. He then proceeded with his defense. Two psychiatrists testified for appellant as experts and stated that in their opinion he had been insane at the time of the shooting. After appellant had rested and closed, in rebuttal the state called a psychiatrist who was a member of the staff of the Mississippi State Hospital (for the insane) where the appellant had been sent for examination. This witness testified as an expert regarding the hospital staff's examination of the appellant and its findings with respect to his mental condition. When the state had rested and closed its case appellant's motion for a directed verdict of not guilty was not renewed.
Appellant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict has been made and has been rejected by this Court on each of the two former appeals. The thrust of appellant's argument on this point is that the jury was bound to accept the expert opinions of the two psychiatrists who testified for him upon the issue of insanity. The opinions of these experts were, of course, competent and relevant to the issue. However, uncontradicted evidence before the jury acquainted the jurors with the conduct of the appellant before, at the time of, and subsequent to the homicide. In the context of appellant's relationship with the woman he killed, and in the light of evidence of his having been cast off by her in favor of another man, the evidence was more than ample to support a finding by the jury that appellant's act was motivated by jealousy and affronted vanity. These have been classic motives for murder since the dawn of recorded history and bring the case within a well known pattern of human behavior. But neither has been considered as excusing or justifying homicide. Appellant's preparations for the homicide show clearly a premeditated and reasoned design. In carrying it out, particularly the bringing of the pistol into the restaurant concealed in the bag after waiting for the restaurant to clear, his remarks and conduct before and at the time of the shooting, reflect an understanding of the wrongful or illegal character of his act. This is strongly supported by the fact that he subsequently sought out the officers and surrendered himself to them. His emotional state and expressions of remorse also support the view that he knew the nature and consequences of his act and knew that it was wrong. It was the prerogative of the jury, and it was its duty, to consider all of this evidence. The jury was not deprived of the right to use common sense or of applying the lessons of human experience in resolving the question of whether the appellant had or had not...
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